On Reconceptualization of Regionalism in Central Asia from Within and Outside the Region

In the post-Soviet period, Central Asia has lost the cohesiveness it had in the Soviet period. The states of the region have since been seeking outward linkages to pursue their economic and security interests. In the process, the relation between the Central Asian countries weakened and, in some cases, became adversarial. The nation-building process undertaken by the national leaders alienated ethnic minorities and neighbouring states. As a result, the regional mechanisms or organizations that have come up in the region are led or initiated by powers such as Russia, China and the USA. The competing interests of these powers have not helped in promoting cooperation among the Central Asia countries though some of these organizations are useful for member states. However, a new trend is visible since 2016 when a new leader became president in Uzbekistan. Improved bilateral relations and summits of leaders of the region create hope for a new regionalism in Central Asia that is based on the internal cooperative dynamics within the region. This may not replace the already existing mechanisms or organizations. However, the process itself is conducive for intra-regional cooperation and would be helpful in keeping the region free from the geopolitical competition of external powers.

Behind the rhetoric of regional cooperation, the Central Asian states have been embroiled with increasing frequency in conflicts among themselves, including trade wars, border disputes and disagreements over the management and use of water and energy resources. Far from engendering a new regional order in Central Asia, the events of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent basing of US troops in the region have served to entrench pre-existing patterns of regional cooperation, while highlighting the obstacles that have beset the regionalization process there since the mid-1990s. While all five Central Asian states have been attempting to use the renewed rivalry between Russia and the United States, which is being played out in the Central Asian region, to maximize their strategic and economic benefits, the formation of the United States–Uzbekistan strategic partnership has increased the resolve of the other Central Asian states (Turkmenistan excepted) to balance Uzbekistan's preponderance by enthusiastically pursuing regional projects involving Russia and, to a lesser extent, China. This regional dynamic has resulted in the steady gravitation of the centre of regionalism in Central Asia to the north from a nominal Tashkent–Astana axis to a more stable Astana–Moscow one, with possible repercussions for the poorer states of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The article examines the major constraints on regionalism in Central Asia, considering in particular the ways in which the personalist, non-democratic regimes of Central Asia have obstructed state–centric ‘top–down’ regionalism as well as informal regionalist processes ‘from below’.

The failure of regionalism in Central Asia is a puzzle. Whereas almost all world regions have seen a rise of regional organisations since the end of the Cold War, attempts to establish durable regional cooperation among Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan proofed unsuccessful. Although some of the Central Asian countries participate in wider regional organisations like the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), the genuine Central Asian Cooperation Organisation (CACO) was dissolved in 2005. Given the cultural, economic and political similarities between the five Central Asian countries, this lack of a regional organisation is surprising. In contrast to previous work, this paper argues that the failure of regionalism in Central Asia is not so much due to domestic political factors, but more to the extra-regional economic dependence of the regional economies and the impact of external powers within Central Asia. Challenged by the rise of China, Russia uses the EAEU in order to preserve its hegemonic influence over the former Soviet Republics. By joining the Russian dominated EAEU, Central Asia’s regional power Kazakhstan enjoys economic benefits which outweigh the potential gains of Central Asian cooperation within CACO by far. Consequently, Kazakhstan follows its extra-regional interests in closer cooperation with Russia at the cost of regional cooperation with its Central Asian neighbours. As a result, the Central Asian countries are unable to build up a unified regional block in relation to extra-regional powers like China or Russia.

Energy infrastructures have become key points of competition and cooperation within the multiple regionalism agendas driven by great power rivalries in central Asia and south-east Asia. Yet central Asia and south-east Asia have received little attention within scholarship on energy regionalism, while comparative analyses on the development of the Belt and Road Initiative and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific in these regions are also lacking. To address these research gaps, this article examines the mutual constitution between energy regionalism and geopolitical rivalries between great powers in two regions of Asia. By examining multiple cross-border energy projects, this article provides insights into the history of imperialism and colonization, hegemony and regional agency for the evolution of great power competition in driving regionalism in central Asia and south-east Asia. The research demonstrates that interactions between the United States, Japan, Russia and China over energy vary significantly from one region to another. In central Asia, great powers collaborate within and outside multilateral frameworks on energy regionalism. In contrast, south-east Asia is marked by low levels of collaboration by great powers on energy. The comparative analysis demonstrates that energy regionalism is an outcome not just of strategic competition, but also of overlapping interests between great powers. In this context, the agency of central Asian and south-east Asian countries will be a key factor in managing great power relations to accelerate energy transition and enhance regional stability.

