On the Nature of Cessation in the Cheng Weishi Lun 成唯識論

Cheng weishi lun, Chinese Yogacara text, proposes that the thoroughly established nature alone really exists, because it is not established in reliance on other conditions, suggesting a view of emptiness that is similar to Jonang school's shentong view of Great Middle Way. This paper examines works of Dolpopa Sherap Gyeltsen and Taranatha, as well as Cheng weishi lun and its related literature, to compare similarities and differences between two doctrinal systems, primarily in terms of their definitions of consciousness and pristine wisdom. It finds that eighth consciousness — mind entity itself and its components — is central concept of both systems, and that tathagatagarbha of Jonang school and true suchness in Cheng weishi lun are both empty of other phenomena but not empty of itself. The findings suggest that Cheng weishi lun and shentong view of Great Middle Way share highly similar doctrinal framework, which could be two versions of same teachings delivered to sentient beings living in different time and space.

There have been several attempts of late to read Yogācāra through the lens of Western phenomenology. I approach the issue through a reading of the Cheng weishi lun (Treatise on the Perfection of Consciousness Only), a seventh-century Chinese compilation that preserves the voices of multiple Indian commentators on Vasubandhu’s Triṃśikāvijñaptikārikā (Thirty Verses on Consciousness). Specifically, I focus on the “five omnipresent mental factors” (pañcasarvatraga, Chin. wu bianxing xinsuo) and the “four aspects” (Chin. sifen) of cognition. These two topics seem ripe, at least on the surface, for phenomenological analysis, particularly as the latter topic includes a discussion of “self-awareness” (svasaṃvedana, svasaṃvitti, Chin. zizheng). Yet we find that the Cheng weishi lun account has little in common with the tradition associated with Husserl and his heirs. The categories and modes of analysis in the Cheng weishi lun do not emerge from or aver to a systematic reflection on the nature of “lived experience” so much as they are focused on subliminal processes and metaphysical entities that belong to the domain of the noumenal. In my conclusion I suggest that the later pramāṇa tradition associated with Dignāga and Dharmakīrti—a tradition that profoundly influenced later Yogācāra exegesis in Tibet—did indeed take a “phenomenological turn.” But my comparison shows that both traditions falter when it comes to relating conceptual content to non-conceptual experience, and thus there is reason to be skeptical about claims that phenomenology is epistemologically grounded in how the world presents itself first-personally.

The Chinese pilgrim, translator and monk Xuanzang (玄奘) (602-664) traveled thorough Central Asia and South Asia between the years of 629 and 645, and learned about Buddhist mainstream schools and their authorities. When Xuanzang returned to China, he formed the school of Faxiang ‘dharma characteristics’. The text, which forms the subject of the paper, belongs to the Faxiang school (法相宗 Faxiang zong), which was developed from the Yogācāra school of Buddhism. Triṃśikā, written by Vasubandhu, and its ten prose commentaries, led to the emergence of Xuanzang’s Cheng weishi lun. Old Uyghur fragments published here belong to chapter 21 of a manuscript in the shape of a compilation, which is preserved in the Berlin Turfan Collection, and according to Kitsudō’s identification, the aforementioned chapter is a translation into Old Uyghur from a commentary to Xuanzang’s Cheng weishi lun by Queiji. In this paper, brief information will be given on Faxiang school, Xuanzang and Cheng weishi lun in the introduction part and in the following chapters, an unpublished 12th and 13th leaves of chapter 21 of the Old Uyghur manuscript will be presented as well as their translations into Turkish and notes concerning the text and glossary with an analytical index. 

