On the Relation between Moral, Legal and Evaluative Justifications of Pre-Implantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD)

Abstract

In Germany the question whether to uphold or repeal the judicial prohibition on Pre-implantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD) is being debated from quite different standpoints. This paper differentiates the major arguments according to their reasons as a) moral, b) evaluative (i.e. cultural/religious), and c) legal. The arguments for and against PGD can be divided by content into three groups: arguments relating to the status of the embryo, focusing on individual actions in the implementation of PGD, and relating to the foreseeable or probable consequences of PGD. In Germany, from a legal perspective, the status of the embryo does not permit the intervention of PGD; from a purely moral perspective, a prohibition on PGD does not appear defensible. It remains an open question, however, whether the moral argument permitting PGD should be restricted for evaluative (cultural) reasons. The paper discusses the species-ethical reasons, for which Jurgen Habermas sees worrisome consequences in the wake of PGD to the extent that we comprehend it as the forerunner of a 'positive eugenics'. It would so disrupt the natural preconditions of our universal morality. The question of whether to prohibit or allow PGD is not merely a question of simple moral and/or legal arguments, but demands a choice between evaluative, moral and (still to be specified) species-ethical arguments, and the question remains open.