Not All Roads Lead to Kashmir: British Road Construction in the High Himalayas and the Railroad That Never Was

Game Over? Russia’s Conquest of Central Asia Reconsidered David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye (bio) Elena Andreeva, Russian Central Asia in the Works of Nikolai Karazin, 1842–1908. 369 pp. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020. ISBN-13 978-3030363376. $89.99. Irina Kantarbaeva-Bill, Entre imaginaire et réel: Les voyageurs britanniques en Asie centrale au XIXe siècle (Between Fantasy and Fact: British Travelers to Central Asia in the 19th Century). 441 pp. Geneva: Éditions Olizane, 2019. ISBN-13 978-2880664859. CHF 42.00. Rudolf A. Mark, Händler, Forscher, Invasoren: Russland und Zentralasien 1000–1900 (Merchants, Scientists, Invaders: Russia and Central Asia, 1000–1900). 587 pp. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2020. ISBN-13 978-3657792450. €83.18. Alexander Morrison, The Russian Conquest of Central Asia: A Study in Imperial Expansion, 1814–1914. 613 pp. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. ISBN-13 978-11107030305. £75.00. Artem Rudnitskii, Vitkevich: Buntaŕ, soldat imperii (Witkiewicz: Rebel, Soldier of Empire). 335 pp. St. Petersburg: Aleteiia, 2019. ISBN-13 978-5907189072. In the summer of 1840, a year after Britain had occupied Afghanistan to install its own client as the country’s ruler, one of the kingdom’s political agents, Captain Arthur Conolly, wrote to Major Henry Rawlinson, a colleague who [End Page 641] had just been posted to Qandahar. The subaltern reminded Rawlinson of his duty to bring the benefits of civilization to the Asian realm: “You’ve a great game, a noble game before you.” As Conolly made clear in another letter to the major, this was the task of all European powers: “if the British Government would only play the grand game, help Russia cordially to all that she has a right to expect … we shall play the noble part that the first Christian nations of the world ought to fill.”1 Captain Conolly saw the Russian bear as a benevolent creature engaged in friendly play with his own country. But it was Rudyard Kipling who gave the term “Great Game” a much more sinister connotation in his novel Kim.2 Published at the turn of the 20th century, Kim is a ripping yarn about the adventures of an intrepid boy who is enlisted by British intelligence to spy on tsarist intrigues in the Himalayas to undermine London’s hold on the South Asian colony. To Britons, the Great Game now began to signify a momentous struggle between their kingdom and Russia for hegemony over Central Asia. Like some Victorian Cold War, this was a twilight contest that involved espionage, subterfuge, and subversion. At its heart was the belief that the tsars’ Cossacks were advancing into the sands of Turkestan to conquer British India.3 While for much of the century, scholars and journalists rarely invoked the Great Game, the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 as well as the publication of Peter Hopkirk’s eponymous book a decade later brought the phrase into common parlance.4 ________ In his splendid new history, The Russian Conquest of Central Asia, Alexander Morrison firmly rebuts the notion of the Great Game—that tsarist imperial expansion into the region was driven by a desire to expel Albion from South Asia. Indeed, if most previous books about the topic tended to ascribe the conquest to a single motive, Morrison wisely avoids a monocausal explanation.5 Thus he deftly dismisses such other motives as the insubordinate [End Page 642] actions of officers on the spot eager for easy victories to pin another medal on their tunics.6 The author is particularly effective when he counters the “cotton canard,” the Marxist thesis that blamed lobbying by merchants who wanted the army to take Turkestan so that they could cultivate cotton there to replace American exports of the crop that had been disrupted by the US Civil War.7 But above all, Morrison is keen to sweep the notion of a Great Game into the historian’s dustbin. As he puts it, “it is remarkable how seldom British India featured in the calculation of the Russian soldiers and statesmen who planned and undertook the conquest of Central Asia” (12–13). Morrison, a Fellow and Tutor in History at Oxford’s New College, explains that the story...