<p>結城令聞曾將江戶時期唯識學研究的發展分為四期。本文的研究對象戒定屬於第三期的代表人物之一。這一時期的學風特徵主要是批判性的自由探討。本文嘗試以《成唯識論戒定鈔》為據，檢視與討論戒定所代表的批判性自由探討的學風的具體展現及其意義與價值。戒定將《唯識三十頌》、《成唯識論》以及窺基的《成唯識論述記》在思想上視為是三個獨立的個體，分開對待，並就其理論缺陷進行批評。本文指出戒定在為學上不仰賴權威的獨立精神，取徑上也很類近於西方批判性思維（Critical thinking）；然而，當注意的是，此一極富批判性的為學取徑也有其侷限性。</p> <p> </p><p>Yūki Norikazu divided the development of Yogācāra studies during the Edo period into four stages. The subject of this study, Kaijou, is considered one of the representative figures of the third stage. The academic style of this period was characterized mainly by critical and free exploration. This paper attempts to examine and discuss the specific manifestation, significance, and value of the critical and free academic style represented by Kaijou, based on his work Jouyuishikiron Kaijoushou. Kaijou viewed the Thirty Verses on Consciousness-Only, the Cheng Weishi Lun, and the Commentary on the Cheng Weishi Lun as three independent entities in terms of thought, treating them separately and criticizing their theoretical flaws. This paper highlights Kaijou ’s independent scholarly spirit, which does not rely on authority, and notes that his approach closely resembles Western critical thinking. However, it is also important to recognize that this highly critical academic approach has its limitations.</p> <p> </p>

Apart from his remarkable translation career, the Tang Tripitaka Master Xuanzang was also a brilliant exegete who left us with Cheng weishi lun and Verses Delineating the Eight Consciousnesses, two expositions of lasting academic value. This paper argues that the doctrines put forth in these two works of Xuanzang should not be regarded as simply one of many Buddhist doctrinal systems. Examined from the perspective of cognitive psychology, the tenets presented in these expositions could be understood as the principles of psychological anatomy — an investigation into the workings of the mind. Written with the spirit of modern scientific research, these two texts should be deemed as paragons of Buddhist literature for their eloquent articulation of core Buddhist teachings. This paper also shows that not only do the Cheng weishi lun and Verses Delineating the Eight Consciousnesses demonstrate the spirit of scientific empiricism, they also provide inspirational and monumental materials for modern research in psychology.

In this paper, I examine how the theory of bijas (“seeds”) was interpreted in the Weishi School (Chinese Yogacara) in the early Tang.The most authoritative exposition of seeds was articulated in vol. 2 of the Cheng weishi lun, translated into Chinese by Xuanzang in 659. The main point of this bija theory was to prove the existence of “uncontaminated seeds” (anasravabija). In particular, the idea of originally existing uncontaminated seeds (dharmatanasravabija) worked successfully to flesh out the theory of five different natures of religious capacity.The purpose of presenting the theory of uncontaminated seeds in the Cheng weishi lun was not only to justify the theory of five different natures, but also to rescue the theory of “seeds that take thusness as causal referent” (tathatalambanapratyayabija) that was set forth in vol. 52 of the Yuqie shidi lun (Yogacarabhumi; translated by Xuanzang in 648).This was done because the seeds that take thusness as causal referent were taken as buddha-nature (buddhadhatu) or Tathagatagarbha by the people who believed in the Mahaparinirvanasutra—which claimed that all sentient beings have the buddha-nature within themselves and that each and every one can reach Buddhahood.Faced with this crisis, the Weishi school needed a new framework for its seed theory, in order to bring added nuance to its theory of seeds that take thusness as causal referent and the theory of five natures. Thus, the uncontaminated seeds postulated in the Cheng weishi lun superceded the thusnessreferential seeds.

In the majority of Abhidharmic Buddhist schools, smṛti serves the crucial function of ensuring the recollection of past events and is thus conceptualized as memory in scholarly discourse nowadays. Nevertheless, upon closer examination of various doctrinal perspectives, the interpretation of smṛti diverges significantly among different schools. Notably, it is deemed to be omnipresent in every moment of perception within the Sarvāstivādin tradition, while in Yogācāra, it is regarded as a specific response to an experienced object. This paper seeks to delve into the concept of smṛti within the latter tradition, with a specific focus on the Cheng Weishi Lun (成唯識論, henceforth: CWSL). Drawing upon the foundational principles of Yogācāra doctrine, which posit the ālayavijñāna as an underlying substratum responsible for retaining past information, I contend that smṛti embodies a cognitive faculty that intensifies the apprehension of learned objects when they are present. Furthermore, I argue that smṛti serves as the inception point for a series of cognitive processes acquiring knowledge that helps decision-making. Additionally, I will demonstrate that the function of smṛti in the CWSL diverges from both traditional Buddhist conceptions of memory and contemporary understandings thereof.

