Noncompliance and the limits of coercion: The problematic enforcement of unpopular laws

Abstract

This paper constructs a mathematical representation of the dynamic logic tying together coercion and noncompliance within political systems. Several concepts are central to the effort: system legitimacy; the long-term institutionalized investment of the political system in coercive resources; the vulnerability of political systems to mass noncompliance; and the short-term response of the political system to noncompliance. The analysis addresses a number of issues. What are the dynamic consequences of system legitimacy and of the political system's institutionalized investment in coercive resources? What are the consequences of its short-term coercive response to noncompliance? Under what circumstances will noncompliance be eliminated? Under what circumstances will it be controlled? Under what circumstances will political systems become overwhelmed by noncompliance? A central argument of this paper is that aggressive short-term responses to noncompliance are likely to be ineffective in controlling noncompliance, and they are likely to aggravate the vulnerability of political systems to mass noncompliance.