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This book fills a major gap in the scholarly literature concerning international criminal law, comparative criminal law, and human rights law. The principle of legality (non-retroactivity of crimes and punishments and related doctrines) is fundamental to criminal law and human rights law. Yet this was the first book-length study of the status of legality in international law - in international criminal law, international human rights law, and international humanitarian law. This was also the first book to survey legality/non-retroactivity in all national constitutions, developing the patterns of implementation of legality in the various legal systems such as Common Law, Civil Law, Islamic Law, and Asian Law around the world. This is a necessary book for any scholar, practitioner, and library in the area of international, criminal, comparative, human rights, or international humanitarian law.

A large proportion of the articles in Juridica International this year is dedicated to criminal law. A paper that truly addresses the issues of legal dogmatics in this field in depth with regard to delict of negligence was contributed by Laura Feldmanis. Raimo Lahti’s article on the criminal liability of a legal person is written from the standpoint of criminal and comparative law, while Frieder Dünkel’s approach to German sanction law should provide plenty of interest and joy of discovery for legal scientists and practitioners alike. Thomas Weigend’s submission, in turn, takes a rather unique look at the material element in criminal law and criminal procedure. He focuses his attention on truth and values. Andres Parmas has considered Estonian criminal law in relation to the dogmatics of international criminal law. All of these articles are an outgrowth of presentations made at a jubilee conference that took place at the University of Tartu. I would like to take the opportunity here to thank everyone who participated in the conference – especially, of course, the speakers. In addition, two articles on medical law had their beginnings in presentations at the conference. One of them, by Henning Rosenau, is squarely in the domain of classic medical law, bringing together discussion of human rights and of issues connected with reproductive medicine. The other medical-law article, by Henning Lorenz, draws particular attention to an addition to German criminal law that has made waves (and met a lot of criticism) in the fields of criminal law, medical law, and legal policy in general: criminalising assisted suicide. This topic has been subject to intense discussion also in the media of Estonia and other countries. I can happily say on behalf of both myself and the editorial board that, at the same time, the new issue offers plenty to read also for those less interested in criminal and medical law. Self-driving cars are a matter of interest not only to engineers but also for lawyers. Taivo Liivak’s ‘What Safety are We Entitled to Expect of Self-driving Vehicles?’ considers some of the issues that we will soon face on the streets on a daily basis. Private law is represented in the article ‘A Half-built House? The New Consumer Sales Directive Assessed as Contract Law’. This piece on consumer protection and contract law was submitted by Kåre Lilleholt, who holds the title Doctor Honoris Causa from the University of Tartu. A paper jointly authored by Ilya Ilin and Aleksei Kelli, ‘The Use of Human Voice and Speech in Language Technologies: The EU and Russian Intellectual Property Law Perspectives’, examines the legal protection of intellectual property. The field of constitutional law is represented too, by Ivo Pilving’s presentation of an approach to fundamental rights in the context of European Union law in ‘Parallele Anwendbarkeit von Grundrechtecharta der EU und nationalen Grundrechten’. Still more colours are added to the legal palette by Märt Maarand, with his article ‘The Concept of Recovery of Credit Institutions in the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive’, and by the paper ‘Is Full Preference for a Secured Claim in Insolvency Proceedings Justified?’, by Anto Kasak.

Arguably, more than any other state or interstate actor, German federal authorities, including the German Federal Public Prosecutor General (Generalbundesanwalt, gba) and German Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt), have been at the forefront of issuing arrest warrants for senior members of the Syrian government suspected of atrocity crimes in the wake of the Arab Spring. This includes German federal authorities making the first arrest of a senior member of the Syrian government in February 2019 for crimes against humanity. This article argues that in relation to core international crimes, Germany’s concept of law reflects one based on a ‘standard’ and international rule of law. Moreover, German federal authorities have demonstrated a willingness to use international humanitarian and criminal law (ichl) in relation to those most responsible for core international crimes. In this way, Germany’s current investigations into alleged crimes against humanity in Syria since 2011 provides for an illuminating case for extending universal jurisdiction, as well as the ‘responsibility to prosecute’ as a legal obligation. It also indicates how a multiplicity of actors – including state and non-state actors – can extend the reach of international criminal law, when the International Criminal Court (icc) cannot act.