This article is to provide a concise, yet comprehensible, explanation for the concept of obstructions of knowledge (jneyāvaraṇa) of East Asian Sākāra-vijnānavāda, mainly according to Xuanzang’s Cheung Weishi Lun, the encyclopedic commentary on Vasubandhu’s Triṃśikā. The Cheung Weishi Lun is the major text for Sākāra-vijnānavāda tradition. Among the existing materials in Sanskrit, Tibetan and Chinese, very likely East Asian Sākāra-vijnānavāda is the major tradition able to provide a clear, detailed and comprehensible interpretation on jneyāvaraṇa. In this article, jneyāvaraṇa is explained in terms of three perspectives: first, the argumentation that counters epistemological realism, from an idealistic standpoint; second, the theoretical description about the relationship between the Vijnānavāda doctrine of eight consciousnesses (vijnāna) and jneyāvaraṇa; third, various levels of jneyāvaraṇa on the path (mārga) and stage (bhūmi) that are explained within the framework of ten obstructions (āvaraṇa). The concepts of five sciences (panca vidyā) and omniscience (sarvajnā), along with jneyāvaraṇa, are used to approach the Universal (Mahayana) horizon.

Message from the Editor Gereon Kopf Welcome to the second issue of the Journal of Buddhist Philosophy. For this issue, Klaus-Dieter Mathes organized a thematically focused section on the distinction between the two senses of emptiness, namely being “empty of an own-being” (rang stong) and being “empty of other” (gzhan stong) in Tibetan Buddhism. He skillfully introduces the essays and contextualizes this debate on how to interpret the central notion of emptiness as well as its relevance for today in the present issue of our journal. The five articles that comprise this section are complemented with inspiring essays on Tsong kha pa, Nishida, Dōgen, and Prajñāpāramitā philosophy in Indian and Chinese sources. It has been exciting to edit this issue and to see the wealth and profundity of Buddhist philosophy brought to the fore by the most recent scholarship. After only two issues, it has been already possible to identify certain tendencies and trends in today’s scholarship on Buddhist philosophy. Our first two issues have been quite similar in structure and content. Each included a group of essays that focused on one central theme, the foundational concepts and discussions of Tibetan Madhyamaka in issue one and the distinction between the two senses of emptiness, namely being “empty of an own-being” (rang stong) and being “empty of other” (gzhan stong) in issue two. Both issues introduced and discussed topics, the basic forms of argument such as the catuṣkoṭi and the notion “emptiness,” that are central to Buddhist philosophy and constitute perfect themes for the two first editions of the Journal of Buddhist Philosophy. In both issues these [End Page 1] thematically focused clusters of essays were complemented with research articles, book reviews, and, in the case of issue one, reports on the status of the field that highlight fundamental topics and achievements of contemporary scholarship on Buddhist philosophy and provide an insightful glance into the field of Buddhist philosophy today in its breadth and depth. The Journal of Buddhist Philosophy was designed to provide a forum where scholarship on Buddhist philosophy as well as Buddhist philosophy itself is presented, engaged, and shaped. To accomplish this goal, we would like to expand the themes, styles, and canon of Buddhist philosophy. Scholarship on the Indo-Tibetan tradition is absolutely foundational to the understanding of Buddhist philosophy and we could not have asked for a more appropriate theme for each of the first two issues than the ones introduced by Kevin Vose and Klaus-Dieter Mathes. At the same time, the Journal of Buddhist Philosophy strives to represent and foster diversity in the Buddhist world. We, therefore, continue to encourage submissions on philosophical texts and concepts from the Buddhist traditions of East and Southeast Asia as well as on philosophers not usually considered part of the canon of Buddhist philosophy in addition to fresh approaches that interpret the classics and commonly recognized representatives of Buddhist philosophy. We welcome submissions of thematically focused essay clusters, individual articles, reports on the developments in the field, and book reviews that present, examine, and increase the variety of approaches within Buddhist philosophy, in addition to our general call for papers. Essays on topics frequently neglected will not only enrich our understanding of the Buddhist tradition itself but will also deepen our conception of what Buddhist philosophy in particular and philosophy in general really is. Finally, the Journal of Buddhist Philosophy provides a venue for innovative expressions of scholarship. In particular, we would like to include four additional formats in our future issues: (1) A conversation between an author and her or his critics: This could be in response to a book review or a book review submitted as dialogue. (2) A direct engagement of two or more philosophers on one topic either in the form of a co-authored essay or of a cluster of essays with direct responses to each of these essays: This format not only illustrates how philosophy develops but also performs philosophy in action. (3) Translations of hitherto untranslated, philosophical texts from any Buddhist tradition: It is necessary to make more resources accessible to bring out the diversity of Buddhist philosophies. (4) Reports on...