This study examines regionalism and regionalization as political phenomena, with a particular focus on Central Asia. The paper addresses a simple question: How and why has regionalism in Central Asia evolved into its current form? Despite the rapid development of regional cooperation and an increase in institutional frameworks in the area, scepticism about the prospects for successful regional cooperation persists in both academic and public policy circles. At the same time, there is a strong desire among stakeholders for a firmly institutionalized regionalism. To explain the characteristics and direction of regionalism, this paper proposes an analytical framework comprising three essential but non-exhaustive elements: positionality, motivation, and functionality. By utilizing multiple empirical sources related to the region and applying them to this framework, the paper demonstrates how and why Central Asian regionalism can be defined as an externally guided regionalism.

The security dimension of regionalism and regional structures in Central Asia and Azerbaijan has been limited by Russia's influence as a regional hegemon, aswell as by various other constraints specific to the region and the local states. Moreover, as a peripheral zone in the world system, Central Eurasia has not shown much evidence of regionalization as a process. But in response to the proximity of hegemonic power the smaller states have tried to adopt bandwagoning and balancing strategies in regional formats. Although their fixation on ‘regime security’ has encouraged them to accommodate Russia through CIS structures, this is changing as new bilateral security relationships develop with the United States. The Russian-sponsored Collective Security Treaty Organization is unable to address the most serious challenges for regional security management in Central Asia. Yet the local states have been unable on their own to establish a regional security consensus and to institutionalize cooperation on that basis. The diffuse GUUAM grouping (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova) has not offered a basis for selfsustaining regional security cooperation. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization has created a venue to engage China in the security dialogue on Central Asia, particularly over counterterrorism, but has otherwise failed to tackle security challenges among and within the Central Asian states. Overall, the current focus of these states and their sponsors on bilateral relations to provide security assistance continues to displace security-related regionalism.

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine in February 2022 has created uncertainty regarding the balance of power, particularly in Central Asia, where Russia wields significant influence. Russia’s military confrontation in Ukraine and its strategic concentration on disrupting equations in its favor have led to changes in its national and foreign policy, giving rise to new questions. This research aims to address the following inquiries: will the conflict in Ukraine diminish Russia’s sway and involvement in regional institutions in Central Asia? Will China’s position become more prominent if the function of regional organizations, in which Russia has played a significant part, decreases? Will the Central Asian countries align themselves with the Western bloc or other regional powers like Turkey? This research has utilized secondary data analysis and applied the theories of regionalism and soft power to examine the sources of power and influence of China and Russia in regional organizations and mechanisms in Central Asia, both before and after the Ukrainian war. Assessing the potential difficulties and advantages that this war has brought for China and Russia’s influence in this area, provide potential outcomes for the future condition of regionalism in Central Asia and the significant actors involved. According to the research findings, Russia’s allocation of military resources in the Ukraine war and its efforts to advance its goals have created uncertainty regarding the future of the country’s power resources in Central Asia, particularly in the security field. The premise that another power or powers will likely fill the potential power vacuum left by Russia in Central Asia has been reinforced in the context of this war. As Russia’s attention towards Central Asia diminishes, China has a favorable chance to enhance its political and economic Nevertheless, the decline of Russia’s influence and power resources in Central Asia has created a significant chance for the governments in this area to enhance their engagements with other significant regional nations like Turkey and India, as well as trans-regional states such as the European Union.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will have political and economic impacts in Central Asia. Politically, first, Central Asian countries will strengthen cooperation with neighbouring regional powers such as India, Turkey and Iran to hedge their political and economic security. Second, while China’s influence in Central Asia will increase, SCO will be more economic cooperation organisation. Third, the future direction of Central Asian regionalism will be uncertain. Although it is unlikely, if Uzbekistan shows anti-Russian behaviour, regionalism in Central Asia may weaken. Fourth, it is unlikely that the US role will be expanded again in Central Asia after the Ukraine War. Economically, first, it is highly likely that the status and centripetal force of the Eurasian Economic Union will be weakened. Second, if Europe’s anti-Russian energy policy is strengthened and green energy policies are accelerated, the renewable energy policies of Central Asian carbon-centered energy producing countries such as Kazakhstan in particular can be accelerated. Third, if the logistical obstacles of TSR persist, the bypass logistics infrastructure going to Central Asia through India, Iran, Pakistan, etc. instead of through Russia will be activated. It seems inevitable to shift Korea’s diplomacy toward Central Asia to a certain level to organically link value-based diplomacy and economic security strategies. In this context, first, the existing diplomatic strategies and economic cooperation policies toward Central Asia must be freed from the tendency to view Central Asian countries only as a sphere of influence from Russia. Second, in a situation in which economic cooperation between Korea and Russia is inevitably severely curtailed due to western sanctions against Russia and geopolitical conflicts, it is necessary to strengthen economic cooperation with Central Asian countries as a means of circumventing economic cooperation with Russia. Third, there is a possibility that the northern policy of new governments may be weakened due to the Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, thus the cooperation with Central Asian countries may also shrink. It will be necessary to maintain and develop the previous government’s cooperation platform with Central Asian countries.