The essay is devoted to the intelligence assessment of planning for war against Great Britain in Central Asia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The systematic preparation for war against Great Britain began during the Pandjeh Incident of 1885 and continued until 1914. Russian war planning foresaw offensive operations against the British Indian Army in Central Asia. The development of the “Invasion of India” plan became a high-priority objective for the Russian General Staff during the lowest point of relations with Great Britain. After 1905, the development of this plan was abandoned. Study of the British Indian Army and possible enemy war plans in Central Asia by Russian military intelligence played an important role in the war planning. The Russian General Staff's preparation for a war against Afghanistan and British India in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was carried out with a lack of information about the region and enemies. After the Russo-Japanese war, the War Ministry began paying more attention to the conduct of intelligence activities and the scientific analysis of information about the region. Since 1904, Russian military intelligence had observed the development of a large-scale reform of the British Indian Army, initiated by General H. Kitchener. The Russian General Staff came to the wrong conclusions about the threat to Turkestan. Therefore, exaggerated estimates of the military readiness and plans of Great Britain influenced Russian strategic planning and brought about the cancellation of the “Invasion of India” plan in 1905-1910.

Since the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, the US, and China are aspiring to enhance their strategic influence in Central Asia which has recently been intensified due to China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Further, China has also increased its influence in Central Asia through regional organizations such as Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Against this backdrop, Pakistan emerged as an important pivot of China's BRI where the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is the flagship project. This study begins with a theoretical debate of Heartland theory of Halford John Mackinder and the later version of Heartland theory into Rimland theory by Nicolas Spykman, which explains the geopolitical significance of Central Asia for Major Powers. Within this theoretical context, the study discusses China and the US grand strategies in Central Asia in the form of China's BRI, SCO and the US counter‐strategies such as from phase 1.0, policy to 2.0, policy, and the recent initiative of C5 + 1. The study finds out that US–China strategic competition will have implications for various states having relations with both of these two major powers. In case of Pakistan, the strategic competition between China and the US will affect various dimensions of Pakistan's security at the broader level such as political, military, and economic security. First, at the political level, it is affecting Pakistan's relations with Russia, China, Iran, and Gulf States. Second, at military level, Pakistan's strategic value has been enhanced as a frontline state against terrorism. Finally, at the economic level, CPEC provides opportunities for Pakistan's economy and regional connectivity.

SEER, 92, 4, OCTOBER 2014 772 Sergeev, Evgeny. The Great Game 1856–1907: Russo-British Relations in Central andEastAsia.WoodrowWilsonCenterPressandJohnsHopkinsUniversity Press, Washington, D.C. and Baltimore, MD, 2013. xix + 530 pp. Selected chronology. Notes. Appendix. Selected archival sources and bibliography. Index. $65.00; $35.00. The imperial rivalry in Asia between Russia and Britain played a central role in shaping the international relations of the Great Powers in the half century before the First World War. Sergeev’s book describes the course of the ‘Great Game’ in Central Asia in detail, concentrating on the period between the end of the Crimean War in 1856 and the signing of the Anglo-Russian agreement in 1907. Strangely, the book nowhere mentions that it is effectively a translation of Sergeev’s 2012 work published in Russia (E. Iu. Sergeev, Bol´shaia igra, 1856– 1907: mify i realii rossiisko-britanskikh otnoshenii v Tsentral´noi i Vostochnoi Azii, Moscow 2012). Sergeev begins by putting Russo-British relations into a broader context through discussions of the their development during the first half of the nineteenth century and of the wider phenomenon of imperialism. He suggests that it was the Crimean War which marked the beginning of a period of intense rivalry between Britain and Russia, as both states began to concentrate on expanding their power and influence in Central Asia. St Petersburg, feeling its European ambitions frustrated, began to expand vigorously into Central Asia while the British acted to protect their Indian possessions in the wake of the 1857 revolt (for which Sergeev uses the term ‘Sepoy mutiny’). The book proceeds to trace the course of Anglo-Russian rivalry over the following half century in depth, identifying Afghanistan as the fulcrum for competition between the two states. Sergeev shows how British pressure on Russia in the Balkans and the Near East at the end of the 1870s prompted more assertive elements in the Russian military to propose marching troops into Afghanistan as a step towards threatening British India. Russian intervention in Afghanistan in the summer of 1878 proved, however, to be unsuccessful, as by the end of the year the British had entered Kabul and for almost the next twenty years the two powers faced a stalemate in Central Asia. Changes in the European balance of power at the beginning of the twentieth century, with Germany emerging as a potential threat to British interests, persuaded the London government to try to break the deadlock in its relations with Russia. The resulting Anglo-Russian convention of 1907 essentially neutralized the rivalry between the two states in Asia, opening the way for the wartime alliance of 1914. Sergeev’s book is based on a wide range of sources from both the Russian and British sides and the discussion of this intense imperial rivalry from both standpoints represents the major strength of the work. He shows how threat REVIEWS 773 and counter-threat reinforced each other, and how the process built upon deepseated perceptions of Asia in both Britain and Russia. The Great Game was a central part of nineteenth-century European imperialism, and both Russia and Britain felt themselves justified in bringing what they perceived to be political, economic and cultural benefits to Asian peoples. Sergeev’s book itself continues to perpetuate some of these stereotypes: he asserts that in the mid nineteenth century ‘Central and East Asia were characterized by more or less medieval political, social and political features’ (p. 329), stuck for centuries in ‘social apathy, economic backwardness and political anarchy’ (p. 330). He sees both Britain and Russia as pursuing ‘civilizing missions’ (p. 346) in their desire to cement their power in Asia. The intellectual challenge posed by Edward Said to European interpretations of the wider world is acknowledged in Sergeev’s book, but his view of the rivalry between Britain and Russia is firmly within the tradition that Said ably dissected. This book takes very much a traditional view of relations between European powers and Asia: it places Britain and Russia as the central figures in a struggle for influence, with Asian states and peoples as merely subjects in the interplay between the two European powers. Sergeev rejects the idea that Anglo-Russian rivalry...

