Abstract
A simple fishery model is developed with legal and illegal markets for fish, the latter market being combated by enforcement efforts put forth by a social regulator. In response to enforcement, violators undertake avoidance activities to escape detection. The possible impacts of illegal activity on optimal fishery management are then explored, and some policy implications are suggested. Concurrently, optimal regulation is calculated when: (a) only legal surplus is maximized versus (b) when both legal and illegal surplus is maximized. The rationale for these two regimes and their divergence in optimal management policies is outlined.
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