On the Problem of Clarifying Commitment Theory

Abstract

O ne of ways in which sociology advances is through development of an hypothesis and testing of it empirically. The result of such empirical testing may be an acceptance, rejection, or casting of doubt on hypothesis. Once an hypothesis has been tested empirically, other theorists or empiricists (or both) may feel compelled to respond to results of empirical test. Such is an ideal type of sociological research and, happily, is one which is being followed in case of Howard Becker's (1960) theory of commitment. In brief, Becker contends that greater number of investments (side-bets), greater commitment. In recent study by authors (Ritzer and Trice, 1969a) this theory of commitment was tested on sample of personnel managers. The results indicated that there was little or no support in that study for side-bet theory of commitment (Ritzer and Trice, 1969b). Stebbins in his critique of our study has attempted to point out an area of conceptual confusion in our study as well as in theorv of commitment. Despite limitations in Stebbins' critique, this process of theory development, empirical test, and rejoinder has promise of greatly advancing theory of commitment. As Stebbins makes clear, commitment has, in his opinion, two dimensions: value commitment and continuance commitment. Value commitment consists of series of defined or of certain costs or which tell us what attracts an individual to given Continuance commitment, on other hand, arises not from presence of rewards, from presence or imminence of subjectively defined penalties associated with attempt or desire to leave specific position. Further, these penalties may also be the absence of obtainable only, or most efficiently, in incumbent identity. Stebbins feels that Becker's side-bet theory is concerned with continuance commitment, but we in an innocent and facile error misunderstood this and tested, instead, value commitment of personnel managers. This is Stebbins' major critique of our study and we should like to respond to it. As outlined in our study we asked our respondents whether they would leave their organization (or occupation) for variety of reasons. From answers to these questions we constructed commitment to organization score which could range from 5 (low commitment to organization) to 25 (high organizational commitment). Since, in constructing this score, we asked respondents if they would leave their organizations for more pay, freedom, status, responsibility, or opportunity, Stebbins concludes that since these are rewards we are really measuring value commitment. In fact, we are not dealing with either value or continuance commitment, but with end result of both. The commitment scores computed tell us how committed personnel manager is to his organization, not how he became committed. He may be committed because of or because of presence or imminence of penalties, but whatever reason, he is committed to some degree to his organization and it is merely this degree of commitment which we are measuring in our dependent variable. Stebbins is clearly talking about process of becoming committed, while we are focusing on result of this process. That Stebbins is thinking about process is implicit in his definition of two dimensions in which he talks of a frame of mind that arises from . and a psychological state that arises not from . Although Stebbins makes an interesting, and