Of Experience and Being: Apropos of This and That - An Analysis from Daoism to Heidegger

This groundbreaking inquiry into the centrality of place in Martin Heidegger's thinking offers not only an illuminating reading of Heidegger's thought but a detailed investigation into the way in which the concept of place relates to core philosophical issues. In Heidegger's Topology, Jeff Malpas argues that an engagement with place, explicit in Heidegger's later work, informs Heidegger's thought as a whole. What guides Heidegger's thinking, Malpas writes, is a conception of philosophy's starting point: our finding ourselves already "there," situated in the world, in "place". Heidegger's concepts of being and place, he argues, are inextricably bound together. Malpas follows the development of Heidegger's topology through three stages: the early period of the 1910s and 1920s, through Being and Time, centered on the "meaning of being"; the middle period of the 1930s into the 1940s, centered on the "truth of being"; and the late period from the mid-1940s on, when the "place of being" comes to the fore. (Malpas also challenges the widely repeated arguments that link Heidegger's notions of place and belonging to his entanglement with Nazism.) The significance of Heidegger as a thinker of place, Malpas claims, lies not only in Heidegger's own investigations but also in the way that spatial and topographic thinking has flowed from Heidegger's work into that of other key thinkers of the past 60 years. Bradford Books imprint

This groundbreaking inquiry into the centrality of in Martin Heidegger's thinking offers not only an illuminating reading of Heidegger's thought but a detailed investigation into the way in which the concept of relates to core philosophical issues. In Heidegger's Topology, Jeff Malpas argues that an engagement with place, explicit in Heidegger's later work, informs Heidegger's thought as a whole. What guides Heidegger's thinking, Malpas writes, is a conception of philosophy's starting point: our finding ourselves already there, situated in the world, in place. Heidegger's concepts of and place, he argues, are inextricably bound together. Malpas follows the development of Heidegger's topology through three stages: the early period of the 1910s and 1920s, through Being and Time, centered on the meaning of being; the middle period of the 1930s into the 1940s, centered on the truth of being; and the late period from the mid-1940s on, when the place of being comes to the fore. (Malpas also challenges the widely repeated arguments that link Heidegger's notions of and belonging to his entanglement with Nazism.) The significance of Heidegger as a thinker of place, Malpas claims, lies not only in Heidegger's own investigations but also in the way that spatial and topographic thinking has flowed from Heidegger's work into that of other key thinkers of the past 60 years.

242 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY asks questions like these: What is there in favor of calling green a primary color, and not a blend of blue and yellow? (1, 6) or, Why can something be transparent green but not transparent white? (1, 19). The effect of such questions is to force us to realize that our concept of color is more complex than we might have realized, or would want it to be if we are committed to epistemologicaI theories in which color experience counts as basic. Other questions make us aware that the simple contrast of conceptual and empirical turns out to be hopelessly inadequate, and that this immensely complicates, if it does not vitiate, the task of drawing a comprehensive map of knowledge . We understand, in a way, what Wittgenstein is doing, but come to think we do not, since the effect of reading these remarks is to unsettle us about beliefs we had thought we could safely assume. The difficulties of Wittgenstein's questions pass over into the Companion, as was the case with Max Black's Companion to the "Tractatus" as well. Both works fortify standard ventures at interpretation, and both frustrate by leaving untouched one's worst perplexities. But perhaps one sweeping thought can be ventured. Wittgenstein once remarked that the present age is a time for popular science, and therefore not a time for philosophy. 6 Reading Wittgenstein, or his Companion , restores vitality to ways of thought and speech more primitive, and more basic, than science. Surely the typical object of his therapy is the muddle we get into by borrowing the language and method of science to describe and explain the relation of the perceiver to the world, or the agent to influences on his conduct. Moreover, the language of thought, act, and agency is presupposed in a description of how scientists can and do proceed. The temptations of a religious picture of the world for this point of view are strong--and reflected in the positive interest Wittgenstein evinced for religious thinkers. For religion expresses the limits of science by means of imagery that is not alien to a description of the world in terms of things and processes. But to say this is to come to a halt before the apparatus of language games and deep grammar as one comes to exegetical dead ends before Plato's Forms or Spinoza's infinite attributes. They are the imperfect means of communicating essentially private visions. One final cavil: The reader is sometimes teased rather than appeased by numbered citations referring to unpublished manuscripts. To quote them in full would of course have made the Companion impossibly tong. But for many readers Hallett's citations wilt be, at best, promissory notes to be cashed only when it suits Wittgenstein's executors to publish this material. It is to be hoped that when that day arrives it will be possible to correlate the manuscripts with Hallett's citations. As the Remarks on Colour show, however, we cannot be too sanguine. Would it not be wiser to publish the manuscripts as they were written, rather than to select passages which in the editor's judgment are related by theme? Such a policy would better serve future students of Wittgenstein , who from now on will go to the texts Hallett in hand. ALFRED LOUCH Clarement Graduate School Martin Heidegger. The Piety of Thinking: Essays by Martin Heidegger. Translated, with notes and commentary, by James G. Hart and John C. Maraldo. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976. Pp. xi + 212. The possible significance of Martin Heidegger's works for theology and for religious faith has long been a question as intriguing as it is complex. Since the first appearance of Being and Time about life," which, Professor Anscombe promises, "will appear elsewhere." The translation, by Linda L. McAlister and Margaret Schuttle, is up to the expected standard of accuracy and lucidity. Normal Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein:A Memoir (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 73. BOOK REVIEWS 243 in 1927 Catholic and Protestant theologians have sought to appropriate Heidegger for their own understandingof Christianity. With the publicationof his many later works over the last fifty years, the controversy over Heidegger's...

