Abstract

ABSTRACTDespite progress in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the largest arsenals, a number of states are now looking to increase their reliance on nuclear weapons not only for deterrence, but also for coercion or war fighting. There is scant evidence that nuclear weapons are effective or well suited for these roles, and the risks of relying on nuclear weapons for more than deterrence of nuclear attack are under appreciated. We review the evolution of US nuclear strategy and assesses the prospects for establishing a policy of no first use. A no first use policy would in no way reduce deterrence of nuclear attack against the United States or its allies. Nuclear weapons are not an effective deterrent against non-nuclear attack because there are few if any scenarios in which a US threat to use nuclear weapons first in response to non-nuclear aggression against the United States or its allies would be credible. The benefits of adopting a policy of no first use include reducing the risks of accidental nuclear escalation or nuclear use from miscalculation, as well as supporting nonproliferation and disarmament efforts.

Highlights

  • Despite progress in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the largest arsenals, a number of states are looking to increase their reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence, and for coercion or war fighting

  • As a candidate Donald Trump refused to rule out the first use of nuclear weapons by the United States (Sanger, 2016) and implied his willingness to initiate nuclear weapons’ use against North Korea (Fifield and Wagner, 2017)

  • The poor relations between the United States and Russia and the disparity in conventional and nuclear forces and doctrine fuel these dangers. This contrasts with the consideration, reported in 2016 by the New York Times (Sanger and Broad, 2016) and the Washington Post (Rogin, 2016a) that President Obama was considering ruling out the first-use of nuclear weapons for the United States

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Summary

No First Use and Credible Deterrence

JOURNAL FOR PEACE AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, 2018 VOL. Steve Fettera and Jon Wolfsthalb aSchool of Public Policy, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA; bKennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA

Over reliance on nuclear weapons
Cold war origins
The end of the cold war
NFU and Japan
Scenarios for first use
The commitment trap
Conventional preparation for conventional war
Findings
Notes on contributors

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