Alongside the rapid development of globalization, the post-Cold War era has witnessed the expansion of various forms of regional cooperation in many areas of the world. Regionalism, therefore—both in reference to the construction of a regional identity (“soft regionalism”) and the building of regional cooperative institutions (“hard regionalism”) —has become a salient ongoing process worldwide, involving the participation of both states and non-state actors as a response to globalization. Different from the “old regionalism” that arose immediately after World War II, which underscored the economic and security dimensions of regional integration and the dominant role of external power or even hegemony in it, the “new regionalism” that is increasingly widespread nowadays emphasizes spontaneous regional cooperation in a variety of areas, including politics, economy, security, culture, etc. For Central Asia (a region consisting of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan), however, the “new regionalism” wave has not yet arrived. Instead, a pattern of great power-sponsored regionalism has dominated the development of structures of regional cooperation. Although the dissolution of the USSR and the following independence of the five Central Asian states once generated opportunities to form self-sustaining regional cooperation frameworks based on common interests that could lead to a functioning regionalism, the disagreements among the states caused by water resource disputes, border issues, and other conflicts of interest impeded them from making substantial moves. In addition, since the newly independent states in Central Asia are quite concerned with their hard-won sovereignty and are still hampered by their relatively poor economic performance, the political will and national capabilities to promote usually binding regional cooperation projects are inevitably inadequate. A good instance of such challenges is the failure of the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO), a spontaneously initiated regional project consisting of all the five Central Asian states.

This article examines the record of American policy towards regional cooperation in Central Asia. It begins with the determinants of regionalism and the role of external states therein. It then considers the nature of American interests in Central Asia. This is followed by a historical account of the three stages of American policy towards the region. The article argues that regional cooperation has not been a significant aspect of US policy. Instead US policy-makers have preferred bilateral relations or multilateral structures (e.g. the Partnership for Peace, the GUUAM [Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova] group) which draw the region's states beyond its boundaries. US policy tends to reduce incentives for regional actors to develop multilateral cooperation. It may also encourage competitive regionalist agendas on the part of other interested major powers (Russia and China).

