Abstract
I will outline the so-called nativist position as it relates to language. While this debate has a long history, the data on which we can now draw is much richer and more varied than that available when the issues were first articulated and then debated in the â60s and â70s. Similarly the research context is radically different: behaviourism is no longer as dominant as it once was, Linguistics and Cognitive Science are much more theoretically mature and diverse, sporting a rich array of subdisciplines and perspectives. Along the way, some arguments have proved richer and more sustainable than others and indeed, in my opinion, the nativist position has shifted over the years. In some sense, it might be fair to ask whether the field has outgrown the debate and whether it is still as polarizing as it once was. This paper attempts to outline a nativist position by looking at the fundamental research questions that define it. Nativism is one possible coherent way of navigating through these questions; other routes through them may be possible. Consequently, there may be new spaces for rapprochement between different linguistic disciplines but which are often concealed by our scientific discourses.
Highlights
I will start by outlining a number of research problems that have underpinned a fundamental research thrust in Linguistics
The brain can be studied with CT and (f)MRI imaging, it can be modelled with Bayesian networks among many others, it can be studied through experimental behavioural studies, and its functioning can be affected by chemicals and drugs
Calabretta (2007), who develops a theory of the evolution of modularity itself. She argues that such learning in undifferentiated networks is subject to âneural interferenceâ and âgenetic interferenceâ which can be reduced if the learning network is inherited through sexual reproduction: âentrusting the task of finding the neural network architecture to evolution and that of finding the network connection weights to learning is a way to completely avoid the problem of genetic interferenceâ (Calabretta 2007: 403)
Summary
I will start by outlining a number of research problems that have underpinned a fundamental research thrust in Linguistics. What may be thought of as Humboldtâs Problem (Chomsky 1965, 1986) (section 3) considers what constitutes knowledge of language This question can be answered in two ways: (i) what do we, as linguists and cognitive scientists, know to empirically constitute language (section 3.1) and (ii) what theoretical tools, systems and structures are required to explain those facts (section 3.2). Whether these systems are considered to be âknowledge of languageâ in an intrinsic or extrinsic sense depends on whether one considers them to be real or not. For the non-specialist reader, I will explain what this means as it becomes relevant
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
