On the Perils of Engaging

While much research has examined the correlates of climate change beliefs from an alarmist perspective, less work has systematically measured climate change skepticism. This study aims to create a comprehensive tool capturing climate skeptics' beliefs and test its association with individual difference variables. 502 European adults completed a 22-item questionnaire on climate change (CC) skepticism as well as measures of ambiguity tolerance, belief in a just world (BJW), dark-side personality traits, and self-esteem. Principal components analysis revealed a four dimension structure of CC. Political ideology was the most consistent and significant predictor across the climate change skepticism factors. Dark-side traits, also played a role. Future research should further validate this measure and explore how climate change information could be tailored to different audiences. Understanding the nuances and causes of climate skepticism can enable more effective communication to promote sustainability.

In his article, ‘Social constructionism and climate science denial’, Hansson claims to present empirical evidence that the cultural theory developed by Dame Mary Douglas, Aaron Wildavsky and ourselves (among others) leads to (climate) science denial. In this reply, we show that there is no validity to these claims. First, we show that Hansson’s empirical evidence that cultural theory has led to climate science denial falls apart under closer inspection. Contrary to Hansson’s claims, cultural theory has made significant contributions to understanding and addressing climate change. Second, we discuss various features of Douglas’ cultural theory that differentiate it from other constructivist approaches and make it compatible with the scientific method. Thus, we also demonstrate that cultural theory cannot be accused of epistemic relativism.

Ecofeminism purports that sexist ideology and climate change denial are related, as prejudice, and its desire for power and nonuniversalism, create a disregard for both. In three studies we examined the associations between hostile and benevolent sexism with climate change denial. The first study (n = 270) demonstrated that hostile sexism explained unique variance in climate change denial over and above two strong predictors of prejudice and climate change denial, social dominance orientation and right‐wing authoritarianism. The second study (n = 294) reports on the significant indirect effects of willingness to make sacrifices for the environment on the relation between hostile/benevolent sexism and climate change denial. The third and final study (n = 514) found significant indirect effects of hostile and benevolent sexism, as well as willingness to make sacrifices for the environment, on the relation between power and climate change denial. Universalism demonstrated direct effects with climate change denial when benevolent sexism and willingness to make sacrifices for the environment were taken into account; direct and indirect effects were found when hostile sexism and willingness to make sacrifices for the environment were considered. Our findings provide support for a strong relation between hostile sexism and climate change denial and suggest underlying psychological processes that may represent paths through which climate change attitudes could be indirectly modified.

How can we build a reliable and affordable energy supply based on renewables? How rapidly do we need to cut greenhouse gas emissions to keep climate change within manageable bounds? What does it take to maintain a stable common currency of different nations?

Understanding the differences between climate change deniers and believers’ knowledge, media use, and trust in related information sources

The Copenhagen climate summit in 2009 was a watershed moment in the international climate change discourse, reinforcing controversy and polarization between climate sceptics and climate activists. Simultaneously, the blogosphere, known as a place for polarized mobilization, became a proliferating forum for both camps. Building on Dryzek’s and Carvalho’s conceptualization of environmental discourse, this paper analyses how ideological polarization is grounded in climate sceptics’ and climate activists’ blogs between COP15 and COP21. We investigated ten climate sceptic and climate activist blogs accessible in the UK. Qualitative-quantitative analysis of 357 blog posts revealed contrasting ontological and epistemological worlds in the climate change controversy. Four storylines were identified in the climate sceptical discourse – ‘hoax’, ‘no scientific evidence’, ‘climate sceptical science’, and ‘injustice’ – and five storylines in the climate activist discourse – ‘action’, ‘social justice’, ‘disaster strikes’, ‘potential catastrophe’, and ‘opportunity’. Implications for policy, practice and future research are provided.

