Nuclear Command and Control in NATO

Gaurav Kampani provides a compelling account of the evolution of India's nuclear weapons program from 1989 to 1999 and rightly highlights how the need for secrecy “stymied India's operational advances.”1 “Secrecy concerns,” he argues, “prevented decisionmakers and policy planners from decomposing problem sets and parceling them out simultaneously for resolution to multiple bureaucratic actors, including the military” (p. 82). In his eagerness to argue this point, however, Kampani is too quick to dismiss other explanations for India's slow pace of operationalization. In this letter, I argue that a more complete account of “New Delhi's long nuclear journey” should incorporate civil-military relations as another influential factor.Most accounts of India's nuclear weapons program agree that India's political establishment largely excluded the military from shaping the program's pace, direction, and progress. According to Verghese Koithara, “[K]eeping the military at arm's length and sidelining military competencies the way India has done has no parallel in global nuclear weapons development history.”2 He attributes this situation to the “barren relationship that developed between the political leadership and the armed forces of the country soon after independence.”3 Ashley Tellis blames India's nonoperationalization of nuclear weapons on its “peculiar organization of civil-military relations.”4 Raj Chengappa claims that “despite the Indian Army providing all the logistics support [for both of India's nuclear tests] … it was rarely privy to India's nuclear secrets. … All this was part of a deliberate design by successive governments to rein in the armed forces.”5 More recently, Vipin Narang has written that “a distrust of India's armed forces … [produced] a civil-military relationship in which India's political leadership is patently unwilling to entrust any dedicated nuclear subcomponents to the armed forces.”6 Kampani presents little concrete evidence to undermine these views.Kampani makes four points to support his contention that “the distrust that pervades India's civil-military institutions” was not a factor in the development of India's nuclear weapons program (p. 108). None supports his claim.First, Kampani asserts that “[i]f civil-military institutional tensions were the cause [of India's slow nuclear operationalization], … one would [have] see[n] greater aggregation of information among civilians” (ibid.). He does not explain, however, what he means by a “greater aggregation of information among civilians.” What kind of information and about what? The nuclear weapons program, delivery options, nuclear targeting philosophy? If he means all of these, then there was a designated civilian official who possessed this “aggregated” knowledge: the scientific adviser to the defense minister. In the period under discussion, two individuals held this post—V.S. Arunachalam from 1982 to 1992 and Abdul Kalam from 1992 to 1999. Another key official was former Defense Secretary Naresh Chandra, who, as Kampani notes, was brought in as a “specially designated coordinator” (p. 89). In addition, members of the scientific-technocratic enclave such as K. Santhanam and R. Chidambaram would have had information far in excess of that of any member of the military.7 Still, one can argue that none of these officials would have had “aggregated information” if the military aspects of the nuclear weapons program were included—that is, the operational details and capabilities of designated aircraft and delivery options, the military's standard operating procedures, and so on. But the argument would then be tautological: if the military was deliberately kept “at the margins,” as Kampani states, then how could civilian officials stay informed about its capabilities (p. 94)? Such an arrangement would have structurally prevented the “greater aggregation of information” among civilians, as predicted by the author.Second, Kampani quotes an unnamed senior Indian defense official who justified keeping the military out the loop “because of the danger of secrecy being compromised.” The official added, “[T]he military's complaints have more to [do] with a sense of privilege and pride. Why should they be told? The cabinet ministers weren't told, the defense minister, their political boss was not told. So why should the armed services chiefs be told” (ibid.)? Kampani's use of this quote as evidence of a lack of civil-military distrust is problematic on several counts. To begin, it contradicts his earlier assertion that “the regime of information scarcity operated with nearly equal severity on both the civilian and military sides of the nuclear equation” (ibid.). Information scarcity, however, could not have been of “nearly equal severity” if, according to this interviewee, a deliberate decision had been made to keep the military away from the program. More important, Kampani accepts uncritically what he was being told. If he had challenged the logic of the interviewee, he would have found several inconsistencies. For instance, if one were to analyze the period from the time the decision for nuclearization was made—Kampani argues it was in 1989–90—to the 1998 nuclear tests, the prime minister also held the defense minister's portfolio for more than half that duration.8 It is inconceivable that information about the nuclear weapons program was withheld from such a senior official. Moreover, according to some accounts, knowledge about the nuclear program was shared with India's two defense ministers—Sharad Pawar and Mulayam Singh Yadav—who held this post for a considerable period during this time.9 Additionally, if the logic offered by the interviewee is correct, then no secret—on any subject—should ever be shared with the military. Perhaps the biggest inconsistency, however, is how the interviewee could justify keeping the military uninformed when it was responsible for delivering India's nuclear weapons.Third, Kampani argues that civil-military distrust would have manifested itself in other ways, citing examples where this seemingly has not occurred. He argues that two facts—that the military enjoys considerable autonomy in formulating India's conventional war plans and that it engages extensively in countering domestic insurgencies—reflect civilian trust in the institution. This is a spurious argument, because neither observation necessarily suggests a lack of civil-military distrust. As is well known, the predominant narrative emerging from the 1962 Sino-Indian War blamed the collapse of the Indian army on ill-informed civilian intervention. Since then, India's civil-military relationship has been “informed by the notion that civilians should eschew involvement in operational matters.”10 That the military enjoys considerable autonomy in formulating conventional war plans should therefore not be surprising, because this function is considered to be within the military's “domain.”11 In this context, the military also enjoys considerable autonomy in other fields, including specifying weapons systems, doctrine, training, defense planning, and service promotions (up to the rank of brigadier).Similarly, the military's extensive involvement in counterinsurgency operations does not necessarily suggest harmonious civil-military relations. Instead, India's civilian and military leaders have agreed to an arrangement wherein the military enjoys considerable legal immunity when engaged in counterinsurgency operations. Tellingly, civil-military tensions have escalated when civilians have tried to alter this arrangement—for instance, when trying to amend or even overturn the controversial Armed Forces Special Powers Act, which provides legal immunity to the military.12 Rightly or wrongly, however, nuclear weapons were not considered to be in the military's domain, and hence civilians were able to keep the military away from the program.Kampani's assertion that there is no civil-military distrust in India not only challenges the conventional wisdom but does not comport with contemporary events. India's problem is not a possible loss of civilian control but problematic civil-military relations, a constant theme in the literature.13 Tensions between civilians and the military were even acknowledged in two official committee reports written in the aftermath of the 1999 Kargil war.14 Most recently, the controversial tenure of Chief of Army Staff Gen. V.K. Singh “saw civil-military relations reach their lowest ever in the history of independent India.”15Fourth, Kampani argues that “India's civilian leaders have shown little hesitation in institutionalizing the military's role in nuclear planning post-1998. … This change has occurred without any fundamental rewrite in the DNA of India's civil-military relations” (p. 109). Kampani's claim oversimplifies a complex civil-military dynamic surrounding the development of India's nuclear arsenal. Moreover, it contradicts the available evidence. To be sure, the government established the Strategic Forces Command in 2003 to administer all of India's nuclear and strategic forces, and it has given the military unprecedented access to nuclear weapons. At the same time, civil-military integration has not been as smooth as Kampani would have us believe. According to one school of thought, most prominently associated with Verghese Koithara, civilians have resisted incorporating the military fully into the nuclear command and control chain.16 Supporters of this claim point to the fact that the “operational controller” of the Strategic Forces Command is not a military officer but the national security adviser.17 Elsewhere, Kampani notes this strange arrangement, observing