Abstract
We axiomatize a representation for preference between acts in Savage's formulation for decision under uncertainty that is based on expectation of a non-separable utility function on pairs of consequences with respect to the decision maker's subjective probability measure over states. The representation has been discussed previously by Graham Loomes and Robert Sugden, David Bell, and the present author. The representation follows from Savage's axioms for subjective utility when his ordering axiom is weakened and his conditional dominance principle is added as an explicit axiom. All axioms except the Archimedean condition are necessary for the non-separable representation.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