Populist right‐wing politicians and voters tend to dismiss climate change. To investigate possible reasons for this, we tested correlations between climate change denial and variables linked to right‐wing populism (Study 1: N = 1,587; Study 2: N = 909). The strongest predictor of climate change denial was an index capturing exclusionary and anti‐egalitarian preferences (opposition to, e.g., multiculturalism and feminism), followed by traditional values (Study 1) and Social Dominance Orientation (Study 2). Populist antiestablishment attitudes correlated only weakly with climate change denial, and this correlation vanished when exclusionary and anti‐egalitarian preferences were controlled for. Also, the effects of authoritarianism (Study 2) and (low) openness vanished in the full models. Climate change denial did not correlate with (low) agreeableness, which is a personality trait linked to populism. However, both antiestablishment attitudes and climate change denial correlated with pseudoscientific beliefs (e.g., anti‐vaccination attitudes) (Study 1). To conclude, we did not find support for a notable linkage between climate change denial and populist antiestablishment attitudes. Thus, when addressing climate change denial, it could be more beneficial to focus on the ideological worldviews that are being protected by denial, such as endorsement of the existing societal power relations, than on the antiestablishment arguments used by some who deny.

At 18.27 on 12 December 2015, Laurent Fabius brought down his gavel to mark the adoption of the Paris Agreement by nearly 200 countries. Even the most optimistic commentators agree that the scale and speed of the action needed to realize the ambitions of the Agreement are daunting. The history of action on climate change gives us no grounds for optimism. But perhaps, we still have grounds for hope (McKinnon 2014). Many things could snuff out this fragile hope. In this article, I shall address conduct that explicitly aims to do so: climate change denial (from here on in, “climate denial”). By “climate denial,” I mean the deliberate and deceptive misrepresentation of the scientific realities of climate change, such as the fact that climate change is happening, its anthropogenic causes, and its damaging impacts (Dunlap 2013). What I do not mean by “climate denial” are minority or outlier positions on aspects of climate science that lie within the range of normal and healthy disciplinary disagreement. There is an established international network of well-funded organizations devoted to organized climate denial, and their activity is on the increase (Boussalis and Coan 2016). The epicenter of this activity is in the United States, where climate denial has had a significant impact on public opinion (Leiserowitz et al. 2014), and has impeded legislation to tackle climate change (Farrell 2016; Oreskes and Conway 2012). My question is: should we tolerate climate denial? The “we” in this question refers to broadly liberal people and legislators in democratic societies, for whom principles of toleration and the virtue of tolerance are of fundamental importance in social and political life. Toleration is a matter of principled self-restraint with respect to conduct that would alter, suppress, or prevent the characteristics or conduct of people opposed by the tolerator (McKinnon 2006; McKinnon and Castiglione 2003). The tolerant agent refrains from interfering with those she dislikes or of whom she disapproves even when she believes that her dislike or disapproval is well-grounded. The agents of toleration can be individual people—when toleration is likely to manifest as a virtue, or as a civic disposition—or institutions, when fundamental political principles, the constitution, and laws and their implementation, are framed to respect the limits of toleration (McKinnon 2013). Toleration is difficult to justify and hard to practice at both the personal and institutional level, particularly for liberals (Scanlon 2003a). Liberalism is committed to freedom of association, conscience, worship, movement, and expression as a matter of fundamental principle (Rawls 1971). This delivers a distinctive liberal, permissive vision of the limits of toleration with respect to acts of expression. Given that climate denial is achieved through acts of expression, there is a heavy burden of proof attached to any liberal proposal to be intolerant of climate denial.1 My aim in this short article is to identify the proper site for this debate. What are the questions to be answered in deciding whether climate denial lies beyond the limits of liberal toleration? Although I do not answer these questions, by correctly identifying them I hope to show that the burden of proof is perhaps not as heavy as we initially might have thought.

ABSTRACTInsufficient US public education and misinformation from other sources contribute to climate change (CC) denial. Public US university students in the South (Study 1) and Northeast (Studies 1 and 2) were randomly assigned to watch two educational science videos on CC (experimental condition) or flu viruses (control condition). Experimental (vs. control) condition participants reported (a) less agreement with statements reflecting CC denial (immediate post‐test [Studies 1 and 2] and delayed post‐test [Study 2]); (b) greater agreement with statements about the existence, seriousness, and human causes of CC and hope for CC interventions (immediate post‐test [Studies 1 and 2]); (c) greater intentions to support climate‐friendly US policies (immediate post‐test [Study 1]); and (d) less negative feelings about CC (delayed post‐test [Study 2]), when controlling for gender and political leaning. Implications for effectively addressing CC education among university students with relatively easy‐to‐implement, time‐efficient, and cost‐effective interventions are discussed.