that the Strategic Forces Command essentially functions “directly under the Prime Minister's Office through the national security advisor, bypassing the defense ministry and the military's normal chain of command.”18 Adm. Arun Prakash, chief of India's naval staff from 2004 to 2006, complained about the “complete exclusion of the armed forces from all aspects of planning and structuring of strategic programmes.”19In a rare speech on nuclear deterrence on April 24, 2013, however, former Foreign Secretary Shyam Sharan dismissed the “perception that India's armed forces are not fully part of the strategic decision-making process.” He curiously added, however, that “one cannot accept that the credibility of India's nuclear deterrence demands management by its military.” Although his definition of “management” is unclear, later in the speech he acknowledged the need to “encourage better civil-military relations and coordination.” He went on to say that “the military's inputs into strategic planning and execution should be enhanced to make India's nuclear deterrent more effective.”20 Writing a few months after Saran's speech, former Army Chief Gen. V.P. Malik argued that “weaknesses” existed because the military “is not consulted adequately or given political directions and resources … for an assured and effective operationalization of nuclear capability.”21 According to a former chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), who wishes to remain unnamed: “[A]lthough the strategic target list is decided by the COSC, the Chairman is never consulted about vital issues relating to the effectiveness of the deterrent. For example: missile ranges and CEP [circular error probable] of nuclear warhead yields and reliability or development of PALs. … [A]ll these are decided ‘in-house’ by DAE & DRDO scientists. … [T]he ‘user’ [i.e., the military] is well out of the loop.”22India stands as an outlier for the manner in which it kept its military away from its nuclear weapons program. According to an unnamed former chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, “[T]he Indian program never took the army into [its] confidence. We didn't discuss details with them. It wasn't a military program.”23 Moreover, the scientists wanted to prevent an “untoward build-up of the deterrent and its use, which they believed would accrue were the military to be brought into the decision-making and weapon handling loop.”24 Although the custodians of the nuclear program—scientists, technocrats, and selected bureaucrats—may have held such seemingly noble beliefs, it can also be argued that they were afraid that bringing the military into the loop might curtail their near-total operational autonomy.25 Indeed, one of the fears of the scientific-technocratic community that controlled the program was that the military might make a bid for greater involvement, ownership, and perhaps even control.26 An episode from early 1998 illustrates this point. In a meeting with Prime Minister I.K. Gujral, General Malik reported that the service chiefs jointly conveyed the need for a nuclear doctrine. Abdul Kalam, then scientific adviser to the defense minister, who was present at the meeting, claimed that there was one but that it was not to be shared with the armed forces. Expressing his incredulity, General Malik claims that this was part of “a nexus that kept the armed forces away from the nuclear weapons program.”27When talking about a civil-military gap in India's nuclear program, the custodians of the bomb will of course deny that one existed and will justify exclusion of the military from the program on the grounds of secrecy (as they did in interviews with Kampani). The civil-military divide would have been evident, however, if the author had focused on the decisionmakers at the time. Hence, on a number of occasions Kampani alleges failure on the part of Indian defense and policy “planners” (see p. 82, 88, 92, 99, and 100). But who were these “planners?” As far as we know, they were mostly scientists, technocrats, and a few select bureaucrats, such as Naresh Chandra. They did not include any military representatives.The main problem with Kampani's otherwise excellent article is his rejection of alternative explanations for the slow pace of India's nuclear program. Civil-military relations and the decision to keep the military on the margins played an important role in the program's delayed operationalization. One could similarly argue that the military was excluded because nuclear weapons were not considered weapons of war. Or perhaps the strategic culture argument explains the failure of Indian politicians to oversee the coordination of the scientific and military aspects of the program. To be fair, the need to maintain secrecy could still be the primary factor explaining this slow pace, but it was not the only one.—Anit MukherjeeSingaporeKudos to Gaurav Kampani for his deeply researched narration of the “excruciatingly long” course India has taken “to develop an operational nuclear capability.”1 “New Delhi's Long Nuclear Journey” corrects some mistaken details of earlier treatments of this history, including my own in India's Nuclear Bomb.2 Anyone wanting details on the material and institutional evolution of India's nuclear capabilities should value Kampani's contribution.The article is less persuasive in explaining the history it uncovers. The central flaw is Kampani's attempt to ascribe India's nuclear muddling to one factor—secrecy born of “fear of the nonproliferation regime” (p. 81). Here one perceives the tyranny of academic theorizing and its diktat of “parsimony,” which an aspiring academic political scientist dare not reject. The problem is twofold: no single driver can explain most of the Indian nuclear story; second, secrecy is an effect of other causes, and therefore a weak cornerstone for a compelling theory of how the nonproliferation regime affected India's (or anyone else's?) development of operational nuclear forces.Kampani duly explores other candidate causes of India's irresolute nuclear course: “the normative beliefs of decisionmakers who pitted their moral aversion of nuclear weapons against more prosaic realist national security concerns”; decisionmaker preferences for “existential deterrence out of normative concerns for strategic stability in South Asia”; “a unique Indian strategic culture of restraint”; and “the dysfunctional nature of Indian civil-military institutions” (pp. 82–83). He offers evidence of Indian actions that can be interpreted to conclude that each alternative fails to explain key developments in India.Yet, the failure of any of these single explanations to cover all or most of the relevant developments in a decade of nuclear history does not mean that their sum is invalid or without utility. In fact, the four explanations that Kampani considers do help significantly to illuminate India's nuclear history from 1989 to 1999. The quest for a single decisive independent variable is unnecessary and misleading.Secrecy's inadequacy as a central causal explanation in the Indian case is evident in several Most important, one to why India's nuclear capabilities and have been so Kampani Indian officials who that secrecy from of “the of the he it is also that and have been (p. against makes of do officials in a ever to any other for If national defense is the for but the effect of secrecy is to national decisionmakers should not it too to more One wishes Kampani had into domestic why Indian political leaders have (or secrecy for so notes that prime ministers in the were in India's nuclear (p. 100). same could have been for several earlier prime He also reports that after Indian scientists and the challenges of political leaders from the weapons within and that would them operational in the military sense of the (p. 81). more than an in secrecy to keep in the these to the nuclear weapon program. and that of that these prime ministers were and about the and of nuclear weapons for nuclear weapons was not that important among the other and security India to In of the secrecy and in the Indian program prevented the military from being able to and the civilian weapons establishment and the political This on secrecy the among Indian political and that the with its and in Indian nuclear policy would to of the of nuclear weapons and to on as occurred in the and the theory is by the fact that the operationalization of India's nuclear weapons found in the defense policy and in the civilian nuclear The in all of these bureaucratic and political including of the at the of the defense and nuclear have secrecy and to and their from within as India's nuclear weapons scientists and long to the military from involvement in their the that Kampani has not been a Indian leaders have been privy to at four or among other India's nuclear and operationalization. Prime Minister V.P. Singh in one K. Gen. K. and Arun in 1999 the Kargil by K. was by the Arun Singh on Defense in The Naresh Committee on national security a in The in each of these reports were in the policy They all to India's defense including in the nuclear no prime minister has to the central of these For the Kargil and the Singh both of an defense staff chief would then have a role in nuclear planning and operations. however, among the armed forces and among political leaders have this still the that Kampani so and the 1989 to 1999 period he causes are and more than any theory can Still, they can be as Kampani's narrative to and rejection of my that secrecy was the cause of India's slow nuclear operationalization in the because it prevented successive Indian governments from a institutional within the has given for after their alternative