On biodiversity access, intellectual property rights, and conservation

Abstract

Recent international agreements such as the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights have called for increased mutual transfer of biodiversity and biotechnology between poor and rich countries. These agreements also call for the protection of intellectual property rights (IPR) on biotechnology transferors in the receiving countries. This paper examines the biodiversity conservation implications of providing physical access and IPR protection to foreign consumers of biodiversity. An integrated model of optimal resource extinction and shared resource harvesting game is presented. The model results show that, as foreign and indigenous users compete for the same open-access resource, optimal extinction may occur as a noncooperative equilibrium under certain bioeconomic conditions. Extinction may be prevented by forging successful cooperation between consumers, initiating a joint harvesting process. Depending upon the model parameters, even under cooperation, increased patent protection and physical access either promotes the conservation of biodiversity or enhances its physical exploitation. Patent protection and resource access must, therefore, be developed carefully by biodiversity-rich countries to successfully balance their domestic conservation and socioeconomic goals.