Nuclear Proliferation: Can Congress Act in Time?

Abstract

I The threat of nuclear proliferation can scarcely be overstated. As many as forty countries, typically underdeveloped and unstable, may have nuclear weapons capabilities by 1990.1 More likely than an all-out nuclear war beginning between superpowers is a nuclear exchange between small countries, and a nuclear war anywhere has to be assumed to risk escalation to superpower involvement whether by deliberate intervention, or by miscalculation, bluff, or panic. Even between two small nations, a nuclear war could result in unprecedented death and destruction, with the United States being called upon to supply billions of dollars for humanitarian relief, and with environmental damage that would scarcely respect borders. Paranoia caused by nuclear weapons proliferation would complicate defense planning.2 The United States could be compelled to prepare against a variety of threats from numerous challengers, building us a vastly increased nuclear arsenal with no clear strategic purpose. How could the United States signal in advance its determination to retaliate with unacceptable damage against a nuclear attack if there were no way of identifying the attacker against whom we would then retaliate? Such an attack could be delivered by terrorists or in bombs exploded in ships of false national registry anchored in our harbors. Indeed, the objective could be to provoke us into nuclear war with the wrong nation. Damage to our own civil liberties could hardly be avoided. National fright typically leads to a huge and pervasive police apparatus. Who can say that our