On pricing schemes in data center network with game theoretic approach

Abstract

This paper aims at systematically analyzing the pricing schemes in data center network. The interaction between a monopolistic operator and customers in the network is modeled as Stackelberg game. In this model, both homogeneous- and heterogeneous-customer scenarios are analyzed. In homogeneous customer case, a special scenario is that only a single customer exists in the network. In this scenario, we observe that the Stackelberg equilibrium will lead to a Pareto-inefficient outcome. To address this problem, a two-part pricing scheme is proposed to derive a Pareto efficient outcome and benefit both the operator and customers. When there are an infinite number of homogeneous customers in the network, our analysis shows that customers' selfish action may incur zero utility to them and operator can achieve all the utility by announcing an appropriate price. As to the heterogeneous customer case, we not only analyse how the operator should price the network resources, but also introduce Paris Metro Pricing (PMP) scheme to further increase operator's profit. Since the operator's profit is not a concave function of the resource price, these studies are conducted by simulation.