Optimizing stakeholder collaboration in prefabricated construction: a tripartite evolutionary game approach

PurposeOwing to multiple superiorities to traditional counterparts, prefabricated construction (PC) has gained increasing attention worldwide. The development of PC projects reflects the effects of both policy supervision and PC practice, which aids the government in reasonably identifying the key issues of PC's promotion and rationally improving the policy deployment. However, existing studies fail to address this aspect, especially lacking quantitative exploration. This study explores the micro mechanism of PC's promotion, from the perspective of developing PC projects.Design/methodology/approachA tripartite evolutionary game model based on prospect theory of the government, developers and contractors is constructed. After rigorous theoretical deduction, this study adopts Changchun in China as a case city and collects the data using the Delphi technique, policy documents and literature analysis.FindingsResults indicate that contractors are generally willing to implement PC projects and the government chooses to actively supervise PC's promotion. The negative investment behavior of developers is the main obstacle to promote PC in Changchun currently.Practical implicationsThe conclusions are applicable to other comparable regions. This study is of value to promote PC with high efficiency and effect.Originality/valueThe tripartite evolutionary game model based on prospect theory proposed in this study is conducive to reveal the essence of PC's promotion. This is an important breakthrough in extant studies, with a broad applicability in the PC domain beyond China.

PurposeCurrently, many studies have shown an increasing interest in owner-dynamic capabilities (ODCs). Existing studies mainly focus on the dynamic capability basis and capability development within the owner organization, whereas they rarely analyze the capability mobilization within the network of participants in megaprojects. Therefore, this study aims to explain the interaction and evolution of the mobilization strategies of ODCs and the cooperative strategies of other participants.Design/methodology/approachThis study develops a tripartite evolutionary game model to analyze the evolutionarily stable strategy of the owner, the reciprocal participants and the general participants. Results are numerically simulated with a validation case. The asymptotic stability of multiple group strategies is discussed under the replicator dynamic system.FindingsThis study suggests that resource complementarity significantly reduces the difficulty of mobilization. Moreover, these strategies are only effective with sufficient ODCs. The results indicate that reciprocal participants are more sensitive to the change in resource complementarity.Originality/valueThis study provides strategic guidance for mobilizing ODCs in megaprojects to better embrace uncertainty and stress, contributing to the dynamic capability literature with an evolutionary game approach. And new insight for the study of reciprocity preference in megaprojects is also provided.

Performance appraisal is a key link in the performance payment mechanism of government-paid Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects. As the performance appraisal of PPP projects is highly professional and complex, it is usually necessary to introduce a third-party performance appraisal institution to evaluate the project outputs of the private investor. However, driven by economic rent, the private investor has the incentive to seek rent from the third party in the performance appraisal process, leading to the low overall performance level of PPP projects and the inability to achieve the PPP performance appraisal goal effectively. To explore how to avoid rent-seeking in performance appraisal and improve the overall performance of government-paid PPP projects, a tripartite evolutionary game model between the behaviour, third party, and the public sector has been constructed. Based on the evolutionary game model, this study analyses the evolutionary stability of each player's strategy, discusses the influence of various factors on the strategy selection of the three-party, and further analyses the stability of the equilibrium point of the three-party game system. The findings reveal that the public sector can slow down the rent-seeking behaviour of the private sector by setting up a reasonable reward and punishment mechanism. The design of a reasonable reward and punishment mechanism must meet the following conditions: (1) the sum of the reward and punishment of all parties is greater than the speculative income; (2) the amount of performance fee withheld for the private investor is greater than the difference between the project operating cost saved and the speculation cost. The research provides technical support for the design of the performance appraisal mechanism of government-paid PPP projects.

The intelligent connected vehicle (ICV) industry encounters substantial challenges related to technology, policies, and funding. Its development relies not only on the close collaboration and technological innovation between carmakers and technology companies but also on the support of government’s incentive policies. Therefore, this paper establishes a tripartite evolutionary game model that involves governments, carmakers, and technology companies to investigate the stability equilibrium strategy of multi-party participation in promoting the development of the ICV industry. In addition, by analyzing relevant regulations and company annual reports, this paper conducts a simulation analysis to examine how government incentive policies and benefit distribution mechanisms impact the evolutionary trajectory. Several insightful and practical conclusions are drawn. First, in the early stages of industrial development, the government’s infrastructure investment could promote the cross-border innovation cooperation between carmakers and technology companies, thereby accelerating the advancement of ICVs; however, the long-term impact of the sustained investment remains limited. Second, the incremental government subsidies for carmakers and technology companies within limits could increase the probability of them choosing to cooperate and innovate with each other. Still, the excessive subsidies could result in unstable industry growth. Finally, the increase in the benefit distribution ratio for carmakers with professional technology in automotive technology and vehicle design has a positive effect on the development of the ICV industry. This paper expands the research scope of ICVs and provides theoretical insights for promoting the sustainable development of the ICV industry from policy and market viewpoints.