The olfactory sense and experience are considered a conduit between spirituality and the divine realm in Daoism. The ceremonial use of incense in Daoism (shixiang 侍香) has been explored from various theological perspectives and described by numerous liturgists. Despite its importance, several questions about the development and history of Daoist olfactory culture remain unresolved. This paper examines medieval religious dialogs concerning divine smells and smoke before and during the Tang dynasty, a period marked by the interaction and mutual influence of Daoism and Buddhism in China. I argue that medieval Daoism enhanced its soteriology by adopting the concept of vāsanā (xun 薰) from Buddhism, particularly Yogâcāra. Xuan Zang’s 玄奘 translation corpus of Vasubandhu, Cheng Weishi Lun 成唯識論, along with the treatises of two Tang Daoist liturgists Zhu Faman’s 朱法滿 and Du Guangting’s 杜光庭, reveal a shared belief that sacred smells transform the perfumed at a profound level, embedding the divine essence within them. The Yogâcāra concept of vāsanā, elucidated by Xuan Zang, was readily incorporated into Tang Daoism due to their shared soteriological interests. Tang Daoism was in the process of codifying its rituals for self-purification and collective salvation, thereby enhancing the significance of incense through its dynamic absorption of vāsanā. The olfactory practices in medieval Daoism demonstrate that East Asian medieval soteriology promoted universalism through the ritual interactions between Buddhism and Daoism.

Reviewed by: Chinese and Buddhist Philosophy in Early Twentieth-Century German Thought by Eric S. Nelson David Chai (bio) Chinese and Buddhist Philosophy in Early Twentieth-Century German Thought. By Eric S. Nelson. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017. Pp. x + 344. Hardcover $114.00. ISBN 978–1-3500–0255-5. Eric Nelson's Chinese and Buddhist Philosophy in Early Twentieth-Century German Thought opens with the following: "The work before you is an interpretive journey through the historical reception of Chinese and Buddhist philosophy in modern German thought, focusing in particular--albeit not exclusively--on the early twentieth century. Its intent is to describe and analyze the intertextual nexus of intersecting sources for the sake of elucidating implications and critical models for intercultural hermeneutics and intercultural philosophy. The possibility of such a philosophy is confronted by the persistent myth and prejudice that philosophy is and can only be a unique and exclusive Western spiritual achievement" (p. 1). The book is directed by "the question of who can philosophize, and who counts as a philosopher" (p. 2), a quintessential question indeed, but I wonder if it dawned on Nelson that this question never occurred to the people of Asia, rendering it an exclusively Western line of approach. The same can be said when Nelson writes: "The much-needed emancipation of philosophy from ethnocentrism, often cloaked in the language of a false universality, requires what could be called 'a critique of European reason,' or a deconstruction of the Eurocentric conception of rationality, which is simultaneously an internal immanent critique of the dialectic of Western philosophy and an exposure to the exteriority of its--in this case East Asian--others" (p. 3). Is this not also true of the lack of Chinese receptivity towards Western thought for much of its history? Until the arrival of the Jesuits in the 16th century, the Chinese lacked the means to converse with Western philosophy, Buddhism notwithstanding. Of course, Nelson is only concerned with the modern Western reception of East Asian thought, but this doesn't make my point moot. Indeed, if the West can engage the ancient traditions of the East, and be accused of misrepresenting or misconstruing their ideas, why is there no similar criticism being made of the modern Chinese reception of classical Western thought? Perhaps the reason is as Nelson says: "A more genuine encounter and dialogue is constrained and undermined by the colonial and racial history of modern Western philosophy" (p. 5). [End Page 1] Chapter 1 "traces episodes in the story of European Confucianism by exploring historical examples of the role and interpretation of Confucianism in modern German philosophy in general and in early twentieth-century thought in particular" (p. 16). A richly detailed historical and intellectual account, it is necessary for Nelson to provide this as it sets the stage for the analysis that follows in subsequent chapters. Chapter 2 examines Zhang Junmai's (1886–1969) relationship with Rudolf Eucken (1846–1926) and Hans Driesch (1867–1941), and how their life-philosophy influenced Zhang's own intercultural thinking. In light of the social and political chaos engulfing China at the turn of the 19th century, many Chinese intellectuals turned to the West for inspiration and potential solutions to the identity crisis sweeping their country. That Zhang turned to the life-philosopher Eucken and the neo-vitalist Driesch is both surprising and also fascinating because Zhang and Eucken co-authored a book in German in 1922 entitled: Das Lebensproblem in China und Europa (The Problem of Life in China and Europe). Nelson describes their collaborative work as "perceiving affinities between early Greek and Chinese thinking, particularly in their Socratic and Confucian moments, as critical reflection concerning the individual and social-political formation of life through self-cultivation and moral government" (p. 50). Such qualities were absent from the China of Zhang's time, deserted when the Qing empire collapsed a decade beforehand. Zhang, therefore, "articulates a modern Confucian philosophy that has learnt from and is open to learning and adopting from Western modernity, in particular from Kantian philosophy and liberal-constitutional and social democratic political thought, in the formation of a distinctive Chinese modernity achieved through a form of enlightenment suited...

