Optimal supply chain green innovation and subsidy strategy: producer subsidy versus consumer subsidy

Abstract

PurposeConsidering two types of subsidies for producers (supplier and manufacturer) and one for consumers based on product greenness and sales quantity, this study aims to formulate optimal supply chain green innovation and subsidy strategies, and to achieve this goal with the support of information systems.Design/methodology/approachThis study introduces a composite green-product supply chain where suppliers focus on green innovation for component greenness and manufacturers focus on green innovation for manufacturing process greenness. Game theory modeling is applied to investigate the differences of product greenness, supply chain members’ profit and social welfare under different government subsidy strategies.FindingsIncreasing the unit greenness subsidy coefficient can boost product greenness and supply chain members’ profits, but does not always raise social welfare. When the government exclusively offers subsidies to producers, subsidies should be allocated to suppliers when there is a significant disparity in supply chain green innovation costs. Conversely, it is more beneficial to subsidize manufacturers. Consumer subsidies have the potential to enhance both environmental and economic performance in the supply chain compared with producer-exclusive subsidies, but may not always maximize social welfare when supply chain members have low unit costs associated with green innovation.Originality/valueThis study examines the optimal decisions for green supply chain innovation and government subsidy strategies. Supply chain members and the government can use the information system to collect and evaluate the cost of upstream and downstream green innovation, and then develop reasonable collaborative green innovation and subsidy strategies.