Reviewed by: Hyderabad, British India, and the World: Muslim networks and minor sovereignty, c. 1850–1950 by Eric Beverley Rama Sundari Mantena Hyderabad, British India, and the World: Muslim networks and minor sovereignty, c. 1850–1950 By Eric Beverley. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Eric Beverley’s Hyderabad, British India, and the World: Muslim networks and minor sovereignty, c. 1850–1950 on the Princely State of Hyderabad at the turn of the twentieth century explores the worldly connections of a unique polity: one enclosed by the territories of British India and thus virtually limiting its territorial connections unless carefully mediated and negotiated through the British Empire. Hyderabad was one of several hundred princely states that remained autonomous enjoying varying levels of sovereignty until 1947 when British India gained independence from colonial rule. Precisely what the nature of Hyderabad’s sovereignty was forms the subject of Beverley’s research. Beverley proposes that Hyderabad was able to break free of this constraining relationship with British India by forging what he calls “Muslim internationalism” globally through a dynamic Muslim public sphere (49). Beverley further suggests that Hyderabad managed to forge international links through Muslim networks (transnational, pan-Islamist, Muslim internationalist) and with other “sub-imperial” polities. However, Beverley suggests that scholars of Hyderabad have obscured Hyderabad’s global presence by paying exclusive attention to British India and its historical trajectories as the outer perimeter of Hyderabad’s relations. This myopic view of Hyderabad limits our understanding of Hyderabad’s internal dynamics and its connections with the world outside. Beverley argues that because of its “minor” sovereignty, Hyderabad as a state managed to maintain a degree of autonomy which led to political experimentation (43). The book begins with two introductory chapters on the idea of sovereignty and minor sovereignty. Then the chapters are divided into three sections with two chapters each on “Ideas,” “Institutions,” and “Urban Space.” “Ideas” contains two chapters on the difference of Hyderabad and its cultivation of “Muslimness” and its self-representation as a modern progressive state. The second section moves to the everyday, to the workings of governance on the borderlands or frontiers of the state in its relations with the British Raj. The third moves to the theme of urbanism—specifically colonial urbanism—and how it impacted urban development in Hyderabad. All chapters cover overlapping themes of political experimentation and worldly connections that Hyderabad was able to foster and sustain until its forced incorporation within the Indian Union in 1948. With regard to the theme of political experimentation, Beverley notes: “Though thwarted by European world empires, smaller sovereign states that were not colonized provided fertile ground for refashioning political concepts and institutions in dialogue with other global examples as well as local and regional histories” (30). It is a suggestive thesis in the idea that Hyderabad provided dynamic political conditions that gave rise to alternative concepts and institutions for the political future of the region. It is an argument full of possibilities and one that needs to be made. However, this statement is made often without the author illustrating the global links that refashioned political concepts. What are these political concepts circulating in the transnational Muslim public sphere? Did political experimentation include both constitutional monarchy and representative governing bodies? How were they negotiated in the global public sphere? While the idea of experimentation is fascinating, one would like to know what social structures specific to Hyderabad allowed for political experimentation. For instance, pan-Islamism existed in British India. While it is true that British India had greater surveillance of its colonial subjects, it nevertheless did not put a stop to the expansion of political discourse (in the English and vernacular public spheres). Beverley also suggests that political experimentation was able to give rise to counter-colonial and anti-colonial geographies of power (50). This frames his discussion of pan-Islamism and “Muslim internationalism” that linked Hyderabad with global Islam or a wider Islamicate world. Another fascinating discussion Beverley explores is the bureaucratic-intellectual in Hyderabad. The question that lingers is whether outside of a racialized hierarchical structure of colonial power in British India these figures were able to function differently. Were they able to forge different moral relations with...