explanations and them against the of the available I their claims his with the claim that my is a of the of academic and the of that an aspiring political scientist dare not One could similarly of on when there is He with the that I secrecy as the independent variable in my I maintain that secrecy was an variable and its cause in India's case in the to from the nonproliferation the not the nonproliferation regime as my He my argument on both his of a explanation for India's slow pace of and lack of operational planning in the political moral their in India's culture of strategic and the Indian domestic asserts that each of the alternative explanations I dismiss might not adequately explain India's their sum is greater than their The however, is that each of these explanations under the of which their into a explanation leaders by moral do not An deterrence does not into deterrence and of deterrence within a decade Strategic are not of India's of “existential to its for strategic stability with the factor in India's nuclear If deterrence and strategic stability were the of India's nuclear in the then Indian leaders could have that with to 1998 or in the after the nuclear Indian however, did not this More important, the domestic in India's to nuclear have the did not prevent India from a nuclear in but the to India's nuclear capabilities in the two and to India's and were in in Delhi's nuclear at several of all who has this history in can deny this Indeed, one of the of India's 1998 nuclear was the of a strategic with the to have central made in the early that India's from the and political of its political is that India was not It was India tried to develop a operational deterrent in the as as it but secrecy from fears of the that 1989 India the to nuclear weapons and this time, Indian defense and development to make for this which makes Indian the of moral prime ministers India's nuclear policy on because they could do little a from they on operational given the policy the with the from the that would India's and India's nuclear operationalization program therefore the of a and The secrecy surrounding it to the of The in knowledge between the scientists and the on the one who the challenges of operationalization and and their political on the who were of operational and the This is a of a to that leaders make with to them. however, is with prosaic examples of decided by Indian prime ministers the development of operational because of concerns that they could the nuclear to the as In the only of the the service with nuclear were privy to India's nuclear secrets. the government operational planning, the army and would have excluded from the was little for the civilians to the loss of control the policy The key for not through with the operational planning was to policy and that could of India's of a key Indeed, after India claimed nuclear and nuclear with the of the civilians remain in of the nuclear The among both in India and is that civilian defense scientists remain in the of the nuclear weapons program. the from the decade and the decade it do not support also makes the claim that is to India's defense and nuclear As the that India's nuclear program in the was part of the same that government operations more The problem with this argument is that can have can but need not a cause or That on India's nuclear program has the of of the lack of institutional and on the means to my explanation is to an and India's nuclear operationalization during the and the decade the in the program's pace, its during the and its in the decade the In this to the failure of successive Indian prime ministers to the of to a chief of defense staff to to the government on defense and nuclear is to the argument at is of explanations for India's slow secrecy can the of explaining the during this of India's nuclear But explanation on the logic of my rejection of India's problematic civil-military relations as a to the secrecy The problem with however, is that the of he Verghese Koithara, Ashley and Vipin does little to help his his from the is and that from the decade is an of not the for the he or the that at the my argument and India's civil-military as the cause of its slow nuclear makes a to the Indian in the to This observation is both and because the was the service of for the of nuclear delivery and operations in the more offers a of Indian nuclear policy It largely from academic and is of evidence from the of its The of written was to the of India's emerging deterrent. Tellis the main of his argument by all of the for India's to 1998 without them or their concerns how and civil-military nuclear among nuclear is of my rejection of civil-military tensions as a in the slow pace of Indian nuclear operationalization in the but he these and presents no evidence to my He is if my claim about defense ministers out of the nuclear loop is We can to this point when he greater on this He points out that Indian prime ministers held the defense portfolio for half of the decade and have about the nuclear program. I never argue that prime ministers were out of the He it that civilians in India would to keep the military out of nuclear Indeed, civilian scientists who with the in the they were to operational planning with their military a from the political argument is not that civil-military tensions in India were or are I argue that civil-military tensions were not to slow the pace of and operational planning in the For all the that pervades civil-military in the operational autonomy by the military as well as the lack of hesitation in its in with extensive domestic India's are evidence of a have an to for of claims to the that civilian have the military a role in India's nuclear and planning nuclear operations. point, is that the of civil-military nuclear is with that nuclear operations. This is and my own to however, the in India's civil-military institutional development and in the details of institutional to for had argued that civil-military tensions India from an operational nuclear Instead, the civilians have the role of the military in with civilian defense scientists under the leadership of the national security adviser in the prime minister's all of the claims made to 1998 about in the way of India an operational of its political strategic culture and the lack domestic and civil-military by the and its in successive Indian governments from a institutional is the explanation for India's long nuclear during the

Journal Article Nuclear command and control in NATO: nuclear weapons and operations and the strategy of flexible response Get access Nuclear command and control in NATO: nuclear weapons and operations and the strategy of flexible response. By Shaun R. Gregory. London: Macmillan. 1996. 251pp. Index. £45.00. ISBN 0 333 64697 5. Christoph Bluth Christoph Bluth 1University of Reading Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International Affairs, Volume 73, Issue 2, April 1997, Pages 357–358, https://doi.org/10.2307/2623841 Published: 01 April 1997

ABSTRACTSome 30 years since the release of the Hollywood blockbuster War Games, the possibility that hackers might break into nuclear command and control facilities, compromise early warning or firing systems, or even cause the launch of a nuclear weapon has become disturbingly real. While this challenge will impact all nuclear-armed states, it appears particularly acute for the USA and Russia given their large, diverse, and highly alerted nuclear forces. The fact that east–west relations have deteriorated to a nadir perhaps not seen since the 1980s, strategic instability has increased – particularly in the wake of the Ukraine and now Syria crises – and that the nuclear arms reductions agenda appears to have reached a standstill makes this challenge particularly pressing. In this discouraging milieu, new cyberthreats are both exacerbating the already strained US–Russia strategic balance – particularly the perceived safety and security of nuclear forces – and at the same time creating new vulnerabilities and problems that might be exploited by a third party. Taken together, these dynamics add another major complication for current arms control agreements and possible future nuclear cuts, and also seem likely to increase the possibility of accidents, miscalculation, and potential unauthorised nuclear use, especially given the large number of nuclear weapons that remain on “hair-trigger” alert.

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: A nuclear power In recent years, we have seen a deterioration of the security environment in the Asian region. This situation is mainly influenced by the political, economic, and military rivalry among states. Countries that have nuclear weapons in their arsenals play important roles in the security system. Of the nine countries with nuclear weapons, four are in Asia. Along with increasing their nuclear capabilities, these states are also revising their war doctrines, often moving away from deterrence strategies and envisaging the use of nuclear weapons as a means of first strike. North Korea has made significant progress over the past two decades in developing its nuclear weapons arsenal, including means of delivery. It has conducted six nuclear tests and tested a number of new ballistic missiles, several of which can hit targets in Northeast Asia and potentially in the United States and Europe. It is estimated that North Korea could potentially produce 20 to 30 warheads to be delivered mainly by medium and short-range ballistic missiles. In September 2022, North Korea announced it would respond to attacks on its nuclear command and control systems by launching a nuclear attack “automatically and immediately.”

