Optimal Tenure of Elected Public Officials

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Previous articleNext article No AccessOptimal Tenure of Elected Public OfficialsJames D. Adams and Lawrence W. KennyJames D. Adams Search for more articles by this author and Lawrence W. Kenny Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Law and Economics Volume 29, Number 2Oct., 1986 Sponsored by The University of Chicago Booth School of Business and The University of Chicago Law School Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/467121 Views: 18Total views on this site Citations: 26Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1986 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Yacov Tsur Political tenure, term limits and corruption, European Journal of Political Economy 128 (Jan 2022): 102166.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2021.102166Daniel J. Smith, George R. 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Eric Schansberg AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF CONGRESSIONAL TERM LIMITS, Economic Inquiry 32, no.11 (Jan 1994): 79–91.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1994.tb01313.xJohn R. Lott, W. Robert Reed Shirking and sorting in a political market with finite-lived politicians, Public Choice 61, no.11 (Apr 1989): 75–96.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00116763Edward J. López Term Limits 1, (): 880–881.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-306-47828-4_197