OTTOMAN MAPS FROM THE SECOND HALF OF THE 19TH CENTURY AS A SOURCE FOR THE HISTORY OF RAILWAYS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

The success of implementing any developmental plan is related to the progress achieved by the country in the field of local competition within the country itself. Also, to build a strong and broad base of local suppliers, as well as creating a high awareness and continuous requirements of the domestic consumer, making adoption of sound economic reform program, which, in turn, accelerates economic development, which is located within the priorities of the national plans. So, this study has made an explanation of the concept of economic reform, its main objectives, its success factors and the obstacles to its application. The study showed that there are several strategic approaches to achieve the economic reform program include the totalitarian approach, which considers the economic reform as an integral part of the political, economic and social situations, and launches towards economic development and reform in the framework of a comprehensive strategy. Also, there is the partial approach that launches towards reform via the gradual reform and considers reform as a restoration process of the constituent parts of update inputs, such as increased productivity, achieve a measure of economic and social equity, establish new knowledge and develop the institutions of production and services. The study concluded that the program of economic reform in Egypt and the Arab world has not achieved its objectives for many reasons such as not taking into account the economic and material dimension, the social dimension, the legal dimension, and the cultural dimension. For the economic development, it has not achieved its goals as a result of lack of a clear plan for economic reform program, productive variety, unemployment, specialization; legislations support market, the economic entity of local ruling, the intermediary institutions between the state and the market, the structure of information and communications, the international trade and export and finally, the elite of management. The success of implementing any developmental plan is related to the progress achieved by the country in the field of local competition within the country itself. Also, to build a strong and broad base of local suppliers, as well as creating a high awareness and continuous requirements of the domestic consumer, making adoption of sound economic reform program, which, in turn, accelerates economic development, which is located within the priorities of the national plans. So, this study has made an explanation of the concept of economic reform, its main objectives, its success factors and the obstacles to its application. The study showed that there are several strategic approaches to achieve the economic reform program include the totalitarian approach, which considers the economic reform as an integral part of the political, economic and social situations, and launches towards economic development and reform in the framework of a comprehensive strategy. Also, there is the partial approach that launches towards reform via the gradual reform and considers reform as a restoration process of the constituent parts of update inputs, such as increased productivity, achieve a measure of economic and social equity, establish new knowledge and develop the institutions of production and services. The study concluded that the program of economic reform in Egypt and the Arab world has not achieved its objectives for many reasons such as not taking into account the economic and material dimension, the social dimension, the legal dimension, and the cultural dimension. For the economic development, it has not achieved its goals as a result of lack of a clear plan for economic reform program, productive variety, unemployment, specialization; legislations support market, the economic entity of local ruling, the intermediary institutions between the state and the market, the structure of information and communications, the international trade and export and finally, the elite of management.

