Abstract

While it has repeatedly been observed that pastoralist resource governance systems tend not to conform to the assumptions and principles of mainstream scholarship on property rights and governance of commons, coherent theoretical reasons why this is the case are less common. One exception is the concept of open property regimes . This view holds that the quintessential features of dryland pastoralist systems—limited and highly variable rainfall, low resource density, mobility, and institutions and norms that emphasize flexibility and access—can result in pastoralist herders dynamically distributing and redistributing themselves across a territory without the assumed benefit of clear boundaries or of collective decision-making and rules. However, the open property regimes explanation describes some pastoralist systems better than others. This paper argues that some pastoralist systems are neither conventional commons nor open property regimes. Instead they tend reflect another model, referred to here as a complex mosaic regime , in which there is gradation of strength and clarity of exclusionary property rights over different resources, in which property rights are often unbundled and allocated to different actors and governance mechanisms, and in which a prominent role is played by social processes and governance mechanisms other than property rights institutions. Social and biophysical characteristics that may be more conducive to complex mosaic regimes than to open property systems, particularly if all of those characteristics are found together, include a severe and chronic shortage of one or more critical resources, spatial heterogeneity of resources, scalar heterogeneity of interests, and a herd mobility pattern that involves occasional convergence on highly valued key resource areas. In elaborating the complex mosaic regime model, this paper addresses a blind spot in scholarship on property rights and commons, deepening the understanding of why pastoralist systems tend not to conform to mainstream theory, as well as helping to explain some of the differences among pastoralist systems. Understanding the internal logic of alternative resource governance regime models and the social-ecological conditions that make one model more viable than another can help to guide national policies and the strategies of conservation and development actors.

Highlights

  • In mainstream conceptualizations of land tenure and governance of common pool resources, effective resource management is normally assumed to require secure, enforceable tenure over resources

  • Instead they tend to reflect another model, referred to here as a complex mosaic regime, in which there is gradation of strength and clarity of exclusionary property rights over different resources, in which property rights are often unbundled and allocated to different actors and governance mechanisms, and in which a prominent role is played by social processes and governance mechanisms other than property rights institutions

  • This paper argues that some pastoralist resource governance systems are neither conventional commons nor open property regimes, but rather correspond to a model referred to here as complex mosaic regimes in which there is a gradation in strength and clarity of property rights over different resources, in which property rights are often unbundled and allocated among various institutions and governance actors, and in which governance mechanisms and social processes other than property rights play a prominent role in land and resource governance

Read more

Summary

Introduction

In mainstream conceptualizations of land tenure and governance of common pool resources, effective resource management is normally assumed to require secure, enforceable tenure over resources. Two recent exceptions are based on the concepts of open property regimes (Moritz 2016) and sovereign pastoral commons (Behnke 2018) The latter explanation suggests that in many pastoralist systems the securing of access to a large territory, and an inclusive and flexible approach to group membership which builds the political and military strength needed to secure that territory, are prime concerns. These priorities take precedence over some of the characteristics normally assumed to be fundamental to effectively governed commons, such as clearly defined group and territorial boundaries and the existence of rules to prevent overuse of resources. In elaborating the complex mosaic regime model, this paper addresses a blind spot in scholarship on property rights and commons, deepening understanding of why pastoralist systems tend not to conform to mainstream theory, as well as helping to explain some of the differences among pastoralist systems

Ways in which pastoralist systems do not conform to mainstream thinking
Complex mosaic regimes
Traditional Borana resource governance
Differences among pastoralist systems
Conclusion
Literature cited
Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.