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Acknowledgments I wish to acknowledge comments and feedback from Juliet Johnson and Ed Schatz on an earlier version of this essay. Notes 1. The term comes from Parag Khanna, The Second World. Empires and Influence in the New Global Order (New York: Random House, 2008). 2. Use of the term comes from Rudyard Kipling, Kim (London: Penguin Classics, 2007). 3. See Nick Megoran, Sevara Sharapova, and Alisher Fazullaev. “Conference Report. Halford Mackinder's ‘Heartland’ – a Help or Hindrance? Tashkent, 2–3 December 2004,” The Geographical Journal Vol. 171, No. 2 (June 2005), pp. 177–178. 4. Martin C. Spechler and Dina R. Spechler, “Is Russia winning in Central Asia?” CACI Analyst, October 29, 2008. Available at http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/4972 5. “President Dmitry Medvedev, interview by Russian TV channels (Channel One, Rossia, and NTV),” August 31, 2008. Available at http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/08/31/1850_type82912type82916_206003.shtml 6. See also Bobo Lo, Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing, and the New Geopolitics (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008). 7. Willy Lam, “Beijing's Alarm over New ‘U.S. Encirclement Conspiracy,’” China Brief Vol. 5, No. 8 (April 12, 2005); Willy Lam, “Hu's Central Asian Gamble to Counter the U.S. ‘Containment Strategy,’” China Brief Vol. 5, No. 15 (July 5, 2005); Adiljon Umarov and Dmitry Pashkun, “The Prospects for Chinese Influence in Central Asia,” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly Journal (Winter 2005). 8. See also Sean Kay, “Geopolitical Constraints and Institutional Innovation: the Dynamics of Multilateralism in Eurasia,” in James Sperling, Sean Kay, and S. Victor Papacosma, eds., Limiting Institutions? The Challenge of Eurasian Security Governance, pp. 125–143 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003); S. Neil MacFarlane, “The United States and Regionalism in Central Asia,” International Affairs Vol. 8, No. 3 (2004), p. 460. 9. This organization, which takes its name from the initials of its founding countries Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, was formed in 1997 as a forum, though its charter was signed in 2001. Because of its agenda, it is typically considered to propose an alternative to Russian-led integration projects, Uzbekistan has also been a member from 1999 to 2005. 10. See also Roy Allison, ed. “Regionalism and the Changing International Order in Central Eurasia,” International Affairs Vol. 8, No. 3 (2004), Special Issue. 11. See Sébastien Peyrouse, “South Korea's Advances into Central Asia,” CACI Analyst, January 9, 2010. 12. However Cabestan (in Laruelle, p. 26) puts this in perspective, arguing that while Central Asia has acquired a key place in Chinese foreign policy, it has not altered “the country's well-established hierarchy of partnerships and priorities.” 13. See Roman Muzalevsky, “India's ‘Connect Central Asia’ Policy Seeks to Compensate for Lost Time.” Eurasia Daily Monitor Vol. 9, No. 176, September 27, 2012. 14. For early bridge-building efforts, see Stephen Aris, “A new model of Asian regionalism: does the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation have more potential than ASEAN?” Cambridge Review of International Affairs Vol. 22, No. 3 (2009), pp. 451–467; Richard Weitz, “Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A new force in Asian security?” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol. 23, No. 1 (2011), pp. 133–148. 15. See Alastair Iain Johnston, “What (If Anything) Does East Asia Tell Us About International Relations Theory?” Annual Review of Political Science Vol. 15 (2012), pp. 53–78; G. John Ikenberry and Micheal Mastanduno, International relations theory and the Asia-Pacific (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003); Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, “Japan, Asian-Pacific Security, and the Case for Analytical Eclecticism,” International Security Vol. 26, No. 3 (2001–02), pp. 153–185; Peter A. Gourevitch, ed., “The Pacific Region: Challenges to Policy and Theory,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Special Issue, (September 1989).

This paper discusses China and Russia and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Organisation (SCO), a Eurasian regional organisation established in 2001 and consisting of China, Russia and the four Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. I argue that while the two largest members of the SCO are essential to the organisation, they at the same time prevent the SCO from becoming a more comprehensive regional organisation. Moreover, the actions and presence of China and Russia in Central Asia, together with inherently inauspicious characteristics of the region when compared to the post-Cold War new regionalist thinking, hinder the overall regionalisation in the area. However, regionalisation, hopefully in time leading to greater regional cooperation in Central Asia, is very much in the interests of Europe and the European Union (EU) as a potential peaceful way forward in the development of the region.

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