Selections from The Fight for National Cinema, by Halit Refiğ Translated by Melis Behlil (bio) and Esin Paça Cengiz (bio) Halit Refiğ’s The Fight for National Cinema (1971) is a collection of essays on cinema in Turkey written between 1965 and 1971.1 Although Refiğ started his career as a critic, by this time he had become an established filmmaker himself, with a filmography ranging from melodrama to social realist film. Refiğ describes his book as an attempt to scrutinize the identity of Turkish cinema—its existence and substance—and argues that intellectuals in Turkey despise this cinema, particularly as a result of their unconditional admiration for the West and its culture, including the cinema of the West.2 For Refiğ, cinema in Turkey can be considered an extension of traditional Turkish arts. And because the film industry in Turkey had grown by the mid-1950s to be one of the largest in the world, despite the lack of formal state support or private investment, purely as a result of people’s interest in watching local productions, Turkish cinema, to Refiğ, has the potential to create a “national cinema.” Refiğ conceptualizes this potential as bringing to the fore a cinema “that is separate from Western cinema and can counter it, and relies on a shared historical culture where the Turkish element plays a dominant and unifying role.”3 From this standpoint, Refiğ conceptualizes popular cinematic practices in Turkey at the time as “people’s cinema,” whereas alternatives aiming to depart from these are designated as “national cinema.” He does so not only by delving into a discussion of the film industry’s economic structures but also by raising questions about culture, national specificity, and the Westernization processes exercised in the declining years of the Ottoman Empire and then in the early years of the Republic of Turkey. At the same time, he tackles the narrational strategies [End Page 1] films adopt and their resemblance to traditional Turkish arts, as well as trends and movements in world cinema. Although Refiğ takes a somewhat excessive nationalistic approach in the book, we as film scholars find his work extremely significant. This is not only because The Fight for National Cinema is one of the first attempts to open up a theoretical discussion on popular cinema in Turkey and deviations from it; we also see his book as one of the early examples of addressing the question of national cinema in a broader context, before national cinema became a substantial topic in film studies. In this respect, Refiğ’s book and the segments we selected from it for translation in this issue raise vital questions about what constitutes national cinema in relation to stylistic, artistic, and economic trends, and about the possibility of a national “specificity” that responds to theoretical discussions, in terms of both Turkish cinema and national cinema in a broader context. To provide readers with a better understanding of the selections from The Fight for National Cinema, it will be useful to introduce the political, economic, cultural, and cinematic contexts in which Refiğ’s conceptualizations came into existence and in which they functioned. As with other national contexts, the nation-building process in Turkey was based on a denial of particular versions of the past, particular views of religion and diverse cultures, communities, and ethnicities. In this respect, Feroz Ahmad notes that Turkey did not rise phoenix-like out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, as is often suggested: “It was ‘made’ in the image of the Kemalist elite, which won the national struggle against foreign invaders and the old regime” and founded the Republic of Turkey in 1923.4 To achieve the ideal of a secular and modern state, and at the same time underscore the break with the Ottoman legacy, the founders of the republic embarked on a program of political, economic, and cultural reforms. These reforms encompassed the abolition of the Ottoman sultanate and the office of the caliphate, changes in headgear and dress to match Western fashions, and the closure of religious convents and dervish lodges. Religious titles and tribal and clan names were proscribed, and citizens were required to take up surnames instead...

