Not a “sorority party”: black sororities in defense of themselves and Kamala Harris

The common narrative about African Americans’ quest for social justice and Civil Rights during the Twentieth Century consists, largely, of men and women working through organizations to bring about change. The typical list of organizations includes, inter alia, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the National Urban League, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. What is almost never included in this list is African American collegiate-based fraternities. However, at the turn of the Twentieth Century emerged a small group of organizations founded on personal excellence, the development and sustaining of fictive-kinship ties, and racial uplift. Given these organizations’ almost immediate creation of highly-functioning alumni chapters in cities around the United States, members of these organizations who were college graduates could continue their work in actualizing their respective organizations’ ideals. Two such organizations, founded at Howard University and Butler University in 1920 and 1922, respectively, were Zeta Phi Beta and Sigma Gamma Rho Sororities. This article explores the history of these sororities involvement in African American’s question for racial uplift in the United States. In doing so, the article raises a few interesting points: First, black sorority racial uplift engagement was different from that of black fraternities in one particular sense. There was far less civil rights litigation and possibly public policy work on the part of black sororities, at least when compared to black fraternities. Second, and as a result, black sororities — like Zeta Phi Beta and Sigma Gamma Rho — largely engaged in racial uplift work via efforts to shape public policy and through philanthropy. Much of their racial uplift work, however, was demonstrated through community service and non-social justice philanthropy. Third, when compared to the black sororities that predated them, Zeta Phi Beta and Sigma Gamma Rho engaged in less social justice work, comparatively. Fourth, over time, Zeta Phi Beta and Sigma Gamma Rho’s racial uplift efforts and strategies shifted, largely, away from social justice work to even more community service and philanthropy work. In an effort to clarify these points, the authors rely heavily on Zeta Phi Beta and Sigma Gamma Rho’s primary documents — their history books and national magazines.

This essay provides an initial assessment of competing claims about the impact of super PACs and also offers early insights on what super PACs are doing in this election cycle and what impact it may have on the 2012 presidential election and future elections.

Confronting the evolution and expansion of anti-vaccine activism in the USA in the COVID-19 era

The past decade has witnessed a great deal of research on the role of Political Action Committees (PACs) in funding congressional campaigns. One subset of PACs that has attracted increasing public scrutiny are those sponsored by members of Congress. During the past few years, these member PACs have grown in number and size. Eight member PACs contributed just over $400,000 in 1978, while in 1986, 42 member PACs contributed $3.8 million. Member PACs are politically controversial: several of the leading proposals for campaign finance reform currently before Congress eliminate such PACs. Despite this controversy, relatively little research has been done on member PACs. Although numerous studies discussed these PACs briefly, and Clyde Wilcox described the contribution behavior of member PACs and campaign committees for the 1984 election cycle, we know little about how the contribution decisions of member PACs change across election cycles.' In this note, we examine the contribution behavior of member PACs in light of the Gary Jacobson and Samuel Kernell strategic actor model.2 We find that member PACs generally behave as strategic actors, but their contribution strategies vary across parties and chambers, reflecting the unique political position and agenda of PAC sponsors.

AGA to form political action committee

INTENSE political controversy has accompanied the growth of Political Action Committees (PACs) and their contributions during the last decade. In December 1986, 4,157 PACs were registered with the FEC. PACs contributed $87.2 million to House candidates running in 1986, an increase of about 15 percent from 1984.' This study focuses on which candidates PACs decide to support, and on what they hope to accomplish with their contributions. Others generally seek to explain how PACs allocate their money with three sets of legislator attributes: the position of the member of Congress on policy, measured by a vote on a specific piece of legislation or a series of votes summarized in PAC or interest group ratings; the vulnerability of the incumbent and the challenger's prospects for success, as measured by the electoral margin of the current or previous election or by an interactive term that reflects whether the vulnerable incumbent is a friend or a foe; and the power of the incumbent, as measured by seniority, rank on certain committees, and leadership position within the party. While researchers agree that issue positions and electoral competitiveness are important to most PACs, they disagree about the importance of incumbent power in the House. Senority is found generally to be unrelated to PAC contributions (Evans 1983, 1986; Poole, Romer, and Rosenthal 1987; Grier and Munger 1986; Nelson 1982). Wright (1985) reports that neither leadership within the party nor committee positions are consistently or strongly related to the allocation decisions of five association PACs. Herndon (1982) argues that labor is more concerned with voting records than with access to the powerful. Gopoian (1984) concludes that committee assignments are generally unimportant to labor, oil and auto PACs, but they are important to PACs affiliated with defense contractors. Grier and Munger (1986)

