Nuclear strategy in the Nordic region

Abstract

United States proposals during the Carter Administration to place enhanced radiation weapons (neutron bombs) in Western Europe and early discussion about the deployment of intermediate range nuclear missiles spurred former Finnish President Kekkonen to renew his nearly 20-year-old proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Nordic region. Following the December 1979 Dual Track decision of the NATO Ministers, who approved both Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) negotiations and nuclear force modernization if negotiations failed (a combination of 572 Cruise and Pershing II missiles), Kekkonen's proposals were echoed by his successor and by other officials in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark.1 Nordic views on nuclear weapons and related NATO policies are distinctly different from those in the rest of Western Europe. Norway and Denmark refuse to allow nuclear weapons on their soil or bases supporting permanently attached NATO forces. Both have emphasized a strong but conventional defense posture giving the Soviet Union no cause to consider them an offensive threat and no reason to attack them preemptively. Sweden's legacy of neutrality has been backed by strong conventional forces and is viewed in that country as an optimum position to avoid entanglement in Europe's wars.The other non-NATO Nordic state, Finland, has fought Russian forces three times in this century and has long understood that she cannot expect help from outside powers. She maintains small but competent armed forces and avoids direct confrontations with her Soviet neighbor. It is fair to conclude that Northern Europeans have followed and will continue to pursue policies that insulate them from both the worst consequences of the nuclear arms race and war in Central Europe. This paper will argue that it is possible to insulate the Nordic area from the worst con-