Optimal Defensive Strategy for Power Distribution Systems Against Relay Setting Attacks

Abstract

Improving the cyber security of critical protection devices is of paramount importance for reducing the impact of cyber attacks on power distribution system. This paper proposes a game-theoretic approach to identify the optimal defensive strategy and scheme to minimize the impact of relay setting attack on power distribution systems. To this end, two types of attacks, namely active and passive relay setting attacks (RSA), are introduced and modeled as the potential threats to the protection relays. The active RSA impacts the distribution system immediately, while passive RSA disrupts the relay coordination and escalates the outages resulted from future system faults. The optimal budget allocation problem for strengthening the security of relays is modeled by formulating the interaction between the defender, the attacker and the distribution system operation as a tri-level optimization problem, which is then cast into a single-level operation and a bi-level defender-attacker problem. The bi-level problem is further reduced to an expected energy loss minimization problem using an auxiliary constrained parameter. The proposed approach is tested on the IEEE 123-node test feeder, the results of which exhibit the effectiveness of the proposed model on determining the most vulnerable relays and reducing the expected energy not served.