There is no capitalist conspiracy and the rich are not all‐powerful

Enactment of the bill was a major victory for the National Rifle Association, which had worked for years to win relaxation of the landmark Gun Control Act of 1968. Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1986, p. 82) I. Introduction Every election the same political action committees (PACs) contribute millions of dollars to candidates for office. Well-informed participants in the political process surely must get value for their money. Yet empirical research fails to provide systematic evidence that campaign contributions influence congressional roll call votes.1 A mischaracterization of the exchange between PACs and politicians may produce these contradictory results. Empirical studies of roll call voting typically use PAC contributions from only one election cycle. Earlier studies generally assume prepayment in the prior Congress, while more contemporary studies assume a spot exchange. Recent empirical work, however, suggests another possibility: Interest groups may buy current influence with money spent over multiple election cycles. Stratmann (1995) shows that contributions from both the current and the previous election cycles influence floor votes on agricultural price supports. Snyder (1990, 1992) presents evidence that interest groups make long-term investments in politicians. Previous studies, by arbitrarily imposing a payment structure, may have produced erroneous estimates of the influence of PAC money on legislative votes. We examine roll call votes on gun control in the U.S. House of Representatives during the 1980s to determine whether PACs make spot market purchases, prepay for votes in the prior election cycle, or make long-term investments. We investigate whether PAC contributions have a durable, long-term investment effect, as Snyder (1992) suggests. We consider two types of evidence concerning the campaign contribution contract. First, we examine the pattern of expenditures by the two dominant interest groups concerned with gun control: the National Rifle Association (NRA) and Hand Gun Control (HGC). Their expenditures provide strong evidence against the spot market exchange hypothesis: Both groups made significant expenditures in sessions of Congress in which no floor vote occurred. Nor were these expenditures purchasing services such as committee work in a spot market exchange. Further, 1986 NRA expenditures are significantly higher for first-term representatives, which is consistent with long-term investments but contradicts a spot exchange (since freshmen have the least influence to sell). Second, we include expenditures from both the current and the five previous election cycles as separate independent variables in a model of roll call voting. To date, no empirical paper tests whether PAC money from more than two cycles influences roll call voting, and only Stratmann (1995) and Grenzke (1989) use a model that specifies money from more than one cycle in an equation explaining roll call votes. Our probit estimates indicate that NRA expenditures in the three most recent election cycles and HGC expenditures in the two most recent cycles buy votes. The independent effect of expenditures from different cycles suggests that contributions are neither an unqualified one-session prepayment nor a spot exchange. The influence of NRA expenditures two sessions prior to the roll call votes is evidence of a long-term investment. The literature on the determinants of roll call voting assumes that PAC contributions alter representatives' votes. Interest groups might instead simply provide campaign assistance to their supporters to affect the composition of Congress (Stratmann 1991; Bronars and Lott 1997). If a difficult to quantify variable (and thus omitted from regressions) signals a representative's true position and interest groups make campaign contributions on the basis of this variable, PAC contributions might appear to influence votes. The pattern of contributions and votes on gun control, however, indicates attempts by the NRA and HGC to influence votes, not merely the composition of Congress. …

Previous articleNext article No AccessResearch NotesGoals & Strategies of Political Action CommitteesSandra DavisSandra Davis Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Polity Volume 21, Number 1Autumn 1988 The Journal of the Northeastern Political Science Association Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.2307/3234929 Views: 8Total views on this site PDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

Interest group PAC contributions and the 1992 regulation of cable television

A5166 - Pros and Cons to Establish a Political Action Committee (PAC) to Influence Obesity Prevention and Treatment Services

A great deal of research focuses on contributions by political action committees (PACs) to candidates, but PACs are also institutional mechanisms for mobilizing contributions by individuals. Restrictions on the ability of PACs sponsored by businesses, trade associations, and labor unions to solicit contributions and the private benefits of contributing imply that these PACs are likely to mobilize donors who do not otherwise contribute to political campaigns. Analysis of itemized contributions to PACs during the 2004 election cycle confirms this. Moreover, the numbers of donors and dollars contributed to sponsored PACs aggregated by congressional district during 1996-2006 are relatively unaffected by electoral competition, presidential cycles, or changes in campaign finance regulations, and the effects of urbanization are less uniform than for nonconnected PACs. PACs sponsored by economic institutions therefore expand the pool of donors beyond the usual suspects.