10. India’s Objectives in Central Asia

Although most of the neotectonics of eastern and central Asia seems to be due to the collision and continued convergence between India and Eurasia, extensional tectonics prevails in four portions of this region: Tibet, the Baikal rift system, the Shansi graben and Yunnan. We think that the convergence between India and Eurasia is responsible for crustal extension in all four regions, but the physical mechanisms responsible for the extension are not the same in all of these cases. Fault plane solutions of earthquakes, and clearly defined escarpments and adjacent basins seen on the Landsat imagery, indicate widespread normal faulting in Tibet (Molnar & Tapponnier 1975, 1978; Ni & York 1978). The direction of extension appears to be east-west, but the poorly determined fault plane solutions and the lack of field studies allow some variation in the direction of extension. The normal faulting seems to be confined to the areas of highest elevation and some of the normal faults cross the Indus-Zangbu suture into the high Himalaya.

Throughout the nineteenth century, the Persian Mission reflected as a mirror the changing strategies devised by the British to safeguard British India from the unrest and crippling expense expected to follow from the unchecked expansion eastwards of Russia. Control of the mission was regularly seized by the foreign office and, whenever friendly relations with Russia seemed necessary to maintain the European balance of power, was as regularly sloughed off on the board of control and later the India office. If the status of the Persian Mission thus reflected the attempt of the British to postpone the choice between continental commitment and imperial defence of which they were so afraid, the mission's continued attachment to the foreign office after 1907 implied that the Anglo-Russian entente was not meant to reinforce the opponents of Germany in Europe. The willingness of Russia in 1907 to agree to terms she had hitherto refused, suggested that the problem of how to defend India against the repercussions expected to follow a military demonstration by Russia in central Asia, might have been solved by the terms of the revised Anglo-Japanese alliance.2 All plans for the defence of British India in the nineteenth century had to bring victory far away and cheaply. Most of them were made either by the Backward (or Punjab) School, led by Lord Lawrence and later Lord Wolseley or by the Forward (or Bombay) School, led by Lord Roberts. The blueprints had been handed down from two equally bitter rivals earlier in the century, dubbed the Bombay School and the Ludhiana School by H. W. C. Davis.3 The Punjab School followed the Ludhiana School by proposing to defend India at the Indus. This idea was most popular and most sensible between 1856 and 1874. The introduction of steam power to warships followed by the demilitarization of the Black Sea at the end of the Crimean War meant that a stationary defence along the North-West Frontier of India could be made more effective by a demonstration against Russia in the Black Sea. Later in the century, it was doubtful whether the British could force their way into the Black Sea over the opposition of the sultan and the tsar. Earlier, the British had been held back by the wind and the current in the Bosporus and the Dardanelles.4 The dependence of the Ludhiana and Punjab Schools on the ability of Great Britain to attack Russia all over the world, as Wolseley put it, was the argument used by both Bombay Schools to justify their alternative of an offensive strategy in central Asia. The Bombay Schools treated an offensive in central Asia as equivalent to

