Abstract
The United States failed to prevent Pakistan from building nuclear weapons because U.S. officials never fully grasped Pakistan's perception of its security situation relative to India, especially after the 1971 Bangladesh war. Because Pakistani officials considered nuclear weapons essential to national survival, none of the measures deployed by the United States to dissuade Pakistan could have worked. This and other lessons of the Pakistani experience, including exploiting willing supply networks, providing financial and programmatic autonomy to key officials, and the consequent dangers of losing control of a dangerous program conducted in strict secrecy, are analyzed and their implications for future proliferants assessed.
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