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes D. Acemoglu, S. Johnson and J. Robinson, 'The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation', American Economic Review 91 (Dec. 2001). Economist Intelligence Unit, 'Country Profile: Algeria' (2000). Figures in this essay are also taken from El Watan, 2001–02. Algerian daily newspaper and IMF reports are cited elsewhere. G. Joffe, 'The Role of Violence within the Algerian Economy', Journal of North African Studies 7/1 (Spring 2002) pp.29–52. See R. Abdoun, 'Un bilan du programme de stabilisation économique en Algerie', Les Cahiers du CREAD 46–47 (1999) pp.27–42; A. Benachenhou, 'Bilan d'une réforme économique inachevée en Méditerranée', Les Cahiers du CREAD 46–47 (1999) pp.67–88; IMF, 'Algeria: Article IV Consultation', Country Report No.01/162 (2001). See F. Z. Oufriha, 'Ajustements structurel, stabilisation et politique monétaire en Algerie', Les Cahiers du CREAD 46–47 (1999) pp.177–94. See O. Blanchard et al., Reform in Eastern Europe, Report of the Wider World Economy Group (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1990); D. Gross and A. Steinherr, Winds of Change: Economic Transition in Central and Eastern Europe (London: Longman 1996); OECD, Reforming the Economies of Central and Eastern Europe (Paris: OECD 1992); OECD, Transition to a Market Economy in Central and Eastern Europe (Paris: OECD 1992); World Bank, The Transformation of Economies in Central and Eastern Europe: Issues, Progress and Prospects (Washington, DC: Socialist Economies Unit, World Bank 1991). K. Nashshibi and P. Alonso-Gamo, 'Algeria: Stabilisation and Transition to the Market', IMF Occasional Paper 165, Washington, DC, 1998. W. Easterly and R. Levine, 'Tropics, Germs and Crops: How Endowments Influence Economic Development', NBER Working Paper 9106, Aug. 2002. See note 6. For more on external trade, see S. Kebier, 'Le commerce exteriéur et son financement après les réformes', Mémoire de Magister, Université d'Alger, 2002. See Fulvio Attinà's contribution to this volume, pp.150–51, note 1. European agricultural products receive $39bn a year in direct subsidies. See note 6. See A. Benhalima, Le systèm bancaire algérien: Textes et réalites (Algiers: Edition Dahlab 1997). For more on the politics of credit in Algeria, see D. Touati, 'Objectifs et limites de la politique de crédit en Algérie, 1971–2000', Mémoire de Magister, Université d'Alger, 2002. See N. Berkane, 'La politique Monetaire en Algerie, 1986–1996', Mémoire de Magister, Université d'Alger, 2002. See P. Bofings, 'The Role of Monetary Policy in the Process of Economic Reform in Eastern Europe', Discussion Paper No. 457, Centre for Economic Policy Research, London, 1990. See K. Akacem and A. Keddi, 'L'Euro: la monnaie européenne unique', Les Cahiers du CREAD 55 (2001) pp.103–18. See A. Bouyacoub, 'Entreprises publiques, ajustement structurel et privatisation', Les Cahiers du CREAD 57 (2001) pp.75–92; F.Z. Oufriha, 'L'assainissement des entreprises publiques algeriénnes', Les Cahiers du CREAD 46 (1998); R. Frydman and A. Rapaczynski, 'Privatisation in Eastern Europe: Is the State Withering Away?', Finance and Development 30/2 (June 1993); Clemens Schutte, Privatisation and Corporate Control in the Czech Republic (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishers 1999); I. Werenfels, 'Obstacles to Privatisation of State Owned Industries in Algeria: The Political Economy of a Distributive Conflict', Journal of North African Studies 7/1 (Spring 2002) pp.1–28. With an exchange rate of $1 = 70 DZD. Commission de l'Union Européene/Algerie, Algérie: Document de stratégie 2002–2006 et programme indicatif national 2002–2004 (Bruxelles: Partenariat EURO-MED 2002). See B. Bartlet and T.P Roth, The Supply-Side Solution (London: Macmillan 1984).

Unlike the Hungarians, who had agreed on a programme of economic reform two years before it was implemented, China's economic reforms evolved in the midst of bitter debates and controversies. Typically, unfavourable developments in the economy would trigger off opposition to the economic reform, expressed in theoretical disagreements; meanwhile the reform programme would have to mark time to await theoretical clearance. It was not until October 1984, six years after the reforms first began, that the Chinese leaders finally formulated a model or programme of economic reform in a formal decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).1 There are three reasons for this extraordinarily long gestation period. First, the reforms began as a series of localised experiments which were later adopted by central authorities. There was no direct relationship between the local experiments in Sichuan where Zhao Ziyang, now Premier, was at the time First Secretary of the provincial Party and the national reform programme.2 The Sichuan initiatives placed overwhelming emphasis on enterprises rather than on unified planning control, whereas in the national discussion those economists and central leaders in charge of research and propaganda still dealt with reform of the planning system in terms of pre-Cultural Revolution thinking. Second, the economic reforms were initiated at a time when the national economy was in a state of macro-economic and structural imbalance. This called for economic readjustment (retrenchment) and cast doubt on the immediate relevance of the economic reform. The ensuing debate on whether economic readjustment should

This paper assesses the performance of the monetary policy in Egypt during the periods following the introduction of the economic reform and structural adjustment program (ERSAP). It sets out to answer the question why the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) has not been able to achieve the goal of price stability under the ERSAP? The study compares the economic performance from the 1990s with both its counterpart in Germany, during the same periods, and with the economic performance of the Egyptian economy during the periods before the 1990s, i.e., 1975-1990. The study concludes that the CBE could have brought the rate of infl ation down; nevertheless, the unemployment and real GDP growth rates have worsened and a price stability is still far away. The failure to achieve price stability is explained by two reasons, namely, a conflict between monetary policy objectives and a chronic budget deficit financed by issuing new money.