International Criminal Justice is a controversial concept, and there is a burgeoning body of literature on its exact contours. Understood broadly, the term “international criminal justice” covers a broad category, integrating international criminal law (ICL) within an overarching interdisciplinary enterprise also “incorporating philosophical, historical, political and international relations, sociological, anthropological and criminological perspectives” (Roberts, 2007). International criminal law consists, at its core, of a combination of criminal law and public international law principles. The idea of individual criminal responsibility and the concept of prosecuting an individual for a specific (macrocriminal) act are derived from criminal law, while the classical (Nuremberg) offenses form part of (public) international law and thus the respective conduct is directly punishable under ICL (principle of direct individual criminal responsibility in public international law). The dualistic base of international criminal law is also reflected in the reading of the mandates of the international criminal tribunals; one can either take a “security, peace, and human rights”–oriented approach or a “criminal justice”–oriented approach, either of which may entail a paradoxical goal or purpose ambiguity of international criminal law. In any case, the strong grounding in criminal law, together with the actual enforcement of international criminal law by way of international criminal proceedings and trials, converts international criminal law into criminal law on a supranational level and thus entails the full application of the well-known principles of liberal, post-enlightenment criminal law, in particular the principles of legality, culpability, and fairness. These principles constitute the minimum standard of any criminal justice system based on the rule of law and thus must also apply in an international criminal justice system. The adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 1998 and the effective establishment of the Court in 2002 have led to an institutionalization of international criminal law, turning the page on ad hoc imposition in favor of a treaty-based universal system. In addition, the Rome Statute provides for the first codification of international criminal law, with a potentially universal reach. Therewith, international criminal law was not only united into a single penal system of the international community, but it was also extended beyond its fundamental core areas of substantive and procedural law into other branches of criminal law (law of sanctions, enforcement of sentences, and judicial assistance).

The jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (hereinafter: ICC) is limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the entire international community that threaten security, peace, and well-being of the world. This article argues that serious (transitional) economic offences should belong in this group. Ignoring these crimes, which often represent economic violence characteristic of transitional and post-conflict countries, can lead to another cycle of armed conflict and/or physical violence as well as to internal and external insecurity. Responses to globalization are having a significant effect on international law and institutions with a view to protecting economic and social human rights, human security, and human dignity. Sometimes, as in the case of Croatia, national states are not able to and/or unwilling to prosecute serious and systemic economic crimes, which in turn undermines individual and collective security. The same could be said for international criminal law. By ignoring these crimes and violations – unlike what international human rights law, supranational criminology, and transitional justice does – the core international criminal law no longer responds to the needs of societies and individuals. The Rechtsgut in need of protection by prosecuting serious economic crimes that fulfill the threshold of core crimes on an international level is comprised of the “security, peace and well-being of the world.” Therefore, one could argue that the International Criminal Court’s possible involvement in economic violence does have a legal base, without needing to amend the ICC’s Statute (hereinafter: ICCSt). Since one must be aware of the diversity that exists as to the criteria for international criminalization, this article is based on broader grounds in order to argue in favor of international criminalization of these economic crimes. The article therefore emphasizes the importance of connecting narratives of international criminal law, with discourses on international human rights law (based on Art. 21 of the ICCSt), human security, (supranational) criminology, transitional justice, and (economic) criminal law. In the line of (human) security discourse, this approach seeks to find arguments as to whether or not it is necessary to begin prosecuting serious (transitional) economic offences as crimes under international law. First, this article gives a brief overview of the failed experiment in Croatia concerning the prosecution of transitional economic crimes that served as incentive, based on the ICC’s complementarity principle.

This chapter clarifies the relevance, potential and limitations of international criminal law in relation to preventing, mitigating and responding to disasters. 'Disasters are usually complex and rarely entirely ‘natural’ or entirely ‘human-made'. In order to gauge the relevance of international criminal law in relation to disasters, it is crucial to examine how adverse human agency can intervene at various moments in the course of the development, impact, exacerbation of and recovery from a disaster. Depending on the circumstances, adverse human agency can be such that it meets the elements of an international crime, including when a disaster is not a sudden crisis but a slow and gradual decline over time.