The paper aimed to explain the concept of "nuclear sharing" in Europe and determine the direction of its further development, such as proliferation, control, or elimination. It used historical and content analysis, synthesis, and comparative approaches. Historical analysis showed the fundamental motives for the emergence of the US "nuclear sharing," its inextricable link with the expanded deterrence and defense of the US, and its role in NATO. As an instrument of non-proliferation in Europe, "nuclear sharing" was supposed to provide sufficient security guarantees to the US allies so that they would not choose the path of creating their nuclear weapons or cooperating with the already existing European atomic weapons. The Federal Republic of Germany issue was of special concern to both the US and USSR. The "nuclear sharing" was supposed to enable both a stronger binding of the allies to the US and the creation of transatlantic unity, but also to maintain the European balance of power between states that possess and those that do not have nuclear weapons. In addition, the new roles of "nuclear sharing" cannot be linked only to the relationship with Russia but also to the emergence of new threats, especially those in the Middle East, as perceived by the US and its NATO allies. The paper then discussed the controversies of "nuclear sharing" that were known during the negotiations of the NonProliferation Treaty, but which, with the end of the Cold War, became questionable again, not only for Russia but especially for other NPT member states. These controversies relate to Articles 1 and 2 of the NPT (interpretation of the term "transfer" of nuclear weapons), whether it also limits the deployment of delivery systems, the obligation to move towards nuclear disarmament under Article 6 of the NPT, the invalidity of the Treaty in the event of war, as well as the training of the armed forces of non-nuclear-weapon states under the NPT for the performance of nuclear missions and the use of nuclear weapons. In terms of effectiveness, the paper examined the controversies of suitability of "nuclear weapons" for deterrence and defense against asymmetric threats, the need for their continued retention if the strategic forces of NATO members are sufficient for the role of deterrence and defense of the entire NATO, the credibility of American guarantees of extended deterrence, the suitability of the deployed tactical nuclear weapons for nuclear deterrence and defense in Europe, and the effectiveness of the air component of nuclear deterrence and defense, i.e. the limitations on the ability of dual-capability aircraft to deliver nuclear weapons to targets. Finally, the paper considered the future of the development of "nuclear sharing," considering previous historical analysis and controversies. Three possible directions for the development of "nuclear sharing" are considered - proliferation (horizontal, vertical, and the possibility of "succession" of the nuclear status of the European Union from France), control, and elimination of "nuclear sharing" in Europe. The trend that tends to prevail in the conditions of the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East is proliferation from both the Russian and American sides. Although the status of "nuclear sharing" within the West remains unchanged, the pressure from Eastern European allies is growing stronger, especially from more conservative parties. On the other side, developing European nuclear deterrence by giving a "European dimension" to French atomic deterrence would raise the question of relations with the US - competitiveness or complementarity. The "nuclear sharing" issue with Turkey has been identified as the most controversial since ties with the US have weakened, those with Russia have strengthened, and the Turkish defense industry has established a more independent development. As for the elimination of "nuclear sharing," the paper examined the options of the allies concerned own demands to end the sharing and the possibility of accession to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

If nuclear war breaks out in the coming decade or two, it will probably be by accident. The threat of a cold-blooded, calculated first strike is vanishing, but beneath the calm surface of constructive diplomacy among the traditional nuclear rivals lurks the danger of unpremeditated use of nuclear weapons. The accidental, unauthorized or inadvertent use of these weapons has become the most plausible path to nuclear war. Both superpowers, as well as France, Great Britain and China - long-standing members of the nuclear club - are potential sources of accidental missile launch. The emergence of fledgling nuclear powers such as India, Pakistan and Israel - some armed with ballistic missiles - pushes nuclear safeguards even closer to the top of the international security agenda. The chances of unwanted nuclear war would be reduced significantly if tamper proof, coded locks were installed on all nuclear weapons and if methods were put in place to disarm nuclear forces even after launch. In addition, the US and the Soviet Union should reduce their reliance on the dangerous policy of launch on warning and reduce the launch readiness of their nuclear forces. The social and political upheavals in the Soviet Union underscore fears ofmore » unintended nuclear war. Civil turmoil raises the possibility that rebellious ethnic groups or splinter organizations could capture nuclear weapons. Other, deeper fault lines run through the whole of Soviet society and may be capable of cracking the foundations of its nuclear command system. Although the US faces no such civil unrest, the country's system of nuclear command carries some risk that nuclear weapons might be used contrary to the intentions of legitimate authorities.« less

Nuclear weapons are a throwback to the analog age. This is a good thing because in the digital era, air-gapped, nuclear command, control, and communication systems operating with antiquated software and hardware are resistant to today's internet-enabled cyber threats. As Herbert Lin notes in this brilliant little book, however, the safety, security, and surety inherent in the analog nuclear complex is eroding as the digital revolution overtakes just about every aspect of scientific, technological, commercial, and social life. By exploring the nuclear complex as a system and across the life-cycle of its various components, Lin illustrates how cyber context (the growing presence and interaction of digital systems) and cyber operations (digital attacks intended to compromise computer systems and the humans that operate them) threaten the integrity of a nuclear arsenal in a myriad of ways. Officers and officials can do little to arrest this trend. Dealing with the growing presence of Information Age technology in the nuclear complex creates a series of dilemmas that can never be fully resolved by designers, manufacturers, and operators. Every component in the nuclear complex—delivery systems, communications, sensors, and nuclear weapons themselves—can be compromised if actors can manage to incorporate malware or unauthorized hardware into the manufacturing process. It is possible to limit this threat, but such measures increase costs while decreasing capability and ease of operation. This pattern emerges when it comes to mitigating cyber threats against each component and function of the nuclear complex.

In the United Kingdom, defence has come to be seen, rightly or wrongly, as a largely nuclear business. Not only do we share with our allies in NATO a reliance on possible first use of nuclear weapons in the event of a major conflict in Europe, but in many respects the United Kingdom is actually more dependent on nuclear weapons than other countries. No other country in the world has a defence policy involving all of the following three elements of reliance on nuclear weapons: (i) formal military alliance with a nuclear power (the NATO alliance with the USA); (ii) nuclear bases and facilities of an allied state (USA) situated on its territory; and (iii) possession of its own nuclear weapons and delivery systems of various types. We thus have three types of eggs in the increasingly questioned basket of nuclear deterrence.