Chapter seven studies the diluted economic and political reforms that emanated from the resilience of the effendi social contract—between the mid-1980s and the January 2011 Uprising—regardless of official state attempts to launch a new social contract. The chapter first examines the growing academic and public discourse of despair over the future of the middle class, beginning in the late 1980s. It then studies how the contours of an existing effendi social contract have shaped the partial implementation of the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment program since the 1990s. The chapter further examines an implied exchange (or pendulum swing) in reforms between efforts at the neoliberalization of the economy and official attempts at democratization. Meanwhile, an informal economy and informal political practices tacitly filled the gap between the dissolving effendi social contract and the unfulfilled new social contract. The chapter concludes that the effendi social contract, despite its many deficiencies and the constant calls for its change, turned out to be highly stable. Economic and political reforms could not move forward as envisioned, because all sides to the existing social contract had too much to lose.

Османи на трьох континентах, пер. з турецьк. О. Кульчинського

Recent proposals in the US and elsewhere aim to tackle climate change and socioeconomic inequalities together through a Green New Deal (GND). GND proposals have been criticized by high-profile advocates of carbon-centric climate policies—advocates who do not perceive socioeconomic inequalities to be significant drivers of climate change and who argue that GNDs' wider agenda will undermine decarbonization efforts. Here, we show that socioeconomic inequalities drive emissions-intensive consumption and production, facilitate the obstruction of climate policies by wealthy elites, undermine public support for climate policy, and weaken the social foundations of collective action. This suggests that integrating certain carbon-centric policies into a wider program of social, economic, and democratic reforms would achieve decarbonization more effectively than carbon-centric policies alone. We show that common policy components of GNDs do indeed tackle the causal mechanisms by which inequalities fuel climate change, and we argue that GNDs enable more effective political strategies than carbon-centric policies.

