On Human Altruism and Selfish Memes

Abstract

In a recent contribution, Tullberg and Tullberg (1996) show that there is a discrepancy between factual and normative conclusions drawn by many authors discussing evolution of human altruistic behaviour (Dawkins 1976, 1989, Axelrod 1984, Williams 1989). In short, reciprocity is by all these authors shown to be an evolutionarily stable strategy, while altruistic strategies are unstable and thereby promote spreading of strategies. But when it comes to normative statements, mentioned authors suggest to teach altruism instead of reciprocity as would be correct due to Tullberg and Tullberg (1996). Altruism is here as by Tullberg and Tullberg (1996) used sensu stricto, i.e. excluding reciprocal and kin altruism. With this paper I want to respond to Tullberg and Tullberg's (1996) attempt of unifying factual and normative statements concerning human morality. I shall, however, keep to their biological statements as I believe that biological journals are inadequate fora for discussing philosophical issues as normative ethics it should just be mentioned that deriving normative statements from facts is far from being generally accepted among philosophers, ever since Hume (1739) established so called ought/is dichotomy. Tullberg and Tullberg (1996) [.. what reasons are for believing that sucker [i.e. altruistic] strategies should not be exploited by cheater [i.e. selfish] strategies in a human context. In contrast, I wonder what mechanisms are by which cheater strategies could spread in human populations. Applying the gene's-eye view of Darwinism (Dawkins 1989) on humans is, of course, legitimate because humans during first couple of million years of their evolution did not have welfare states nor social security systems that shielded them from laws of natural selection. Therefore, Tullberg and Tullberg's (1996) conclusions do undeniably hold for that part of human prehistoryr. The crucial point is, however, that it is impossible to infer from historical selection pressures what today's selection pressures look like. Recently, Verrell (1996) applied same argument in a critique of Tessman (1995). How, to repeat question, could cheater strategies in today's human populations be able to exploit sucker strategies? I will consider three possible cases, viewing either genetic or meme bases of both involved strategies, altruistic one to be exploited, and one exploiting: 1) You can assume a genetic basis of altruistic Then, of course, it is absurd to speak of teaching a strategy. Obviously, Axelrod (1984), Dawkins (1976) and Williams (1989) cannot have meant that. 2) Another possibility is a meme basis of altruistic strategy that is defeated by even stronger selection for genes for cheating. If this is model supposed, it should not be forgotten that there is only very weak and rudimentary selection pressure on maximizing viability in most contemporary industrialized human societies. Living in welfare states releases humans from many forces that had selective power in earlier times (cf. Verrell 1996). In some Westernized societies very act of having children is even punished by fiscal means, virtually rewarding zero reproductive success with taxation advantages. Last, but not least, contraception, Dawkins's (1976) favourite example for a meme's ability of outcompeting genes' interests, is widely available. Therefore, family planning and other memes, rather than heritable viability traits, must be thought of as determining reproductive success in contemporary human populations. 3) Finally, you can assume a meme for altruism being invaded by another, meme. Here, I use word in same meaning that Dawkins (1976) uses in phrase selfish gene. Hence, all memes are in sense that ones that are more successful in replicating themselves will increase their representation in (human) brains during next (meme) generation. Talking about memes' success, it is important to realize that you have to distinguish between two differ-