Few words evoke more passionate debate and reveal such widely divergent views as the word “nuclear”. Whether in reference to “nuclear weapons”, “nuclear energy”, or “nuclear terrorism”, nuclear-related questions and issues continue to garner the attention or suffer the opprobrium of scholars, decision-makers, and international and regional organisations. Ever since the nuclear genie was let out of the bottle, fears of impending nuclear disaster—whether in the form of all-out nuclear war or nuclear terrorism—have gripped the attention of policy makers and scholars (for a recent restatement of these fears, cf. Niemeyer 2023; Jacobsen 2024; Karam 2021; Narang & Sagan 2022). As Robert Gates, the former United States (US) Secretary of Defence, noted, every high-ranking government official is kept awake at night by the spectre of a nuclear-armed terrorist group inflicting unimaginable destruction on society (quoted in Coetzee 2020:371). Also, in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, frequent Russian nuclear sabre-rattling has reignited fears about an all-out nuclear blowout, while the safety of nuclear power plants during this war has remained a very real concern (Williams 2024). The prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran and how that development could (but not necessarily would) lead to a nuclear cascade in the Middle East also looms large (Coetzee 2021). At the same time, Chinese modernisation of its nuclear forces continues apace, while nuclear-armed North Korea’s rambunctious behaviour persists (Kristensen et al. 2024). Uncertainty about its external security situation is constraining South Korea, a country historically at odds with nuclear weapons possession, to begin contemplating or, at the very least, publicly discussing the merits and demerits of a South Korean nuclear weapons programme (Kelly & Kim 2024; Cha 2024:1). In the context of the unfolding bipolar or, as some contend, multipolar world, fears about the stability of nuclear deterrence have proliferated. Disruptive technologies, ranging from artificial intelligence (AI), cyber warfare, hypersonic weapons, to quantum computing, ostensibly pose insurmountable risks to deterrence stability, especially in relation to the survivability of second-strike nuclear forces and nuclear command and control systems (Lieber & Press 2017; Lieber & Press 2018; Coetzee 2021).

During the 2000 presidential election, in that time before the September 11th terrorist attacks, the stump speeches of George W. Bush and his Democratic opponent, Al Gore, focused on protecting Social Security, saving American education, expanding Medicare, raising or lowering taxes, and readying the military. If science was mentioned at all, it was usually in the context of missile defense, global warming, or Gore’s role in creating the internet. With the exception of the debate over stem-cell research, science remains a background topic in the current campaign. Democratic candidate John Kerry has occasionally highlighted US science policy and used it against President Bush, charging that the administration has put politics and ideology ahead of science. “Let scientists do science again,” a headline on the Kerry election website says.Bush has responded, primarily through his science adviser, John Marburger, by pointing to the 44% increase in federal R&D since fiscal year 2001 and the record $132 billion in the administration’s FY 2005 R&D budget. “Kerry ignores President Bush’s record science investments,” reads a headline on the Bush reelection website.Kerry answers by noting that most of the R&D money is going for weapons systems and defense spending related to the war in Iraq, not basic science programs. Marburger and other administration officials point to several R&D initiatives, including new nanotechnology centers, the Moon/Mars space initiative, and the program to develop hydrogen fuel technology. In an effort to get the candidates to specifically address questions of interest to the science community, Physics Today has continued a tradition begun in 1976; it asked Bush and Kerry nine questions covering a range of science topics. Their answers, sometimes direct and sometimes vague, show fundamental differences on several key issues.On missile defense, Bush says his request of $10 billion in FY 2005 for development and deployment of such a system fulfills a pledge he made to the American people. Kerry says we should not be “falsely comforted by an untested and unproven defense system.”On global warming, Kerry talks of both near- and long-term programs to deal with the problem. Bush promotes his “comprehensive climate change strategy.” The candidates also address a host of other issues ranging from space exploration to energy policy. During the 2000 presidential election, in that time before the September 11th terrorist attacks, the stump speeches of George W. Bush and his Democratic opponent, Al Gore, focused on protecting Social Security, saving American education, expanding Medicare, raising or lowering taxes, and readying the military. If science was mentioned at all, it was usually in the context of missile defense, global warming, or Gore’s role in creating the internet. With the exception of the debate over stem-cell research, science remains a background topic in the current campaign. Democratic candidate John Kerry has occasionally highlighted US science policy and used it against President Bush, charging that the administration has put politics and ideology ahead of science. “Let scientists do science again,” a headline on the Kerry election website says.Bush has responded, primarily through his science adviser, John Marburger, by pointing to the 44% increase in federal R&D since fiscal year 2001 and the record $132 billion in the administration’s FY 2005 R&D budget. “Kerry ignores President Bush’s record science investments,” reads a headline on the Bush reelection website.Kerry answers by noting that most of the R&D money is going for weapons systems and defense spending related to the war in Iraq, not basic science programs. Marburger and other administration officials point to several R&D initiatives, including new nanotechnology centers, the Moon/Mars space initiative, and the program to develop hydrogen fuel technology. In an effort to get the candidates to specifically address questions of interest to the science community, Physics Today has continued a tradition begun in 1976; it asked Bush and Kerry nine questions covering a range of science topics. Their answers, sometimes direct and sometimes vague, show fundamental differences on several key issues.On missile defense, Bush says his request of $10 billion in FY 2005 for development and deployment of such a system fulfills a pledge he made to the American people. Kerry says we should not be “falsely comforted by an untested and unproven defense system.”On global warming, Kerry talks of both near- and long-term programs to deal with the problem. Bush promotes his “comprehensive climate change strategy.” The candidates also address a host of other issues ranging from space exploration to energy policy. 1Section:ChooseTop of page1 <<BushKerry2BushKerry3BushKerry4BushKerry5BushKerry6BushKerry7BushKerry8BushKerry9BushKerry Missile defense: The present administration is requesting more than $10 billion this year for development and deployment of a missile defense system. Many scientists say the system, given current and foreseeable technology, cannot be effective. What proof of effectiveness should be required before the system is fully deployed? Given the low-tech nature of terrorist attacks and the limited missile capabilities of North Korea and other hostile nations, does missile defense continue to be a wise investment? BushSection:ChooseTop of page1Bush <<Kerry2BushKerry3BushKerry4BushKerry5BushKerry6BushKerry7BushKerry8BushKerry9BushKerryOur policy is to develop and deploy, at the earliest possible date, a weapons system that would defend the United States homeland against nuclear attack, including ballistic missile defenses drawing on the best technologies available. Early in my administration, I called for the examination of the full range of available technologies and basing modes for missile defenses that could protect the United States, our deployed forces, and our friends and allies.The FY 2005 Defense Appropriations Act provides $10 billion that I requested for systems to defend against the threat from ballistic missiles. Later this year, the first components of America’s missile defense system will become operational, and we are on schedule for the next stages of the project. My administration will develop and deploy the technologies necessary to protect our people, fulfilling a pledge I made to the American people more than four years ago.KerrySection:ChooseTop of page1BushKerry <<2BushKerry3BushKerry4BushKerry5BushKerry6BushKerry7BushKerry8BushKerry9BushKerryA missile defense that works is a wise investment, but one that pours money into defenses at the expense of other immediate national security needs is not. And that’s what this administration has done. Missile defense should be one element of a comprehensive national security strategy. But a single-minded focus on this technology and the threat it is designed to meet ignores the very real danger of terrorism and our greatest danger—terrorists with weapons of mass destruction.John Edwards and I will be committed to developing a missile defense system that works, is fully tested, and geared to the threats we face. But I will refocus our efforts on preventing the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and dramatically accelerating the security of nuclear weapons and material in Russia and around the world. We will not sit by, falsely comforted by an untested and unproven defense system, while these threats continue to fester.2Section:ChooseTop of page1BushKerry2 <<BushKerry3BushKerry4BushKerry5BushKerry6BushKerry7BushKerry8BushKerry9BushKerry Climate change: Virtually all reputable research in recent years has reinforced the scientific conclusion that global warming is a real and growing crisis caused, at least in part, by the burning of fossil fuels. Do you accept that scientific consensus? Under what circumstances would you regulate carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions? BushSection:ChooseTop of page1BushKerry2Bush <<Kerry3BushKerry4BushKerry5BushKerry6BushKerry7BushKerry8BushKerry9BushKerryGlobal climate change is a serious long-term issue. In 2001, I asked the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to provide the most up-to-date information about the science of climate change. The academy found that considerable uncertainty remains about the effect of natural fluctuations on climate and the future effects climate change will have on our environment.My administration is now well along in implementing a comprehensive climate change strategy to advance the science, expand the use of transformational energy and carbon sequestration technologies, and mitigate the growth of greenhouse gas emissions in the United States and in partnership with other nations. I created the new US Climate Change Science Program (CCSP) to refocus the federal government’s climate research programs, for which my 2005 budget seeks nearly $2 billion to fund research across the federal government. The NAS endorsed the CCSP strategic plan, noting that it “articulates a guiding vision, is appropriately ambitious, and is broad in scope.”I also committed the nation to a goal of reducing American greenhouse gas intensity by 18% over the next 10 years, which would prevent more than 500 million tons of carbon emissions through 2012. To help achieve this goal, I created the Climate Vision program in 2003 to reduce the growth of greenhouse gas emissions by energy-intensive industrial sectors. Participants in the Climate Vision program account for between 40 and 45% of US greenhouse gas emissions. I have strongly supported over $4 billion in tax incentives for renewable and energy-efficient technologies, including wind and solar energy and hybrid and fuel-cell vehicles. Also, in April 2003, my administration raised the fuel economy standards for light trucks and SUVs [sport utility vehicles] for the first time since 1996, saving 3.6 billion gallons of gasoline. And in my 2003 State of the Union [address], I announced a $1.7 billion hydrogen fuel initiative to accelerate research that could lead to hydrogen-powered, no-emission vehicles within a generation.Additionally, my administration is participating in robust international partnerships to promote clean, renewable, commercially available fusion energy and to construct the $1 billion FutureGen project, which will test the latest technologies to generate electricity, produce hydrogen, and sequester greenhouse gas emissions from coal. KerrySection:ChooseTop of page1BushKerry2BushKerry <<3BushKerry4BushKerry5BushKerry6BushKerry7BushKerry8BushKerry9BushKerryI recognize the risk of climate change, and I have outlined a balanced set of programs that will have impact both in the near term and over the long term. My plan will also provide balanced support for technology that can increase the efficiency and cut greenhouse emissions in transportation systems, buildings, and industry that are attractive to consumers and US producers. Our programs will encourage the use of renewable fuels such as ethanol and renewable electric generation that produce little or no net greenhouse gases. I will expand the production tax credit for wind and biomass energy to cover the full array of renewable energy sources and increase Department of Energy (DOE) research into renewable energy sources and their applications. And I will propose an aggressive program of research, standards, and incentives to accelerate electric generation from renewable energy. Clean coal technology can play a critical role, given technology to cut carbon dioxide emissions.My plan would encourage energy efficiency with programs such as updated fuel efficiency standards, new tax incentives for automakers to build the new, more efficient automobiles of the future, and tax incentives for families to purchase more energy-efficient cars, trucks, and SUVs.3Section:ChooseTop of page1BushKerry2BushKerry3 <<BushKerry4BushKerry5BushKerry6BushKerry7BushKerry8BushKerry9BushKerry Science investment: There is concern in the science and economic communities that the US is losing its world leadership in the sciences, which they say bodes ill for future economic growth and global competitive-ness. To address that concern, should the US increase funding for basic science, and should the administration fully fund the 2001 bill, signed by the president, to double NSF’s budget? How would you reinvigorate science education for US-born students? What is the role of foreign scientists and students in the US scientific enterprise? BushSection:ChooseTop of page1BushKerry2BushKerry3Bush <<Kerry4BushKerry5BushKerry6BushKerry7BushKerry8BushKerry9BushKerryIncluding my FY 2005 budget request, total federal R&D investment during the first term will have increased 44% to a record $132 billion in 2005. My FY 2005 budget request commits 13.5% of total discretionary outlays to R&D, the highest level in 37 years. In the context of the overall economy, federal R&D spending in the FY 2005 budget is the greatest share of GDP [gross domestic product] in over 10 years. Funding for basic research, the fuel for future technology development, is at an all-time high of $26.8 billion in FY 2005, a 26% increase over FY 2001. Funding for NSF during the four years of my administration has increased 30% over FY 2001 to $5.7 billion in FY 2005. NSF’s broad support for basic research, particularly at US academic institutions, provides not only a central source for discovery in many fields but also encourages and supports development of the next generation of scientists and engineers. Moreover, in fulfilling its mission, NSF has used its funding efficiently and effectively.As for the American scientific enterprise, it is important in this information and technological age that our students receive a first-rate science education, just as they receive quality instruction in reading, writing, and math. The federal government has no control over local curricula, and it is not my job to tell states and local boards of education what they should teach in the classroom. Nevertheless, the No Child Left Behind Act, one of my proudest legislative achievements this term, is improving our schools and, consequently, the teaching of science. NCLB requires, for the first time, assessments in science to give us better information about how our students are performing and how to improve instruction in science. I have also proposed creating the Presidential Math and Science Scholars Fund to provide $100 million in grants to low-income students who study math or science. This will ensure that America’s graduates have the training they need to compete for the best jobs of the 21st century.I also value the contributions that foreign scientists and students make to our nation’s scientific enterprise, while recognizing the importance of safeguarding our security. We will continue to welcome international students and scientists while implementing balanced measures to end abuses of the student visa system. My administration has already achieved several notable successes in reducing delays now being experienced by some visa seekers. We have increased security while speeding up the clearance process; approximately 1000 back-logged applications have already been cleared out.KerrySection:ChooseTop of page1BushKerry2BushKerry3BushKerry <<4BushKerry5BushKerry6BushKerry7BushKerry8BushKerry9BushKerryFor three years, the Bush administration has squandered America’s leadership in the world, putting politics before science and doing nothing to create jobs while our workers fall further behind. The administration has proposed cuts for scientific research and grossly distorted and politicized science on issues from mercury pollution to stem-cell research. This approach not only limits the research that our scientists are doing today, it undermines important discoveries of tomorrow and threatens America’s critical edge in innovation. I will reverse this course by restoring America’s scientific leadership, helping find new cures, moderating healthcare costs, and developing new technologies that will create good jobs. I will boost support for the physical sciences and engineering by increasing research investments in agencies such as NSF, the National Institutes of Health, DOE, NIST, and NASA. This funding will help with the broad areas of science and technology that will provide the foundations for economic growth and prosperity in the 21st century.4Section:ChooseTop of page1BushKerry2BushKerry3BushKerry4 <<BushKerry5BushKerry6BushKerry7BushKerry8BushKerry9BushKerry Nuclear weapons: Does the US need to develop a new class of nuclear weapons to deal with the changing threats of the 21st century? Is there any circumstance in which you would support the resumption of nuclear testing? BushSection:ChooseTop of page1BushKerry2BushKerry3BushKerry4Bush <<Kerry5BushKerry6BushKerry7BushKerry8BushKerry9BushKerryThe Nuclear Posture Review, released by my administration in January 2002, noted that the nation’s nuclear infrastructure had atrophied since the end of the cold war and that the evolving security environment requires a flexible and responsive weapons complex infrastructure. To that end, my FY 2005 budget reflects an increase over the 2004 enacted level in the weapons activities account, which encompasses the stockpile stewardship programs. There is no current need for testing due to the sophistication of computer modeling and other new technologies, but we must maintain the capability to test in case such testing becomes necessary in the future to ensure the safety and reliability of our defensive arsenal. We have