The Czarist Empire during the nineteenth century emerged on the scene as a Eurasian colonial power challenging British supremacy, especially in Central Asia. The trans-continental Russian expansion and the ensuing influence were on the march as a result of the increase in the territory controlled by Imperial Russia. Inevitably, the Russian advances in the Caucasus and Central Asia were increasingly perceived by the British as a strategic threat to the interests of the British Indian Empire. These geo-political and geo-strategic developments enhanced the importance of Afghanistan in the British perception as a first line of defense against the advancing Russians and the threat of presumed invasion of British India. Moreover, a mix of these developments also had an impact on the British strategic perception that now viewed the defense of the North-West Frontier as a vital interest for the security of British India. The strategic imperative was to deter the Czarist Empire from having any direct contact with the conquered subjects, especially the North Indian Muslims. An operational expression of this policy gradually unfolded when the Princely State of Dir was loosely incorporated, but quite not settled, into the formal framework of the imperial structure of British India. The elements of this bilateral arrangement included the supply of arms and ammunition, subsidies and formal agreements regarding governance of the state. These agreements created enough time and space for the British to pursue colonial interests in the Great Game, in rivalry with the rapidly-expanding Czarist Empire. British strategic pursuits in the north-west of British India finally emerged as a strategy that historians refer to as the three-fold Frontier Policy. The greater context of the interaction between British India and the Princely State of Dir was the Frontier Policy. Despite the academic awareness of it, there is a lack of comprehensive and coherent research on the subject. This paper is an attempt to bring to the fore an important aspect of the agreements reached and executed between the British Indian government and the Nawab of the Princely State of Dir with regard to the rich forest resources located within the geographic limits of the state. It argues that the British government initially intended to have greater control over the forests under the pretext of preventing deforestation. However, in reality the British turned a blind eye to the threat and practice of widespread deforestation in order to secure a stable frontier for its strategic and commercial interests. No research-based inductive work exists on the theme, and a systematic study analyzing the agreement and its impact is not available. This study is an effort to fill the gap in this area of research. The paper has an additional academic value since the deforestation in the Princely State of Dir has been explored from the point of view of the British imperial strategy in the north-west of British India, which is very much relevant even today. It is all about establishing linkages and connections. 

ABSTRACTChina and Russia both have interests in bordering Central Asia. China's thirst for energy has seen its footprint expand rapidly in the region relative to that of Russia, Central Asia's historical hegemon. With the two powerful neighbors’ history of competition and conflict, the shift in relative influence between them risks a resurgence of bilateral rivalry. Referencing the scholarly literature on strategic rivalry, this article examines how energy relations have helped shaped the trajectory of China-Russian relations in Central Asia, particularly after the shock that came with the collapse of oil and gas prices in 2008–2009.

This research paper examines the strategic, geopolitical, and geo-economic implications of Iran’s Chahbahr Port as an emerging alternative to Pakistan’s Gwadar Port, evaluating the resulting challenges and opportunities for Pakistan in the evolving architecture of regional connectivity. As China and India expand their influence in South Asia, Central Asia, and the Indian Ocean Region, seaports have become central instruments of modern statecraft, economic integration, and power projection. Gwadar, developed under the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), plays a pivotal role in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), offering Beijing critical access to the Arabian Sea and shortening its energy and trade routes. Conversely, India’s strategic partnership with Iran through its investment in Chahbahr provides New Delhi with an alternative gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia, bypassing Pakistan. This development carries major implications for Pakistan’s economic leverage, regional influence, and security environment. Using a qualitative methodology grounded in thematic analysis, the study synthesizes existing literature, trade patterns, geopolitical behavior, and strategic alignments to assess both ports’ comparative capacities, connectivity corridors, and regional impact. Findings reveal that while Chahbahr expands India’s strategic reach and reduces Pakistan’s monopoly over Afghan transit trade, Gwadar retains superior natural depth, logistical capacity, and long-term geostrategic potential due to CPEC’s multi-billion-dollar infrastructure support. However, the strategic rivalry between China and India complicates cooperation possibilities and heightens geopolitical competition across the Indian Ocean and Central Asia. The study concludes that Pakistan must adopt a proactive policy framework to maximize Gwadar’s economic potential while mitigating the impact of Chahbahr’s rise through diplomatic engagement, regional connectivity initiatives, and enhanced security measures. It also recommends exploring selective cooperation mechanisms among Pakistan, Iran, and China to prevent Chahbahr–Gwadar competition from escalating into a zero-sum rivalry.