Many of our current environmental problems stem from damage to the natural world through excessive use of modern technologies. Since these problems are now global in scope, it is helpful to take a comparative philosophical approach—in this case by way of Laozi, Zhuangzi, and Martin Heidegger. Heidegger’s thoughts on these topics are quite consonant with classical Daoist thinking, in part because he was influenced by it. Although Zhuangzi and Heidegger warn against the ways technology can impair rather than promote human flourishing, they are not simply anti-technological in their thinking. Both rather recommend a critical stance that would allow us to shift to a more reflective employment of less disruptive technologies.

In a recent paper in Nursing Inquiry and in his other work, Michael Crotty was severely critical of much interpretive nursing scholarship and especially of some nurse scholars' interpretations of the work of Martin Heidegger. In this paper we respond to Crotty's attempt to set out what Heidegger 'actually says' [sic] in relation to tradition, culture, destruction, das Man and everydayness. We suggest that Crotty took a narrow, existentialist view of Heidegger's work and that this view was often misguided and poorly informed. We show not only that an alternative understanding of Heidegger's work in these important areas is possible, but that this interpretation is strongly supported by a deeper and wider reading of Heidegger's own work and of the secondary literature of Heideggerian scholarship.

Heidegger discussed the topic of ”Nothingness” (Das Nichts) on 1929 in his ”What is Metaphysics?”. He mentioned the ”Das Nichts selbst nichtet”. This thinking of Nothingness is similar with Laotze's ”Wu” (無). This similarity is often mentioned, but its deeper meaning in the background of the thinking of ”Sein und Nichts gehoren zusammen” (Heidegger) and the Being and Nothingness belonging together in the darkness of Tao (Laotze) is disregarded. This article tackles this disregarded topic in two perspectives. First, I reexamine volume 42 of Heidegger's complete works ”Schellings Abhandlung uber das Wesen der Menschlichen Freiheit (1809)” in order to illuminate the trend from Philosophy of reason and will (Heidegger discussed on Kant and Nietzche) to the philosophy of non-will (Heidegger's discussion on Schelling and himself). Second. I reexamine Heidegger's discussion on Nietzsche (Nietzsche, Erster Band, Zweiter Band, Pfullingen, 1961) and its influence on Kyoto school philosopher K. Nishitani. In these new background I exposits the intercultural communication between Heidegger and Laotze about ”Nothingness”.

Following the publication of the Schwarze Hefte, the question of Heideggers relation with German National Socialism arose again with renewed intensity. The books reviewed are three biographies and a monograph treating the life and work of Heidegger with a focus on his commitment to National Socialism. The biographies make use not only of the volumes of the Schwarze Hefte, but also of the widely spread new sources, e.g. of Heideggers letters published during the last two decades, and provide – with various degrees of philosophical insight – new interpretations of Heideggers commitment. The monograph tries to give an interpretation of the entire work centred around and resting upon Heideggers political attitude.Thomas Rohkrämer, Martin Heidegger. Eine politische Biographie. Paderborn: Schöningh, 2020, 297 S. – Lorenz Jäger, Heidegger. Ein deutsches Leben, Berlin: Rowohlt 2021. 606 S. Guillaume Payen, Heidegger. Die Biographie, Darmstadt: WBG / Theiss, 2022. 703 S.; französisches Original: Martin Heidegger. Catholicisme, Révolution, Nazisme, Paris: Perrin, 2016. – Oliver Precht, Heidegger. Zur Selbst- und Fremdbestimmung seiner Philosophie, Hamburg: Meiner, 2020. 312 S.