not identified any need for developing new nuclear weapons. KerrySection:ChooseTop of page1BushKerry2BushKerry3BushKerry4BushKerry <<5BushKerry6BushKerry7BushKerry8BushKerry9BushKerryNo, and a Kerry–Edwards administration will stop this administration’s program to develop a new class of nuclear weapons. This is a weapon we don’t need, and it undermines our ability to persuade other nations to forego development of these weapons.5Section:ChooseTop of page1BushKerry2BushKerry3BushKerry4BushKerry5 Nuclear There is serious concern many that could or a nuclear in a US Do you the US is doing to and control of nuclear weapons and material both in the US and BushSection:ChooseTop of administration in has more to and control nuclear weapons and material than US weapons and are and both the Department of Defense and are to make more My administration has increased funding to weapons and material in the Union and has by years the schedule the administration for security in We are with Russia to end the production of and to weapons for of weapons. the my administration the to or and material We have already weapons material from several our in its for nuclear weapons. To against we the international in a global effort to account and of sources that could be used in such We activities in over 40 on this as well as with international the Energy the the and the of Defense we have dramatically our ability to that could be a threat to us and to our friends and my administration the billion initiative to support and nuclear safety in the This of the international is to a more of nation’s highest must be preventing from to nuclear weapons and the material to make We must in a global partnership with other nations to prevent the spread of these weapons. the Bush administration’s have in the have the we need to advance our security. September they have not nearly to and on the while the nuclear from and North Korea have Our security requires an immediate change of I have proposed a comprehensive strategy to of weapons and including an of programs to all nuclear weapons and within the and at research in the within four production of new material for nuclear weapons by a global on production of new of nuclear weapons and by development of the new generation of nuclear accelerating in US and nuclear and reducing of in nuclear weapons programs in hostile including by with North Korea to ensure the and of its nuclear weapons program and a global effort to prevent from the necessary to build nuclear weapons. international efforts to by and and as well as improving the security a presidential to prevent nuclear terrorism who will focus on a effort to all nuclear weapons and around the world and prevent a nuclear terrorist of Energy than of and have not in a comprehensive US energy policy. years into the future, what do you the US energy should How would you the US in that BushSection:ChooseTop of and energy is critical to America’s and homeland security. We will be more and more we are on foreign sources of energy. The of a comprehensive and balanced national energy policy has been one of my During my first in I proposed a national energy policy that would our energy production and systems, reduce our on foreign promote efficiency and increase domestic production from all of energy including renewable energy and continue to our economy and create new jobs. We will continue to with on the energy to the administration has nearly all of the more than in the comprehensive national energy policy that not as increasing reliability R&D to help prevent and the to its of million to provide energy security in case of of have proposed an program of research, and standards that would increase the efficiency of energy use and use of new energy sources that can ensure a and while reducing the risk of climate change. The program would be supported in by a billion energy security and from federal and gas the in by I have to around the and a of that can meet US needs both in the term and for in the Given the long time required to over energy investments such as of and trucks, industrial and we must a broad set of new technologies as as possible we have any of US energy use in the near term, many of the most control systems, and other technologies to improve the energy of buildings, and industrial that the US to reduce its on from the and I will set for fuels such as I will support research and incentives that will dramatically increase use of from wind and other renewable And I will encourage development of technology and nuclear generation with high standards for stewardship and of Nuclear recent by that nuclear is the best energy source to meet the US while protecting the renewable energy can be deployed on a Do you increasing the use of nuclear If what would you do with the BushSection:ChooseTop of support the further development of nuclear technologies as a clean, and to meet this nation’s future energy Nuclear for of our This which no pollution or greenhouse gas can play an expanding role in our energy future while the we with energy national energy policy several to encourage increased use of nuclear and to the that through the Nuclear my administration is with industry to the for an of a new US nuclear within the next years. through the the United States is with around the to develop a next generation of more and more nuclear that can also produce hydrogen and my administration has made a to the nuclear and the of a long-term at We are ahead with the of a to the Nuclear at the end of this administration is also committed to and in new technologies that will change the we generate I committed the United States to the international fusion energy as in is a important to test the of nuclear fusion as a source of and the of a nearly source of energy the that long-term of Nuclear can play an role in energy while reducing the risk of climate key such as nuclear nuclear and security must be John Edwards and I will ensure safety and science We George Bush’s plan to over the of a Kerry–Edwards administration will on science. John Edwards and I do not support as a nuclear and will that nuclear and transportation only on the of science and that to and the John Edwards and I will George Bush and to from a for an NAS study to is the as to long-term and or some other technology. an international to scientific for nuclear and nuclear from terrorist John Edwards and I will improve and security at nuclear In we will nuclear to to improve including measures to reduce to the an of National National Nuclear the national weapons continue to be with security spending and What would you to improve at the Does the current plan of the to the risk of the in the of the war on BushSection:ChooseTop of national are doing to deal with the threats of the 21st are a in our efforts to improve homeland are the source of technological and are helping the war on With their at the highest level in years, National National and National are also on the edge of defense research, protecting the nation’s infrastructure from terrorist attacks, and developing a that the of a nuclear This is we billion on weapons research and production in FY 2004 and I for billion for We must and security My administration has made effort to improve the the weapons do and one of efforts is that in all areas of central to the war on we can use our more and focus on his or of national play a critical role in our nuclear weapons stockpile and that our nation’s nuclear weapons are and The national also have an important role in preventing the spread of weapons of mass and in science for our nation’s have a of our nation’s but this record has been by and security at the has been John Edwards and I are committed to and and restoring the at these critical national of is being to the long-term of to the and Many scientists the will money from science How do you the importance of science exploration What is the funding between the BushSection:ChooseTop of I announced my for the future of America’s space exploration this will the of both and science will as to the and other vehicles continue to their and of to we have systems on and around a system and one on its to the for cannot be by the most or the most We need to and and for And only are of to the by space we our on the we are developing a new exploration to our This will be by and its first no than will to the as as and no than and use it as a for the We will with to the and for future will with the goal of and there for of Edwards and I will continue America’s long tradition of leadership in and space exploration as of a program to broad for this will not to programs such as the Bush administration’s Program that from in the with no or will in new programs to set by scientific in and other Our administration will on the of the scientific to the most for research and the most for these the of or are most to the 2004 American of