In international law doctrine carried on extensive talking and still it is a actual subject, if the individual is liable of responsability and, implied, of sanction for international crimes. Before to reveal some aspects of natural persons responsability for international crimes a couple of clarifications is required. Thus, we recall that the first author which use the term international criminal law was Jeremy Bentham, who distinguished between the criminal law of the community of states and the criminal law of a state. Over time, legal doctrine has extrapolated the concept of legal relationships with an international element, making the distinction between public international law and private international law. If criminal law is a branch of public law, then international criminal law becomes a sub-branch of international law, regulating criminal legal relationships with an international element. In other words, referring to private international law, we specify that it represents the totality of legal norms that resolve conflicts of laws or conflicts of jurisdiction and those regarding the legal status of the foreign national. In this context, the international element appears as a factual circumstance related to a legal relationship due to which this relationship is related to several legal systems (or laws belonging to different countries). With regard to international criminal law, we specify that this is a branch of public international law and designates the set of legal norms stipulated in various conventions and treaties by which states, in their capacity as subjects of law, order the repression of illicit acts that infringe fundamental rights of the international community. In other words, international criminal law consists of rules of general international law that govern the criminal liability of natural persons, individuals, for acts that harm international public order and constitute crimes against humanity.

Is international criminal law adequate in respect of ‘economic abuses’ such as corporate complicity in human rights abuses or harm arising through the exploitation of resources from conflict-affected areas? Attempts to assess the adequacy of international criminal law to deal with ‘economic abuses’ have given rise to a complex and multi-layered debate. Authors have analysed a range of different phenomena, making it challenging to generalise conclusions on the suitability of existing international criminal law. Against this background, it is crucial to distinguish different types of ‘economic abuses’ if we are to assess the adequacy of international criminal law to address them. To do so, I propose a three-dimensional model to disentangle the various categories of ‘economic abuses’. Depending on whether the actor, the harmful activity, and the affected legal interests are economic or non-economic, legally distinct types of ‘economic abuses’ can be discerned. Through exploring three specific constellations, the article demonstrates that the adequacy of international criminal law varies significantly for the various types of ‘economic abuses’. The model aims to serve as an analytical entry point to distinguish the nature and extent of the legal challenges in a factual scenario and contributes to the elaboration of nuanced and meaningful conclusions on the relative adequacy of international criminal law in relation to ‘economic abuses’.

The subject of this research is the planning, preparation, and waging of an aggressive war as a crime against the peace and security of mankind. The author raises the problem of the possibility of applying the retroactive force of the criminal law to an act of this kind, despite the absence of such a provision in article 10 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. As examples, the author provides examples of the initiation of criminal proceedings against the crime of genocide as one of the crimes against the peace and security of mankind. Special attention is paid to issues of international law, as well as judicial precedents concerning the consideration of disputes on this issue. The role of the International Military Tribunal for War Criminals of the European Axis Countries (Nuremberg Tribunal) in the formulation and subsequent consolidation of the rule on crimes of aggression is emphasized. In his research, the author uses such methods as historical, systematic, formal-legal, comparative, as well as methods of analysis, deduction and formal logic. The author's special contribution to the consideration of this issue is the study of the historical and philosophical foundations, the moral and ethical side of making genocide norms retroactive from both the point of view of international and national criminal law, as well as the study of the speeches of defenders and prosecutors at the Nuremberg trials on the issue under consideration. The main result of the study is the author's conclusion about the need to consolidate in the legislation of the Russian Federation the provision on the need to make the criminal law retroactive in relation to crimes against the peace and security of mankind by amending part 2 of Article 10 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. Expanding the definition of this rule would also simplify criminal procedural activities in the context of the initiation of criminal cases in these circumstances and their investigation.