Explaining strategies of political action committee (PAC) contributions to candidates takes two forms. Scholars emphasize either PAC or candidate characteristics as having more explanatory power over variation in PAC contributions, and this choice results in different expectations for PAC contribution patterns. Using California fruit, nut, and wine PACs, this research revisits a much-debated question: Why do PACs give to some candidates and not others? The findings indicate a mediated model best explains PAC contributions, as these PACs contribute money according to legislator characteristics but predominantly within the state of California.

The influence of health-related political action committees (PACs) continued to grow during the 1990 election campaign. During the first 18 months of the election cycle, contributions from medical and health care PACs to congressional candidates reached a total of $7.7 million. Among the leading PACs were the American Medical Association, American Dental Association, and American Hospital Association, which contributed a total of $3.3 million to congressional races through September 1990. For its study, HealthWeek monitored the contributions and Federal Election Commission reports of 52 leading health care PACs, including professional and trade associations, drug companies, insurers, and other groups. Trade groups made up about two-thirds of all PAC dollars spent, and several of these groups increased their spending significantly in the 1990 election cycle. Key lawmakers on health-related congressional committees received nearly $1.5 million from health care PACs, the study found. In all, 16 senators and representatives received more than $30,000 each from health care PACs. Senator John D. Rockefeller IV (Democrat, West Virginia) and Representative Thomas Tauke (Republican, Iowa) led the Senate and House, respectively, in total PAC receipts.

Many physician professional organizations have endorsed public policies, such as expanded background checks, to reduce firearm-related injury. It is not known whether physician organizations' political giving aligns with these policy endorsements. To compare physician organization-affiliated political action committee (PAC) campaign contributions with US House of Representatives and Senate candidates' stances on firearm safety policies and analyze whether physician organization endorsement of firearm safety policies is associated with contribution patterns. This cross-sectional study compared contributions from the 25 largest physician organization-affiliated PACs during the 2016 election cycle (January 1, 2014, to December 31, 2016) with US House of Representatives and Senate candidate support for firearm regulation. Physician organization endorsement of firearm safety policies was defined by endorsement of the 2015 Firearm-Related Injury and Death in the United States: A Call to Action From 8 Health Professional Organizations and the American Bar Association. Contributions to US House of Representatives and Senate candidates by stance on firearm safety legislation measured by (1) voting history on US Senate Amendment (SA) 4750, which proposed background check expansion; (2) cosponsorship of US House Resolution (HR) 1217, which sought to expand background checks and strengthen the national criminal background check system; and (3) an A rating (vs not A) by the National Rifle Association Political Victory Fund (NRA-PVF), a measure of overall candidate support for firearm regulation. This study examined the 25 largest physician organization-affiliated PACs during the 2016 election cycle. Twenty of 25 PACs (80%) contributed more in total to incumbent Senate candidates who voted against SA 4750 (n = 21) than to those who voted for it (n = 8), and 24 of 25 PACs (96%) contributed more in total to incumbent US House of Representatives candidates who did not cosponsor HR 1217 (n = 227) than to those who cosponsored it (n = 166). A total of 21 of 25 PACs (84%) contributed more total dollars to US House of Representatives and Senate candidates rated A by the NRA-PVF (n = 386) than to those not rated A (n = 546). Twenty-four of 25 PACs (96%) contributed to a greater proportion of candidates rated A by the NRA-PVF than candidates not rated A. Among PACs whose affiliated organizations endorsed the Call to Action, 8 of 9 (89%) supported a greater proportion of candidates rated A by the NRA-PVF than candidates not rated A, whereas 16 of 16 PACs affiliated with nonendorsing organizations supported a greater proportion of candidates rated A by the NRA-PVF. After adjustment for other political factors, the 9 PACs that endorsed the Call to Action had a lower likelihood of donating to NRA-PVF A-rated candidates compared with PACs that did not endorse the Call to Action (odds ratio, 0.76; 95% CI, 0.58-0.99; P = .04). Physician organization-affiliated PACs included in this study donated more funds to more US House of Representatives and Senate candidates who oppose firearm safety policies than to candidates in support of such policies. Although endorsement of the Call to Action was associated with a lower likelihood of donating to candidates who oppose firearm safety policies, the overall pattern was not consistent with professional societies' advocacy for firearm safety.