The doctorinal development of the Japanese Hossō sect is based on rongishō (論義抄) which comprehensively investigate problems in the Cheng weishi lun (成唯識論). Ryōzan’s Jōyuishikiron dogakushō (成唯識論同学鈔) is particularly famous, but it has been pointed out that he compiled another rongishō named Gusō. Moreover he had a close relationship with his master Jōkei (貞慶, 1155–1213), who was the most influential monk of the Hossō sect. This is clear based on the fact that Rōzan’s Gusō was compiled with Jōkei’s permission. Thus, studies of Ryōzan’s Gusō are indispensable to elucidate the details of Yuishiki (Vijñaptimātra) doctrine in medieval Japan.

The Notion of Awareness of Self-awareness and the Problem of Infinite Regress in the Cheng Weishi Lun

The Theory in the Cheng weishi lun that the Mahayana was Expounded by the Buddha

The Cheng weishi lun 成唯識論 (*Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra), a compiled translation of Indian commentaries on Vasubandhu’s (ca. fourth or fifth centuries CE) Triṃśikā, centering on Dharmapāla’s (ca. sixth century) exegesis, is well known as the foundational text that offers the doctrinal basis of the East Asian Yogācāra school—the Dharma Characteristics school (Ch. Faxiang zong, K. Pŏpsang chong, J. Hossōshū 法相宗). In his commentary to the Cheng weishi lun, Kuiji 窺基 (632–682), the de facto founder of the Dharma Characteristics school, considers Dharmapāla’s criticism in the Cheng weishi lun toward those adhering to “emptiness” as aimed at such a Madhyamaka scholiast as Bhāviveka (ca. 500–570). Kuiji’s interpretation has tended to be generally accepted under the backdrop of the contemporary controversy revolving around the distinct doctrinal views between Dharmapāla and Bhāviveka. However, just as the question of whether Madhyamaka and Yogācāra over the long history of Mahāyāna Buddhism were philosophically consistent with each other cannot find an easy answer, we cannot simply conclude based on the “orthodox” explanation that these two scholiasts were doctrinally antagonistic. Indeed, the Silla Yogācāra monk Taehyŏn 大賢 (ca. eighth century) introduced three distinct interpretations by contemporary scholar monks on this matter. This paper examines East Asian commentators’ interpretations on the relationship between Dharmapāla and Bhāviveka as presented in Taehyŏn’s commentary of the Cheng weishi lun, and further discusses how Taehyŏn explains doctrinal conflict between the seemingly contrasting notions, such as ‘the conditioned’ (saṃskāra) and ‘the unconditioned’ (asaṃskāra), by observing his interpretation of such a concept of ‘the immaculate consciousness’ (amalavijñāna).