In view of past historical experiences, there have been growing concerns that the development, use and proliferation of nuclear weapons can cause widespread and severe damage to the global environment, in spite of differences in the perceptions of environmental risks of nuclear weapons depending on the time period and situation. Thus, the proliferation and use of nuclear weapons has long been one of the major issues in the international community, including environmental aspects. As a result, international legal regulations have been attempted for the manufacture, production, acquisition, possession, transportation, deployment, stockpiling, tests and use of nuclear weapons through multilateral treaties, including international environmental law, and the issue was subjected to judicial judgment by the International Court of Justice (ICJ).BR In light of the potential danger of environmental destruction and damage caused by nuclear weapons, which is more severe and massive than by any other conventional weapons, regulation of nuclear weapons for environmental protection is recognized as a major task in modern international law. The traditional approach to nuclear weapon regulation has been primarily discussed in connection with national security, the prohibition of use of force, nuclear disarmament, and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, partially establishing relevant international norms in the respective fields.BR However, comprehensive regulation is still a long way off through the traditional approach. In addition, as ICJ indicated in its 1996 advisory opinion, this approach is somewhat inappropriate in obtaining a clear answer as to whether there is an international legal obligation to protect the environment from nuclear weapons, whether in peace or at war. Moreover, it is still questioned whether current international norms on nuclear weapon regulation can be an effective international legal basis for environmental protection.BR The author, based on this perception, reviewed the main relevant provisions of major international treaties in the fields of nuclear disarmament and denuclearization (Chapter Ⅱ), international humanitarian law (Chapter Ⅲ), and multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) (Chapter Ⅳ), which have been discussed as the influential legal basis to regulate nuclear weapons for the environmental protection in international law, and respectively analyzed their effectiveness as well. Through these discussions, from the perspective of ‘environmental protection’ in the non-ideological and non-political points of view, the author looks forward to being able to provide helpful motives to establish regional and/or global legal regime to not only protect the global environment, but also realize genuine humanitarianism and human rights protection by permanently removing nuclear weapons and achieving denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula.

In 1996, the International Court of Justice issued an opinion that the use of nuclear weapons is “scarcely reconcilable” with international humanitarian law and concluded that nations have an obligation to pursue good-faith negotiations leading to disarmament. The 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference reaffirmed the need for all states to comply with international humanitarian law, which governs the use of nuclear as well as conventional weapons. When the rules of war are applied to nuclear weapons, it becomes clear that these weapons cannot comply with international law. The effects of nuclear weapons are inherently uncontrollable and do not meet international criteria for discrimination between military and civilian targets, for proportionality, and for necessity. Arguments made by the United States as to why some uses of nuclear weapons could be lawful do not stand up to scrutiny. Nuclear weapon states should make immediate changes to any missions, deployments, and targeting policies and practices that facilitate the use of nuclear weapons. Not only does international law preclude the use of nuclear weapons, but it also precludes threats to use nuclear weapons.

Extensive efforts have been made in the modern period to suppress the possession and use of both chemical and nuclear weapons. However, progress towards the abolition of these two types of weapons presents a rather sharp contrast, as this case study shows. In this article the conventional prohibitions on the possession and use of these weapons are outlined, including the recent Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons of 2017. This Treaty prohibits the possession and use of nuclear weapons but it has not been (and likely will not be) ratified by any of the States that possess nuclear weapons. There is a further, and consequent, contrast between the two kinds of weapons in terms of whether a customary prohibition on the possession and use of chemical and/or nuclear weapons exists; this is also examined. Ultimately, there are lessons to be learned in terms of whether international law can change unless those most concerned, in this case the States that possess chemical or nuclear weapons, want it to change.

The general understanding of law is that, it is ‘a body of rules’ or ‘social order’ that regulate the relations in human community, various entities, societal harmonization and individuals to govern their respective mutual understanding. The law defines and regulates societal relationships. It “is an element, the only one, by which we are able to differentiate definitely and successfully between a legal, moral and religious order.” It is a balancing technique of the rights and obligations of humans in their daily life. The term law is a “grand norm” and thus, a general concept replacing all kinds of “laws”; It could be municipal law of states such as civil law, criminal law, liberal law, business law, intellectual property law, economic law, feudal law, socialist law, law, medical law, land law, media law, etc. Municipal law is a domestic law, or name used in replace of the national, statutory, internal law or domestic law of states. It applies to nationals, body of politic and others within state in that limited territorial jurisdiction. The legislative organ of state has supreme power to enact and enforce such laws in the country. The municipal law of the state is usually limited in the scope to nations and regulates the domestic issues, international law is a beyond that. On the other hand, there are certain areas of law developed at international level. These are; private international Law, international human rights law, international humanitarian law, international criminal law, refugee law, international environmental law, international economic & trade law, international space law, and Islamic law [Sharia law] is among few to mention. Municipal law and international law share something communal (or have similar normative conducts as being a law and regulate certain acts). Laws, whether national or international are not permanent; it can be made, amended, reformed and altered at any time. There is no clear way to measure law, its purpose and identify clear line between them to develop a certain model for each of them. The question may arise does international law satisfy legal requirements or normative standards to be considered as [international] law? Some legal scholars and jurists argue ‘if international law can be entitled as a true law or not’. To know whether international law is a true law or not it is would be nice to know the nature and functions of international law. Those who accept the legality of international law consider it as a prefect law with similar footing as the municipal law. Is international law a law? Those who support this view says, it is law because it doesn’t have another name than to be considered as [international] law; it is law because it has a certain procedural and substantive rules to follow; it is a law because, it regulates certain international acts conducted worldwide; it is a law because municipal law is usually limited to a territorial jurisdiction and do not reach for international remedies; it is a law because world nations have something to use separately and to share communally based on general principles of international law; international law regulates the relationship between states, international organizations and individuals across the globe; international law is designed in its own way, applies among sovereign states, and usually applied by international tribunals; international laws are sometimes practiced in national courts, in foreign offices, in international organization offices, and in regional organization offices. Therefore, international law exists as a law, even as a perfect law. International law is a prefect legal system has yet to develop and it doesn’t have to be seen through the ‘eyeglass’ of the municipal law of the states. Thus, the purpose of this article is to elaborate the views regarding this issue and to forward different legal arguments. Under the following title, I have provided three topics. Opposing view, proponents, my take regarding these views and application of international law.

