Norm and a Singular Administrative Act

Abstract

Due to the terminological confusion and dispute in contemporary doctrine regarding the nature of singular administrative acts (Canons 35-95), the paper examines the interdependence between the canonical norm and this category of acts. The research goal is set in a broader context, as the issue of canonical norms and the normative system of the canonical legal order are examined synthetically. The author expresses the view that in relation to individual administrative acts it is inappropriate to use the term “norm”, but he considers it appropriate to use the category of “acts” in the sense of legal acts. This position is based on the following arguments: first, during the codification work, consultors did not use the category of “norm” but the category “singular administrative act”; secondly, the first chapter of the Code’s fourth title is “Common Norms” (Normae communes); in the name of the fourth title, “Singular Administrative Acts”, we find the term “acts”; thirdly, in the canonical system some acts (dispensations, privileges) are issued against or in addition to the law, being exceptions to general norm.