Economic Reform and DemocracyCan The Middle East Compete? Henri Barkey (bio) Reforming stagnant, inefficient, and backward economies like those found throughout most of the Middle East with the aim of integrating them into a dynamic and expanding international market is a difficult endeavor. Adding political liberalization to the agenda results in a truly Herculean task. Yet economic reform and political liberalization are intimately linked. The countries of the Middle East are finding themselves under increasing domestic and international pressure to achieve progress along both of these dimensions. Although authoritarian regimes may initiate economic reform programs, their ultimate success depends not only on reductions in the size and role of the state but also—and to an even greater extent—on the development of pluralist politics. In most of the countries of the Middle East, particularly in the Arab world, it is the incumbent political regime that constitutes the greatest obstacle to both political and economic reform. The much discussed question of sequencing—that is, whether economic reform brings about democracy or vice versa—is not addressed here. Rather, this essay argues that even when authoritarian regimes such as those in power in the Middle East manage to initiate economic reform, its extent and duration are determined more by political considerations than by economic rationality. As a rule, political leaders are moved to implement economic reforms by one or more of the following conditions: 1) balance-of-payments crises, often accompanied by severe indebtedness; 2) runaway inflation and consequent dislocations in domestic production; 3) pressure exerted [End Page 113] by international financial institutions and powerful capitalist states, typically in the form of a refusal to extend any new loans; and 4) a decline in the state’s capacity to extract revenues from its citizens through taxation. In most developing societies beset by such difficulties, the first stage of reform consists of measures designed to redress macroeconomic imbalances. Devaluing the national currency, cutting budget deficits, freeing some prices, and generally opening up the economy are all examples of stabilization measures that have been successfully implemented by authoritarian as well as democratic regimes. The case of Chile under the dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet (1973–90) is often cited as evidence that authoritarian regimes may be better equipped than democratically elected governments to handle the initial stage of economic reform. Yet the record here is mixed. The patronage networks, rent-seeking behavior, and tendency to fall captive to narrow interests that are characteristic of many authoritarian regimes may all serve to derail reform efforts. What an authoritarian regime clearly cannot manage without fundamentally changing its character is the second stage of reform. This stage consists of institutional changes such as the development of stock markets; the liberalization of labor markets; the revamping of social security, social services, and retirement systems; large-scale privatizations, especially of state banks; the restructuring of state enterprises; the encouragement of competition within the domestic private sector; and the establishment of a coherent regulatory framework. Such second-stage tasks entail a major transfer of power from the state to civil society—a civil society that is weak or nonexistent in authoritarian states. The efficient functioning of capital and labor markets requires free flows of accurate information and the decentralization of financial resources. Democratic regimes are clearly more effective than authoritarian ones at generating and distributing unbiased information. Most important, every step that an authoritarian regime takes along the path of the second stage of reform limits its direct control over individuals and groups and is thus a nail in its own coffin. This means that whether or not an economic reform program progresses beyond the initial stage is a political decision. If real competition is allowed—as opposed to a rent-seeking simulacrum of capitalism featuring a tame, state-dependent bourgeoisie and a government that seeks to forestall political opposition through the strategic distribution of goods—then both an efficiently functioning market and a vigorous democracy are a good bet to emerge. In postcommunist Eastern Europe, a consensus in favor of real reform has sprung from the association of command-style economic practices with a repressive political system. In Latin America, the zeal for reform is rooted in...

The recent economic crisis in Sri Lanka has had a devastating impact on each economic sector, and the construction sector is no exception. Hence, the Sri Lankan government has entered into an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to perform an economic reform programme to uplift the country from its insolvent position. However, there is a lack of studies on the impact of economic reforms on the construction industry. Hence, this research aims to identify the impacts of the current economic reform programme of the Sri Lankan government on the construction sector. A comprehensive literature review was conducted to understand the economic crisis, the economic reform programme and its impact on Sri Lanka. Further, under the qualitative research approach, 20 semi-structured interviews were conducted with the experts in the construction sector selected through purposive sampling. The collected data was analysed through code-based content analysis using N-Vivo software and manual content analysis. According to the findings, import restrictions, increased material prices and fuel shortages were highlighted as the major challenges faced by the industry, which led to project terminations, staff turnover, increased construction costs, and bankruptcies. Further, IMF programme objectives such as restoring macro economy, ensuring debt sustainability, establishing export-driven economy and emphasising anti-corruption are appreciated by the experts while highlighting the need for more objectives to be included in future revisions. . Findings of this study can be utilised by the government to improve its reform programme in future to safeguard the construction industry.

This article hypothesizes that economic reforms become sustainable when the discursive conditions prevailing in society tip against the existing paradigm under exceptional circumstances. Thus, unless the pro-liberalization constituencies dominate the development discourse, economic reforms, initiated under the exigencies of crisis and conditionalities, or carried out by a convinced executive with or without the stimulus of a crisis, will be reversed. The discursive conditions are determined based on eight factors: the dominant view of international intellectuals, illustrative country cases, executive orientations, political will, the degree and the perceived causes of economic crisis, attitudes on the part of donor agencies, and the perceived outcomes of economic reforms. The paper seeks to prove this “discursive dominance” hypothesis for the Indian case through a cross-temporal, comparative review of the evolution of economic policy in India over six different phases.