488 BOOK REVIEWS particular period of history, even though this may not be personal guilt. The doctrine of original sin is difficult to accept in our time not simply because of distortions of it in history or because of adjustments that must be made to relate it to the modern understanding of man's development as evolutionary but also because of the individualism that is so deeply ingrained in men of our time and that stands in opposition to the acceptance of this mystery. St. Anselm's Abbey Wa6hington, D. C. Jorrn FARRELLY, 0. S. B. The Piety of Thinking. By MARTIN HEIDEGGER. Translated with an Introduction by James G. Hart and John C. Maraldo. Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1976. $10.95. The Piety of Thinl~ing contains translations of four essays by Martin Heidegger and a formal report of a " Conversation with Martin Heidegger," with extensive and very helpful notes on the texts. The translators, James Hart and John Maraldo, also provide a lengthy commentary on the themes covered in the essays and on Heidegger's thought in general. I shall discuss the four essays in order, considering the " Conversation " in conjunction with the second of these, and finally I shall turn to the translators ' commentary. 1. " Phenomenology and Theology " is an address given by Heidegger in 1927 and again in 1928 and slightly reworked prior to its publication in 1969. Thus its conception roughly coincides with that of Being and Time and Kant and the Problems of Metaphysics, early works which manifest Heidegger's struggle to find clarity with regard to the question of Being. It is an attempt to define the relationship between theology and philosophy . Heidegger concludes by clarifying the fundamental differences between the two and by enjoining cooperation between the two within the " community of sciences." Heidegger in this essay characterizes theology as a positive science which has faith as its object. Theology is a positive science in the sense that it attempts the conceptualization and demonstration of its positiim, faith. Faith is both the motivation and the object of theology; thus theology is understood as fides qiwerens intellectum. Kierkegaard's influence upon Heidegger becomes visible in the understanding of faith that Heidegger proffers. Faith names a believing existence, a " rebirth," a " faith-full existence." The science of theology concerns itself with " subjective truths "; it is an analysis of a specific kind of BOOK REVIEWS 489 existence. God is only mentioned in passing in this essay. Heidegger notes that etymologically theology means the science of God. He comments that traditionally theology studies the relationship between God and man. But he rejects these notions of theology for his own. Theology is Christian theology whose object is Christian faith. Philosophy, by contrast to theology, is the science of Being, Ontology. As in Heidegger's other early works, Being is a transcendental concept by which the totality of beings is grasped; Being is the ontological ground concept. That notion of Being tended to be unworkable in Heidegger's developing efforts to rethink Being more radically. His success at this rethinking gives clarity by contrast; his later reflections on these early statements about Being amount almost to retractions. He includes his own works among those which must be overcome because they a!·e metaphysical and unable to think Being. As Kant and the Problem of Metaphysfos points out, ontology can become possible only after the foundation for metaphysics is established. This effort Heidegger terms "fundamental ontology," which is the basic theme of Being and Time. The phenomenological analysis of Dasein's being functions as an analogy according to which the Being of beings can be known. The phenomenological method is employed by Heidegger in service of the task of fundamental ontology; it makes possible a demonstration that ontological knowledge of Being is possible. This same notion of phenomenology obtains in " Phenomenology and Theology: " " Phenomenology is always the name for the procedure of ontology, which essentially distinguished itself from all other positive sciences" (p. QI). From this it follows that philosophy is understood as the phenomenological analysis of Dasein in service of the question of Being. Philosophy is neither a positive nor an antic science; its " object " is Being...

