Abstract

There is no sense in a science who tries to infer in the object interfering as little as possible. From this simple proposition, this article intends to analyze, perhaps in more topics than it could swallow itself, the sense of representation as used in the tradition, and its respective overcoming in favor of what Ian Hacking names Ontological realism, or, Entity realism. Representations, necessary for the investigation of the object, are knowable even if it’s not possible to answer them adequately in the very nature of language, giving space for questioning the essential role's need of the representation's permanence research in scientific practice, as realized at the clashes between realism and anti-realism in contemporary philosophy.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.