IntroductionAddressing the issue of land abandonment in rural areas is a critical strategy for ensuring national food security and promoting high-quality agricultural and rural development.MethodsBased on the assumption of bounded rationality, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model involving three key stakeholders: farmers, village collectives, and local governments. By integrating system dynamics, we simulate and analyze the behavioral strategies of participants, examining the mechanisms of government regulation. Additionally, we explore the moderating role of agricultural social services and further investigate the impact of incentive and penalty measures.Results(1) under specific constraints, the system evolves toward the optimal equilibrium (1,1,1); (2) government policies influence the strategic choices of farmers and village collectives, with excessively high or low incentive and penalty measures proving ineffective in mitigating land abandonment; (3) compared to incentives, penalty measures exhibit a more substantial impact on addressing land abandonment; (4) enhancing agricultural social services can strengthen the effectiveness of incentive and penalty policies.DiscussionBased on these results, the paper offers policy recommendations from four perspectives: regulatory reform, the integration of incentives and penalties, flexible subsidies, and enhanced collaboration among key stakeholders, thereby providing both theoretical insights and practical guidance for addressing land abandonment.

Tripartite evolutionary game analysis of governance mechanism in Chinese WEEE recycling industry

Ensuring the rational and orderly circulation of medical supplies during a public health emergency is crucial to quickly containing the further spread of the epidemic and restoring the order of rescue and treatment. However, due to the shortage of medical supplies, there are challenges to rationalizing the allocation of critical medical supplies among multiple parties with conflicting interests. In this paper, a tripartite evolutionary game model is constructed to study the allocation of medical supplies in the rescue environment of public health emergencies under conditions of incomplete information. The game’s players include Government-owned Nonprofit Organizations (GNPOs), hospitals, and the government. By analyzing the equilibrium of the tripartite evolutionary game, this paper makes an in-depth study on the optimal allocation strategy of medical supplies. The findings indicate that: (1) the hospital should reasonably increase its willingness to accept the allocation plan of medical supplies, which can help medical supplies allocate more scientifically. (2) The government should design a reasonable reward and punishment mechanism to ensure the rational and orderly circulation of medical supplies, which can reduce the interference of GNPOs and hospitals in the allocation process of medical supplies. (3) Higher authorities should strengthen the supervision of the government and the accountability for loose supervision. The findings of this research can guide the government in promoting better circulation of medical supplies during public health emergencies by formulating more reasonable allocation schemes of emergency medical supplies, as well as incentives and penalties. At the same time, for GNPOs with limited emergency medical supplies, the equal allocation of emergency supplies is not the optimal solution to improve the efficiency of emergency relief, and it is simpler to achieve the goal of maximizing social benefits by allocating limited emergency resources to the demand points that match the degree of urgency. For example, in Corona Virus Disease 2019, emergency medical supplies should be prioritized for allocation to government-designated fever hospitals that are have a greater need for medical supplies and greater treatment capacity.

A tripartite evolutionary game study of low-carbon innovation system from the perspective of dynamic subsidies and taxes

How can the recycling of power batteries for EVs be promoted in China? A multiparty cooperative game analysis

This study aims to analyze how wage structure and individual ability affect practitioners' participation in primary healthcare. This study employs a mixed moral hazard and adverse selection model to analyze the optimal performance-based wage for general practitioners under separating and pooling equilibrium. Subsequently, we utilize tripartite evolutionary games to analyze the dynamic process of participation strategies to the primary health care with high-and less experienced practitioners. Our study yields four main findings: (1) Under an effective separating equilibrium, high-quality practitioners receive information rent, and there is no distortion at the top, while less experienced practitioners face allocation distortion. (2) When the performance risk of less experienced practitioners is greater than or equal to that of high-quality practitioners, reducing the performance risk of less experienced practitioners is an effective method of increasing their performance wage. Conversely, when the performance risk of less experienced practitioners is less than that of high-quality practitioners, and they can transform into high-quality practitioners by increasing education costs, they will be incentivized to continue as general practitioners, provided there is a precise promotion mechanism. (3) If reforms are made to the wage structure in primary healthcare, an effective approach is to increase the proportion of the floating part. This would lead primary healthcare institutions to choose contracts under separating equilibrium, encouraging high-quality practitioners to participate in primary healthcare and less experienced practitioners to improve their abilities by increasing education costs. However, the proportion of the floating part in the wage structure should not be excessively large. (4) The effective cost of medical resource utilization influences the wage structure, and establishing reasonable upper and lower limits for performance wages can effectively increase the incentive for high-quality practitioners to participate in primary healthcare. For the first time, our study employs a tripartite evolutionary game model to analyze the development of the general practitioner system. We analyze how the reform of the wage structure can encourage more practitioners to participate in primary healthcare. Our findings can lay the theoretical foundation for subsequent empirical analyses. Moreover, our findings provide theoretical assistance for government decisions and healthcare institutions.

