Abstract
The increasing penetration of plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs) may cause a low-voltage problem in the distribution network. In particular, the introduction of charging stations where multiple PEVs are simultaneously charged at the same bus can aggravate the low-voltage problem. Unlike a distribution network operator (DNO) who has the overall responsibility for stable and reliable network operation, a charging station operator (CSO) may schedule PEV charging without consideration for the resulting severe voltage drop. Therefore, there is a need for the DNO to impose a coordination measure to induce the CSO to adjust its charging schedule to help mitigate the voltage problem. Although the current time-of-use (TOU) tariff is an indirect coordination measure that can motivate the CSO to shift its charging demand to off-peak time by imposing a high rate at the peak time, it is limited by its rigidity in that the network voltage condition cannot be flexibly reflected in the tariff. Therefore, a flexible penalty contract (FPC) for voltage security to be used as a direct coordination measure is proposed. In addition, the optimal coordinated management is formulated. Using the Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) 69-bus test distribution network, the effectiveness of the coordination was verified by comparison with the current TOU tariff.
Highlights
Plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs) have been attracting interest as an alternative solution to manage the increasing amount of CO2 emission
It should be noted that more time is consumed in case B than other cases, which means that the problem becomes more difficult as the charging station is located further from the main substation
This study proposes an flexible penalty contract (FPC) for voltage security as a coordination measure between the distribution network operator (DNO)
Summary
Plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs) have been attracting interest as an alternative solution to manage the increasing amount of CO2 emission. The intermediate entity does not have any responsibility for the stable and reliable operation of the distribution network, unlike the DNO, but the entity aims to maximize its profit with a proper method for managing the PEV charging demand [14,15,16,17] This conflict of interest can be mitigated by various types of coordination measures. The hundreds of PEVs in the charging station can significantly drop the voltage of the following bus in the same feeder as well as the bus where the station is located For this reason, this study suggests a flexible penalty contract (FPC) as a coordination measure, which is designed to induce the CSO not to compromise the voltage conditions of the distribution network.
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