Abstract
In the process of government procurement, there are contradictions between the policy of promoting independent innovations and the achievement of economic targets. With the purpose of studying suppliers' optimal bidding price under preferential policies towards independent innovation enterprises, this passage modifies the enterprises utility function and deduces the optimal bidding price under the classic SIPV model. The results show that: the preferential policies will affect the suppliers' bidding prices, the more preferential the policy, the higher the bidding price.
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