Abstract
Using a principal-agent framework, this paper argues that the level of contacts or control between parties and their MEPs depends on the costs and benefits of such control for national parties. Based on interviews of party officials carried out in 2004 – 2005, the paper shows how in Finland the electoral system impacts on relations between parties and MEPs. The open-list system works against active control of MEPs, as the party leadership has – despite centralized candidate selection procedures – fairly limited incentives to influence MEPs' work.
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