One of the first book-length studies to examine Gadamer's relation to Heidegger in depth, this important work looks at the ways in which Gadamer positively appropriates central elements of Heidegger's work as well as the way he extends Heidegger's critique of Western metaphysics, avoiding and tacitly challenging some of the most problematical aspects of Heidegger's work. By examining two of the central concepts in Gadamer's work, tradition and language, and by analyzing Gadamer's relation to his mentor, Martin Heidegger, Sheibler successfully shows that far from being the conservative both modernist and post-modernist critics have accused him of being, Gadamer anticipates a number of concerns central to post-modern or post-structuralist thought.

Despite their widespread influence, Martin Heidegger's works have rarely been assessed for their own direct significance as political theory. In this article I undertake such an assessment by drawing out the political implications of Heidegger's understanding of freedom and community in two of his early works. Specifically, I argue that, although Heidegger's thought has been interpreted as advocating political conservatism, it in fact propounds a new kind of radicalism which is neither precisely conservative nor progressive, although decidedly revolutionary. When this is brought to light, it is easier to see the connection between Heidegger's works and the earlier Philosophy of Freedom, as well as ways in which they anticipate important trends in contemporary political thought.

The philosophical significance of place—in Heidegger's work and as the focus of a distinctive mode of philosophical thinking. The idea of place—topos—runs through Martin Heidegger's thinking almost from the very start. It can be seen not only in his attachment to the famous hut in Todtnauberg but in his constant deployment of topological terms and images and in the situated, “placed” character of his thought and of its major themes and motifs. Heidegger's work, argues Jeff Malpas, exemplifies the practice of “philosophical topology.” In Heidegger and the Thinking of Place, Malpas examines the topological aspects of Heidegger's thought and offers a broader elaboration of the philosophical significance of place. Doing so, he provides a distinct and productive approach to Heidegger as well as a new reading of other key figures—notably Kant, Aristotle, Gadamer, and Davidson, but also Benjamin, Arendt, and Camus. Malpas, expanding arguments he made in his earlier book Heidegger's Topology (MIT Press, 2007), discusses such topics as the role of place in philosophical thinking, the topological character of the transcendental, the convergence of Heideggerian topology with Davidsonian triangulation, the necessity of mortality in the possibility of human life, the role of materiality in the working of art, the significance of nostalgia, and the nature of philosophy as beginning in wonder. Philosophy, Malpas argues, begins in wonder and begins in place and the experience of place. The place of wonder, of philosophy, of questioning, he writes, is the very topos of thinking.

This is the first book to explore the relationship between Martin Heidegger's work and modern anthropology. Heidegger attracts much scholarly interest among social scientists, but few have explored his ideas in relation to current anthropological debates. The disciplines modernist foundations, the nature of cultural constructionism and of art even what an anthropology of art must include are all informed and illuminated by Heidegger's work. The author argues that many contemporary anthropologists, in their concern to return subjectivity and voice to their interlocutors, neglect to recognize that language and other representational practices conceal the world and human subjectivity as much as reveal it. The author also suggests that Heidegger's critique of western technology provides the basis for a return to anthropology's sociological foundations. Emerging from over ten years of original research, and drawing on a rich knowledge of Australian and Melanesian ethnography, this book reassesses the underlying framework of modern and,