Climate change denial (CCD) has been found to be more pronounced among individuals with a conservative political orientation. Terror Management Theory posits that an individual's worldview serves as a primary defense mechanism in coping with existential threats, such as the reality of climate change. Drawing on these premises, we conducted preliminary research investigating the impact of death priming on CCD from the Terror management theory perspective. We administered a death priming task and measured CCD in its immediate wake or following a delay task. We confirmed among 219 Amazon's MTurk participants that immediately following death priming, CCD was reduced among all participants. In the delayed death priming condition, we acquired preliminary evidence that CCD was heightened among Republican participants. These findings demonstrate the relevance of death priming to CCD tendencies and potentially spawn future research regarding CCD as a particular form of coping with existential threats.

Political will for action on climate change requires support from the electorate and low levels of climate change skepticism. Rational models suggest that skepticism influences voting behavior; however, other theories suggest the reverse direction of influence may also hold. There is a body of research on associations between climate change skepticism and political preferences, but this has been limited to cross-sectional analyses. This article uses longitudinal data and cross-lagged modeling to infer the direction of influence in a post-election context. We found that voting behavior influenced climate change skepticism after an election more than climate change skepticism influenced voting intentions. This suggests that partisan politics increases fluctuations in climate change skepticism, and there may be more or less opportune times to pursue climate change policies. Similar research is now needed in pre- and mid-election cycle contexts to determine the direction of influence over the election cycle.

Prior research has found that white people are more likely to be climate change skeptics. In much of this prior work, white identity is treated as a categorical label, limiting the theoretical and empirical understanding of this relationship. Drawing on survey data from a US national sample of 933 white young adults, we theorize that white identity is a developmental process where people explore the meanings of their racial identity and commit to a white identity marked by enhanced levels of social dominance orientation and conspiratorial ideation, two social-psychological constructs consistently associated with climate change skepticism. Using regression analyses, we tested a mediation model that a strong white identity would increase climate change skepticism by enhancing one’s social dominance orientation and conspiratorial ideation. We found partial support for our model. While a strong white identity was positively associated with social dominance orientation and conspiratorial ideation, only social dominance orientation increased climate change skepticism. Conspiratorial ideation reduced climate change skepticism. We discuss the implications of our findings for the climate change literature as well as how our findings can inform policies that could reduce climate change skepticism among white people.

Outside the philosophy classroom, global skeptics – skeptics about all (purported) knowledge of the external world – are rare. But there are people who describe themselves as “skeptics” about various more specific domains, including self-professed “skeptics” about the reality of anthropogenic climate change. There is little to no philosophical literature that juxtaposes the climate change skeptic with the external world skeptic. While many “traditional” epistemologists assume that the external world skeptic poses a serious philosophical challenge in a way that the climate change skeptic doesn’t, many “applied” or “social” epistemologists assume that there isn’t much to be learned from debates about the external world skeptic, finding her challenge to be distant from both common sense and real-world concerns. I try to show that both of these views are mistaken. The external world skeptic raises deep questions that are important for our everyday deliberation about what to believe, and there are significant structural parallels between the arguments for external world skepticism and those for at least a form of climate change skepticism that is idealized – but not too idealized! – from the views of flesh-and-blood climate change skeptics. As such, we have strong reasons to think in parallel about how to reply to both skeptics’ challenges. I thus finish by (briefly) considering how different widespread responses to the external world skeptic might or might not generalize happily to the climate change skeptic’s challenge.

This paper examines whether corporate environmental responsibility is influenced by regional differences in climate change denial. While there is an overwhelming consensus among scientists that climate change is happening, recent surveys still indicate widespread climate change denial across societies. Given that corporate activity causing climate change is fundamentally rooted in individual beliefs and societal institutions, we examine whether local perceptions about climate change matter for firms’ engagement in environmental responsibility. We use climate change perception surveys conducted in the U.S. to compute a novel measure of climate change denial for each U.S. county. We find that firms located in counties with higher levels of climate change denial have weaker environmental performance ratings, are more likely to commit environmental violations, and impose greater environmental costs on society. Regional differences in religiosity, social capital, political leaning, or county-level demographic characteristics cannot explain these results. Furthermore, we document that strong corporate governance mechanisms and corporate culture moderate the negative relationship between climate change denial and corporate environmental responsibility. Overall, our findings offer new insights into how local beliefs and perceptions about climate change may influence firm-level sustainability practices.

Social identities, climate change denial, and efficacy beliefs as predictors of pro-environmental engagements