The Secret of Shangri-La: Agricultural Travels and the Rise of Organic Farming Discourse

Dealing with the events of the nineteenth century the author hopes to show the impact of the so called the Great Game played between Britain and Russia on the changing poliiical map of Asia and achieve a better insight in to the current affairs in Afghanistan and West Asia. The British maneuvered the uncompromising tribes of Afghanistan and formed an Afghan nation not as a favour to its inhabitants but rather to create a buffer state between Russia and the British India. This was the Great Game played between Russia and Britain. Since the documents vital for the study of this Great Game were compiled by their agents the author asserts to have read between the lines to obtain the truth. After his introductory pages the author starts off his work tracing back the Great Game to the time Persian Empire versus Macedonian; Alexander's desire -seeing himself successor to Cyrus the Great- to over power the Persian Empire and build 'world order'. This in time, with Egypt up setting the balance between the two empires, ended in a geopolitical vacuum that gaye rise to Islam, the greatest challenge both to Eastem and Westem hemisphere. The Islamic power through the hands of the Turks, mainly the Seljuks passed to the Gttomans, who did not only put an end to the Byzantine Empire, but also came to challenge the European powers. With the discovery of the new world and particularly the sea route to the Far East via Cape of Good Hope, the tide turned other way round. The Europeans eventually came to challenge the Ottomans as well as the whole Islamic world including Persia. Britain, France, Russia and other European powers intensified their colonialism in Asia and Africa. The British conquest of India and the Russian advance in Central Asia, particularly her desire to reach the warm seas, brought the two great powers on the verge of confrontation.

: India as well as China, have maintained diplomatic ties with the five former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan after the Cold War ended. Both India and China have devised diverse tactics in recent years to develop their respective connections with these resource-rich economies known together as the Central Asian Republics. China's strategic ambition is the Belt and Road Initiative, whereas India's objective is Connect Central Asia’s policy to expand its influence in a region that has been considered the most important region to complete China's hegemonic intention in Asia. China's closeness to the Central Asian Republics, financial power, and policy stability has propelled it ahead of India. This article examines the geopolitical significance of Central Asia on the political map of the world and contends that New Delhi's approach in the Central Asian Republic region is constructive while China's approach is hegemonic, from which to assess the two countries’ strategic competition in this region.

The paper examines the development of Russia's customs policy in the Central Asian region in the mid-to-late 19th c. The main part of the paper is a publication of a staff report written by Vladimir P. Cherevansky, a Russian high-rank official to Turkestan, namely, Head of Chamber of Control, in the 1870s. As a member of Commission for Russian Trade in Central Asia he disagreed with his colleagues on customs evolution and expressed his opinion in the report addressed to Konstantin von Kaufman, the then Governor-General of Turkestan. Since the 18th c. Russia had implemented the most favorable treatment towards merchants from the Central Asian khanates (Bukhara, Khiva, Khoqand, etc.) but their monarchs never responded equally. In the 1850s – 1860s, the Russian Empire substantially widened its possessions in Central Asia, shifting its borders southward. It caused a necessity of closing customs stations on the former borders (in particular, in Orenburg region). However, imperial authorities did not agree on whether or not to establish new ones in the newly annexed Russian Turkestan. The problem of customs policy of the Russian Empire (Turkestan Governor-Generalship being its specific region) towards Central Asian Khanates has been studied in a number of works, but the published document was never analyzed properly, whereas its content and especially its author are of great importance to go deeply into that difficult situation in the Russian customs policy to Central Asia. V. P. Cherevansky’s report mirrored different opinions on customs policy and, in fact, the end of the era of free-trade in the Russian Empire in general, and its Central Asian trade specifically. The content of report was influenced by debates between central authorities on administration of Turkestan — the Ministry of Finance and the Military Ministry. Although V. P. Cherevansky and Kaufman represented, respectively, financial authorities and military circles, they were not in conflict, and the report is an evidence of their constructive and respectful relations. In fact, the author of the report, who ex officio had to support free-trade policy, manifested his adherence to protectionism and strict customs policy towards Central Asian khanates and potential competitors from British India. The publication of the report also gives more information on V. P. Cherevansky as such. He was not just an official of a high rank (not only to Turkestan but later in Moscow and St. Petersburg where he finished his career as senator and member of the State Council), but also an author of novels and historical essays. His literary talents can well be seen in the published report, its style and content. Still, first of all V. P. Cherevansky was a professional with expertise in Russian Central Asian affairs. That is why his arguments were kept in mind by both local Turkestanian rulers and central authorities. However, the process of establishment of the customs system in Russian Central Asia proved long-term. Only in the late 19th c. it was finally organized with the aid of Cherevansky’s proposals.