Number of coalitions and resources as sources of power in coalition bargaining.

Abstract

Five-person groups of male or female undergraduates played 20 trials of a coalition game that varied the number of coalitions available to the players. Games were presented either with or without resources being assigned. Results indicated that both resources and number of alternatives influenced coalition outcomes. Players' payoffs were directly related to both factors, and coalition frequency was inversely related to the total number of alternatives available to the coalition members. Minor gender differences were also obtained. Implications of these results for coalition theories in general and weighted probability model in particular, are discussed. During the past decade a substantial body of theoretical and empirical work in social psychology and other disciplines has dealt with the formation of coalitions. Coalitions influence many aspects of our lives, as illustrated by the fact that marriages, trade unions, and NATO are all coalitions. Thus an understanding of coalition formation would be of both practical and theoretical significance. The present study investigated the importance of two potential sources of power in coalition situations (number of coalitions in which the person is included and assigned resources), one potentially influential individual differences factor (gender), and the validity of four theories of coalition formation (minimum power theory, Roth-Shapley value, weighted probability model, and bargaining theory).