Of Spies, Refugees and Hostile Propaganda: How Austria dealt with the Hungarian Crisis of 1956

Abstract

AbstractAustrian historians have traditionally highlighted the positive effects that the Hungarian crisis of 1956 had on their country, forcing it to implement the neutrality it had won just one year earlier. Archival documents, however, reveal the negative ‘spillover’ effects of the crisis, at least in the short run. In fact, the crisis hindered Austria's ability to further the cause of Hungarian freedom. It forced Austria to seek substantial financial and logistical help from other countries. Finally, the crisis worsened Austria's relations with both Hungary and the Soviet Union, thereby undoing the progress made after the State Treaty was signed in May 1955. The Khrushchev and Kádár regimes exploited the issues of border incidents, espionage, discrimination against international organizations, delay in repatriating refugees, and anti‐communist propaganda to accuse Austria of violating neutrality, thereby throwing Austria onto the defensive and reducing the negative impact of the Soviet Union's aggression against its own ally, Hungary. It was hard enough for Austria to remain neutral in the cold war period in general, let alone during an actual ‘hot war’– especially when the country was new at exercising neutrality, when the crisis was right on its border, and when the population adhered to western democratic values.