Abstract
This paper studies an unreliable M/G/1 retrial queue with Bernoulli preventive maintenance, in which the server may break down while providing service to customers. Before the start of each service, the server is subjected to preventive maintenance with a certain probability, which extends the lifetime of the server. If arriving customers find the server unavailable, they decide to balk or enter the orbit based on the linear reward-cost structure. First, the stationary distribution of system states and some important performance measures are derived. Then, we investigate the equilibrium joining strategies of customers in both cooperative and non-cooperative cases, respectively. Next, the optimal pricing strategy is considered from the perspective of the social planner. Finally, numerical examples are provided to illustrate the influence of system parameters on customer equilibrium joining probabilities and the optimal pricing strategy.
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