Conclusions * One cannot quarrel with those who seek ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, provided necessary preconditions are met ... those prerequisites do not exist today. * Public debate on nuclear arms control tends to focus on numbers of weapons ... most important criterion in assessing prospective arms control measures is whether or not they contribute to stability and security. * The United States and Russia have achieved many advances in arms control and strategic stability since end of Cold War. * Radical reductions in forces or wholesale removal of forces from alert may create situations which could be dangerously destabilizing in a crisis. * States with potential to threaten United States and its allies continue to seek nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. * The United States be prepared to pose unacceptable risks to any potential adversary ... at moment, nuclear weapons are an indispensable part of that capability. * In a way not always appreciated, America's nuclear forces also complement efforts to restrict nuclear proliferation by extending an important deterrent guarantee to our allies. * The important issue is not weapons with which one might fight next major war, but to ensure that such a war does not occur ... deterrence will continue to be an indispensable element of national strategy. The Role of Nuclear Weapons The role of nuclear weapons in U.S. policy following Cold War has been subject of much public discussion recently. The issues are complex--much more so than headlines suggest. It's important that these issues be debated--it's essential that citizens in a free society understand them. The Cold War is over. It is important to recognize many advances in arms control and strategic stability achieved by United States and Russia in recent years. Following 1993 Bottom-Up Review of our overall defense requirements, Department of Defense embarked on a comprehensive review of Nation's Nuclear requirements. That Nuclear Posture Review-completed in September 1994--noted the reduced role nuclear weapons play in U.S. security and held out possibility of further arms control reductions. At same time, Review reaffirmed importance of a triad of strategic nuclear forces-land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers--and stressed that, long as nuclear weapons remain a factor in international life deterrence of attack on United States and our allies must be our objective. A common criticism of 1994 Nuclear Posture Review is that it appears to endorse status quo by affirming many of principles that existed in Cold War. What has often not been appreciated is extent to which America's nuclear posture has changed since end of Cold War. Consider, for example, following: * In September 1991, President George Bush took our strategic bombers off alert--up to that time, some 30% of those forces sat on strip alert, with weapons loaded on aircraft and crews ready. * Also in late 1991, President Bush announced that United States was no longer developing any new nuclear weapons. The United States has not tested a nuclear weapon since that time and has signed Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). * President Bush also removed all nuclear weapons from America's ground forces, and put into storage remaining non-strategic nuclear weapons. Following recommendations of 1994 Nuclear Posture Review, President William Clinton directed Navy to abandon capability of even employing nuclear weapons from its surface fleet. Overall, United States has unilaterally reduced its non-strategic nuclear arsenal some 90% from Cold War levels. * In 1993, Presidents Clinton and Boris Yeltsin agreed not to target each other's nations with ballistic missiles, an arrangement that went into effect in May 1994. …

Nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) systems comprise a complex arrangement of people, policy, procedures, infrastructure, and law that governs when, why, how, and by whom the decision to launch a nuclear weapon will be made and executed. At its core, NC3 is designed to ensure that a nuclear weapon is launched only when sanctioned by proper authorities, and that no unsanctioned launch, either intentionally or accidentally, takes place. To be effective, NC3 systems must fulfill certain critical functions, including detection, warning, and attack characterization; nuclear planning and targeting; decision-making; receiving orders; and enabling the management and direction of forces. Current NC3 systems are beset by vulnerabilities, including susceptibility to cyber and other remote attacks, as well as weaknesses due to obsolete legacy technologies and complex command and communication structures. For NC3 systems to fulfill their objectives effectively and accurately, States need to adopt a code of conduct, similar to the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, to outline both the relevant international law and the appropriate best practice that governs, and that should govern, State NC3, to ensure that there is never an intentional or accidental wrongful launch of a nuclear weapon.

WILL THE TWO GERMAN STATES SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF EUROPEAN SECURITY? Jonathan Dean . he "Gorbachev Era" and the improvement in East-West relations associated with it have not changed the basic political facts of the European situation: the division of Germany into two separate states and the continued incorporation of these states into opposing military alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, is regarded by most governments in both alliances as the precondition of military and political stability in Europe. True, the three Western wartime allies — France, the United Kingdom , and the United States— undertook a contractual obligation three decades ago in the 1954 Bonn Convention to promote the reunification of Germany, but this commitment does not alter the political facts. Even the government of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), while insisting that the possibility of ultimate self-determination must be kept open for the population of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), also insists that any chance of fulfilling this possibility is distant in time and that the security of the Federal Republic can be assured only by continued Federal German membership in the NATO alliance. Majority public opinion in the Federal Republic supports the government position, although this support could shift if the German public thought other possibilities were real and would at the same time assure continuation of their current level ofeconomic well-being, political freedom, and security. For its part, the government of the GDR insists that the status of the GDR as a separate state is permanent and that it has every intention of continuing GDR membership in the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Jonathan Dean is arms control adviser to the Union of Concerned Scientists. This article is based on a contribution to a forthcoming book, The German States and European Security, edited by F. Stephen Larrabee, to be published under the auspices of the Institute for East-West Security Studies, New York. 173 174 SAIS REVIEW At present, only a portion of the GDR population (whose size cannot be measured given the authoritarian nature of the GDR system, but which is probably large) actively desires a change in the status quo, and then only under conditions that would maintain at least current standards of living and security. The forces supporting continuation of the status quo of the division of Germany and the membership of the two German states in opposing alliances are very strong. Yet, since their mutual acceptance as separate states in the Grundlagenvertrag , or Basic Treaty of December 1972, the Federal Republic and the GDR, in each case pushed by strong domestic public opinion, have entered into a complex relationship whose increasing scope and intensity has caused considerable concern in both East and West. To the allies of the two German states who have these worries, no aspect of the inner-German relationship is more sensitive — because it is, at least in appearance, so directly related to possible change in the status quo in Europe — than the possibility of inner-German collaboration on security and arms control issues. Starting from timid beginnings in the early 1970s, the security dialogue between the two German states has intensified with the emergence of the reform-minded Gorbachev leadership in the USSR. The policies of the two Germanies already overlap on an increasing number of arms control and security issues. The circumstances surrounding conclusion of the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) treaty have brought strong support in Federal Germany for negotiated reduction of tactical-range nuclear weapons, vigorously seconded by coordinated East German and Soviet pressures for the "third zero" — total elimination of nuclear weapons from Europe. The next five years may bring the conclusion and implementation of a United States-Soviet accord on reduction of strategic nuclear weapons, a second Stockholm-type agreement on confidence-building measures covering NATO and Warsaw Pact armed forces, a NATO-Warsaw Pact agreement to reduce these forces in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals area and, possibly, a worldwide prohibition on production and storage of chemical weapons. Such developments would intensify the inner-German dialogue on security and arms control issues. This article examines the possible extent of such intensification, its implications for the inner-German relationship, for the security policies of...

The logic of India’ nuclear weapons policy has fluctuated over the last 4 decades. India’ present nuclear weapons posture must be viewed in the context of broader regional, global and domestic political compulsions, and from the standpoint of India’ long-term and cumulative historical experience. India’ nuclear threat perceptions were first focused on China during the second half of the 1960s following the Chinese atomic test in 1964. India’ main attention then shifted to Pakistan’ pursuit of nuclear weapons over the next three decades. At the end of the twentieth century, India perceived nuclear weapons as a deterrent against an unrivaled U. S.-led NATO alliance that appeared willing to intervene in the internal affairs of sovereign states on humanitarian grounds.KeywordsNuclear WeaponNorth Atlantic Treaty OrganizationBallistic MissileAtomic TestNonstate ActorThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Suite à la reprise du débat concernant le rôle des armements nucléaires tactiques déployés en Europe occidentale sous l'é;gide de l'OTAN, cet essai analyse les fonctions stratégiques et politiques de ces armements à la lumière des récents arguments contenus dans la littérature et les documents officiels et tente d'évaluer jusqu' à quel point ces arguments sont comparables à ceux évoqués lors des précédents débats des années cinquante et soixante.