Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of consumer preferences on the intensity of competition for companies in a duopoly market. A classical Hotelling’s competition problem will be different if consumers are allowed to distribute non-uniformly. New results in competition intensity are established and conditions for the existence of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is identified through a model that considers generic distribution in consumer preferences. A competition strategy is demonstrated to depend on the signs of local change rates of the density function at the endpoints of market segments.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