As over 80% of global trade relies on maritime transport, and container shipping accounts for more than 90% of the total value of maritime trade. The research on collusion strategies in a monitored container transport chain based on a tripartite evolutionary game, which this paper tackles, is a very interesting topic as an application of game theory. In today’s world where global supply chains are becoming more complex, understanding the strategic interactions between the parties involved in container transport (shippers, carriers, port operators, etc.) is an essential task for improving logistics efficiency and realizing a fair competitive environment. This study investigates the strategic interactions among container terminals, liner enterprises, and Port Authorities under regulatory supervision, revealing two critical regimes. Firstly, when fines fall below regulatory costs, collusion persists despite lax supervision, stabilizing the system at a suboptimal equilibrium regardless of penalty-subsidy combinations. Secondly, when fines exceed costs, an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) emerges if the total penalty-subsidy value undercuts collusion profits; otherwise, cyclical instability occurs as regulators oscillate between enforcement and relaxation due to fiscal constraints. Numerical simulations validate these dynamics, demonstrating how cost-profit thresholds govern strategic outcomes. Using a tripartite evolutionary game model and numerical simulations, we demonstrate how cost-profit thresholds govern these strategic outcomes. Our findings highlight the necessity of designing penalty structures that simultaneously ensure regulatory cost recovery and neutralize collusion incentives, providing actionable insights for maritime policymakers to balance deterrence effectiveness with enforcement sustainability in container shipping markets.

In light of the reality that supply chain finance is plagued by credit risk, this study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving financial institution, small and medium-sized enterprise (SME), and core enterprise to analyze the credit risk in the case of accounts receivable factoring. The micro-mechanism of how blockchain mitigates the credit risk of supply chain finance is analyzed by comparing the changes in the system’s evolutionary stability strategy before and after the introduction of blockchain. Numerical simulation is also conducted to verify the system’s evolutionary stability strategy. The results reveal that whether the traditional supply chain finance business produces credit risk depends on the amount of accounts receivable, the income obtained by SME and core enterprise when maintaining the stability of the supply chain, and the default income and default cost of both. After the introduction of blockchain, a strict regulatory environment increases the default cost of enterprises in the supply chain. Therefore, the system strictly converges to the Pareto-optimal solution of financial institution accepting financing applications, core enterprise repayment, and SME compliance. In addition, the decrease in the amount of accounts receivable held by a single SME can accelerate the convergence of the tripartite evolutionary game to equilibrium after the introduction of blockchain. Thus, blockchain can effectively mitigate the credit risk that financial institutions face while conducting supply chain finance business. Our research provides theoretical support for optimizing credit risk management in supply chain finance using blockchain.

Existing research suggests that government regulation and firm self-discipline are the primary factors in achieving effective product quality regulation. Building on previous research, this study examines the role of employees as participants in quality regulation. We construct a tripartite evolutionary game model involving employees, government, and firms to analyze the impact of employee whistleblowing on product quality regulation. The results indicate that the effectiveness of employee whistleblowing in monitoring enterprises and governments is influenced by government accountability, the severity of administrative penalties, and media exposure. We further analyze two channels of influence of whistleblowing incentives on government and firm behavior. Finally, the impact of whistleblowing on governments and firms is examined and confirmed through case analyses of typical quality incidents in emerging markets, including the Changsheng vaccine incident in China and the Ranbaxy quality incident in India. Our study fills a research gap by constructing an evolutionary game model to analyze the impact of employee whistleblowing incentives on government and firm behavior, supported by case studies from emerging markets, and provides theoretical insights for policymakers in designing effective participation mechanisms that combine rewards, protection, accountability, media coverage, and administrative sanctions.

The garbage classification recycling policy is proposed to curb the waste of recyclable and land resources to reduce the environmental pollution caused by garbage. This paper establishes a tripartite evolutionary game model with governments, recycling companies, and citizens as stakeholders to discuss their corresponding strategic behaviors. Through the stability analysis, we draw a conclusion that only when governments choose to regulate the classification, while both recycling companies and citizens take an active part in the classification, can the environmental benefit be maximized. In addition, the government and recycling companies are advised to increase the rate at which the evolutionary game model converges to a steady state by reducing their own operating costs during the implementation of garbage classification. On this basis, we also recommend an appropriate increase in the benefits given to citizens, which will have a significantly positive impact on citizens and even also on the government and the recycling companies themselves.

Since existing studies primarily explore green development measures from the static perspective of a single airport stakeholder, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model to analyze the strategic choices of three key stakeholders: airport authorities, third-party organizations, and government departments, based on evolutionary game theory. By solving the stable strategy of the tripartite evolution using the Jacobian matrix, the green transition of airport development can be divided into three stages: “initiation”, “development”, and “maturity”, allowing for the exploration of key factors influencing the green transition of airport development. A simulation analysis is conducted based on real Guangzhou Baiyun International Airport data. The results indicate that the tripartite evolutionary game strategy is stable at E4(0,0,1) and the green transition of Baiyun Airport remains in the development stage. By improving the reward and punishment mechanisms of government departments, the evolutionary game strategy can be stabilized at E8(1,1,1), promoting the green transition of airport development toward the mature stage. By adjusting the game parameters, the dynamic process of green transition in airports at different levels of development and under varying regulatory environments can be effectively captured, supporting the precise formulation of corresponding policies.