No-Man's-Land: Texas, Mexico, and International Deal-Making

Abstract

In 2012, the United States and Mexico negotiated an agreement to determine how to address the transboundary hydrocarbon reservoirs in the Gulf of Mexico. This agreement generally comported with international law’s commitment to safe, efficient, and effective exploitation. Notably, however, the agreement did not cover any possible transboundary hydrocarbon reservoirs discovered within the first nine nautical miles of Texas’s coastline. This Comment discusses the constitutional and international law implications of this gap in the 2012 agreement between the United States and Mexico and how Texas and Mexico may cooperate to resolve any potential issues. As Texas cannot enter into a treaty with Mexico, this Comment proposes that Texas’s best option is to negotiate a memorandum of understanding (“MOU”) with the Mexican federal government that directs how exploration, development, and production should be handled in the event of a transboundary reservoir discovery. Although not binding in the same sense as a treaty, such an instrument would indicate the parties’ consent to act in a manner that comports with international custom. Any breach of such an agreement could have serious reputational repercussions, making each party more likely to abide by the MOU’s terms.