The purpose of this paper is explained the concept of economic reform programmes and macro-economic performances were generally seeking the combativeness of the economic system, the satisfaction of demands, solvency of state and the welfare of citizens. An overview of the economic reform programme has become a global phenomenon in the world adopted by many developing countries in a trisection economy in the last two decades. Most of the previous socialist and even communist, economies, began the trend towards partial, or complete economic reform. Indeed, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the newly-independent countries in Africa, the Middle East and Latin America, all came to realise the importance of economic reform programmes. Accordingly, within the last fifteen years most developing countries have implemented similar programmes, in line with recommendations and support from global organisations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. It was argued that the key target of any economic reform programme represents the rate of economic growth and increase per-capita income in order to enhance the welfare of the economic society as a whole. This paper’s result will be useful in reaching policy decisions to develop financial markets to increase economic growth in developing countries or/ emerging economies, in general, and within Libya, in particular. Furthermore, providing empirical evidence regarding this critical issue within specific emerging economies will add to the literature on economic reform related to the macro-economic indicators and its influence on economic growth and, thus, initiate an exciting topic for the paper.

Since embarking on its comprehensive programme of economic and political reform, China has experienced extraordinary wealth and growth. By 2007, some 20 Chinese companies were ranked as the world’s largest companies according to the Fortune Global 500 list (Lodge, 2007), giving a clear signal that Napoleon’s “sleeping dragon” has woken and will be soon spitting fire. Concurrently, the governance structures (gongsi zhili) of Chinese enterprises have also undergone a significant transformation, whilst maintaining long established political and cultural features, namely active government ownership and strong family networks. In fact, the heart of Chinese economic reform is the redesign of corporate governance whilst simultaneously defending the essence of the “Chinese nature.” It can be said that the government-led reform of corporate governance has been a major aspect of China’s economic transition. In response to the State Council’s withdrawal from direct intervention in the economy and change of role to one of acting as a regulatory authority (Qian and Wu, 2000; Ngok and Zhu, 2007), the emerging corporate governance paradigm is fashioned from the Anglo-America model of a market-determined legalistic framework (Tam, 2002). Despite that, China continues to adopt a quasi two-tier board structure, loosely designed on the German system, consisting of a board of executive directors and a supervisory board (Clarke and Du, 1998).KeywordsCorporate GovernanceIndependent DirectorChinese Communist PartySupervisory BoardBoard SizeThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

More than thirty African countries are now attempting simultaneously to liberalize their political systems and reinvigorate their economies with stabilization and structural adjustment programs. The classic question of the ability of democratic forms of government to sustain economic reform has therefore taken on new urgency in sub-Saharan Africa. However, analyses of the relationship between regime type and economic management have not been very illuminating. In particular, many have tried to understand the relationship between democracy and economic growth across a very broad range of countries instead of focusing on the specific problems faced by African countries that are trying to democratize. In this paper we identify the salient features of African political systems and economies that are relevant in understanding the relationship between regime type and economic performance. By examining a set of countries that have much in common (poverty, recent independence, few institutionalized democratic practices), we hope to make more useful generalizations about the interaction between economic and political reform.' We conclude that the simultaneous pursuit of economic and political reform in Africa will be even more difficult than in most other regions of the world. Indeed, many of the factors that normally might promote the viability of simultaneous change are missing in Africa.

On the eve of the tenth anniversary of its democratization, Korea was hit by an unprecedented financial crisis marked by massive capital outflows, a sharp depreciation of the won and severe distress in the corporate and financial sectors. Korea's anniversary gift from the interntional community was an IMF conditionality program that imposed a comprehensive package of neoliberal economic reforms. Compared with the South American and East European experiences, economic reform in Korea has been implemented without significant policy obstructions, political instability or social disruptions. Despite much skepticism, the backbreaking reforms quickly began to pay off. The reforms created a V-shaped (rather than U-shaped) pattern of recovery, though more determined financial and corporate restructuring is needed in order for the nation to achieve sustainable growth. And, the quality of democracy has not deteriorated because of conflicts resulting from the economic reform program (neither, however, has it improved).