Translated by Maria del Rosario Acosta Lopez, Tobias Keiling, Ian Alexander Moore, and Yuliya Aleksandrovna Tsutserova1If only great minds are surrounded by legend, then Martin Heidegger is certainly one of them. Here, one would have to list not only those defamations surrounding rectorate-that he participated in burning of books and denied Husserl entry to library. Something positive, more cheerful would have to be recounted here as well. In this case, one would be crediting Heidegger with skills which he himself did not really dare to believe he possessed and with works he never wrote: this is exactly what has happened in case of speculations surrounding Heidegger's work on Paul Klee in Nachlass.But even legends often have a basis in facts. If, in case of reproaches concerning Heidegger's political engagement, these facts were his assumption of rectorate and associated admission to the party, in case of Klee, it is Heidegger's enthusiasm for Klee's opus, related both verbally and in writing: as both Petzet and Poggeler independently and credibly relate,2 after having experienced art of Klee, Heidegger thought he had to write a second part and a pendant to artwork essay. With Klee, art transforms itself [sich wandele];'5 with his art, something has arrived which none of us glimpse as of yet [etwas eingetroffen, was wir alle noch nicht erblicken] ,4This enthusiasm for Klee has irritated and led astray many who have taken an interest in it. Heidegger was initially approached by Georg Schmidt, director of public art collections of city of Basel, with (unfulfillable) request to write Klee book.5 Furthermore, in his monograph on Heidegger, Walter Biemel writes of a at a gathering of architects in Freiburg i. B. entitled 'Paul Klee'in 1956.6 This lecture is mentioned by Otto Poggeler, too.7 According to Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert, this lecture took place in 1960, again at gathering of architects in Freiburg; in addition, she claims to be aware of extensive, unpublished preparatory writings and elaborations for this lecture.8Truth be told, this lecture is not to be found in Nachlass,9 and neither are there extensive . . . elaborations. In contrast to high expectations, what is contained in Nachlass are meager, bullet point-style notes; seventeen sheets of paper in total that do not at all resemble a lecture or preparatory work for such a lecture.The best and most obvious way of avoiding false legends has always been to put matter and facts of matter [ Tat-Sache] on table, i.e., in this case, to publish notes. There would be nothing to object to here, if such did not contradict express instructions of author. Martin Heidegger himself decided that his sheets of notes (and not only those on Klee) would not be allowed to be published as long as copyright law was in effect. But even after that date, Heidegger did not see it fit to have these sheets edited, since occupying oneself with them would only make sense for experts on subject matter.Thus, only remaining option was path taken here (one might call it a middle path or not): to describe Heidegger's handwritten notes and to sketch out direction of Heidegger's interpretation. Such an attempt does not only pursue negative aim of dispelling legends. Heidegger's notes on Klee-fragmentary, elliptical, and enigmatic though they may be in many respects-are interesting and instructive enough to teach one to look at Klee's work differently and to find a new way of accessing this artist whom Heidegger valued higher than Picasso10 Of course, these notes will be meaningful only for those who are well read and at home in Heidegger's later philosophy.11I.An Account of Handwritten NotesHeidegger's notes on Klee are comprised of seventeen sheets of paper sized DIN A 5 and smaller. They are generally written in German script with blue ink and blue ballpoint; individual words are underlined in red or blue; some sheets feature sketches of Klee's works. …

' Speaking out of Turn : Martin Heidegger and die Kehre ' examines the difference between Heidegger's own understanding of 'the turning' and that understanding which originated with Karl Lowith and was later presented to English-speaking readers by William Richardson in Martin Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought . The study focuses on Heidegger's own introduction to Richardson's book, and argues that, far from confirming Richardson's view that there is a 'Heidegger I' and 'Heidegger II' connected by the 'reversal' or turning, Heidegger sought to indicate with (sometimes indirect) reference to his own works that the 'turning' is a movement in thought that it was part of the original project of Being and Time to carry through, but which he only succeeded in describing much later. The study attempts to illustrate this by a close examination of the works to which Heidegger alludes in his Foreword to Richardson's book. Many of these were not available when Richardson published (1963), and so it has only more recently been possible to amplify Heidegger's earlier published works with reference to his lecture courses. The study concludes that the horizon of time and the analytic of Dasein never really disappear from his later thinking, as many have claimed, and proposes that the relationship between the earlier and later Heidegger be re-examined. This re-examination takes the form of accepting that far from the 'turning' representing a fracture, where Heidegger abandons the existential-temporal analytic of Dasein in favour of an attempt to think only being ( das Sein ) as such, the 'turning' represents the point of unity in Heidegger's work. This point of unity shows how Dasein and being 'belong together' in 'the event' ( das Ereignis ).

I argue that continental philosophical resources are more appropriate for comparative philosophy regarding classical Daoism since they in various ways challenge the dominant metaphysical orientation of Western thought and give us a better and more appropriate vocabulary to make sense of important Daoist ideas within the confines of Western languages. Since classical Daoism is largely non-metaphysical or at least not metaphysical in the same way as the Western history of philosophy is, it makes sense that those within the Western tradition who have sought to displace the dominant metaphysical tradition would be more in tune with such non-metaphysical considerations. I focus on Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Derrida and present three interrelated areas of comparison with classical Daoism. First, I discuss the constant complication of any seriously dualist approach and with that the attempt to put humans in a constructive and primarily interdependent relationship with the rest of the world, which points to a form of process philosophy. Second, I focus on ideas regarding the use and limitations of language that both traditions display, and on the resulting efforts to understand language differently. Lastly, I present the decentering of the subject or the self is another feature prominent in both Daoism and the continental thinkers, although in different ways.