The general understanding of the law is that it is ‘a body of rules’ or ‘social order’ that regulates the relations in the human community, various entities, societal harmonization, and individuals to govern their respective mutual understanding. The law defines and regulates societal relationships. It “is an element, the only one, by which we are able to differentiate definitely and successfully between a legal, moral and religious order.” It is a balancing technique of the rights and obligations of humans in their daily life. The term law is a “grand norm” and thus, a general concept replacing all kinds of “laws”; It could be municipal law of states such as civil law, criminal law, liberal law, business law, intellectual property law, economic law, feudal law, socialist law, law, medical law, land law, media law, etc. Municipal law is domestic law or name used in replace of the national, statutory, internal law, or domestic law of states. It applies to nationals, the body of politics, and others within the state in that limited territorial jurisdiction. The legislative organ of the state has supreme power to enact and enforce such laws in the country. The municipal law of the state is usually limited in the scope to nations and regulates the domestic issues, international law is beyond that. On the other hand, there are certain areas of law developed at the international level. These are; private international law, international human rights law, international humanitarian law, international criminal law, refugee law, international environmental law, international economic & trade law, international space law, and Islamic law [Sharia law] is among a few to mention. Municipal law and international law share something communal (or have similar normative conducts as being a law and regulate certain acts). Laws, whether national or international are not permanent; it can be made, amended, reformed, and altered at any time. There is no clear way to measure law, its purpose, and identify a clear line between them to develop a certain model for each of them. The question may arise does international law satisfy legal requirements or normative standards to be considered as [international] law? Some legal scholars and jurists argue ‘if international law can be entitled as a true law or not’. To know whether international law is a true law or not it is would be nice to know the nature and functions of international law. Those who accept the legality of international law consider it a perfect law with a similar footing as the municipal law. Is international law a law? Those who support this view says, it is law because it doesn’t have another name than to be considered as [international] law; it is law because it has certain procedural and substantive rules to follow; it is a law because it regulates certain international acts conducted worldwide; it is a law because municipal law is usually limited to a territorial jurisdiction and do not reach for international remedies; it is a law because world nations have something to use separately and to share communally based on general principles of international law; international law regulates the relationship between states, international organizations, and individuals across the globe; international law is designed in its own way, applies among sovereign states and usually applied by international tribunals; international laws are sometimes practiced in national courts, in foreign offices, in international organization offices, and in regional organization offices. Therefore, international law exists as a law, even as a perfect law. International law is a perfect legal system that has yet to develop and it doesn’t have to be seen through the ‘eyeglass’ of the municipal law of the states. Thus, the purpose of this article is to elaborate on the views regarding this issue and to forward different legal arguments. Under the following title, I have provided three topics. An opposing view, proponents, my take regarding these views and application of international law.

Ratner, Steven R. <i>The Thin Justice of International Law: A Moral Reckoning of the Law of Nations</i>.New York: Oxford University Press, 2015. Pp. 496. $85.00 (cloth).