New parties with old labels: party families and perceived party positions in Eastern and Western Europe

Introduction Health disparities between Eastern and Western part of Europe have been the subject of many studies. Eastern Europe experienced delay in health improvement compared to Western Europe. Life expectancy differences between East and West average 7 years in men and 5 years in women, in favor of the West. Cancer contributes to 12% and 9% of this difference in men and women, respectively. For those 20-64 years, contribution of cancer to this difference is higher at 16% and 24%, respectively. Methods Cancer mortality data and population data (1959-2010) for each country separately were derived from the WHO Mortality Database. Standardized mortality rates were calculated using the world standard population. Results In young men (20-44 years) cancer mortality was equal in Eastern and Western Europe in late 1960s. Since then, a decline in cancer mortality occurred in Western countries while Eastern countries experienced a cancer mortality increase trend. This increase began to decline in Eastern Europe in the early 1990s, decreasing the cancer mortality gap between the two European regions for this sex and age group. Similar trend disparities were observed in middle-aged men (45-64 years). However, the decline since 1990 was much slower in Eastern Europe than Western Europe, resulting in a residual gap between the two regions. The oldest men (65+ years) in Western Europe had a higher cancer mortality rate than Eastern Europe for many decades. In early 1990s cancer mortality in Western Europe declined whilst rising in the East. The trends intersected a decade later and despite the plateau observed in recent years in Eastern Europe, the gap remains persistent. In young women (20-44 years), cancer mortality diverted in the early 1970s as cancer mortality declined steadily in Western Europe while rising in the east, similarly in trend to cancer mortality among young men. By the 1990s, rates declined and the gap between the two regions trended towards closure. In middle-aged women (45-64 years) cancer mortality rates in Eastern Europe plateaued for the whole observation period, while western rates fell steadily since the 1970s, resulting in a residual gap between the two regions. For several decades, cancer mortality rates in the oldest women (65+ years) in Western Europe were higher than in the east and both regions experienced plateaus. By the 1990s western cancer mortality rates declined with little change in eastern trends. A small gap persists between the two regions. Conclusions Despite health improvement, a cancer mortality rate gap between Eastern and Western Europe persists across all sex and age strata. In particular, men at age of 45 years and more, and women at age of 45-64 years, experience the greatest disparities between the two regions. Deficiency of primary prevention and poor health awareness remain biggest challenge in Eastern part of Europe. Citation Format: Marta Manczuk, Urszula Sulkowska, Dana Hashim, Paolo Boffetta. The gap in cancer mortality between Western and Eastern Europe. [abstract]. In: Proceedings of the 106th Annual Meeting of the American Association for Cancer Research; 2015 Apr 18-22; Philadelphia, PA. Philadelphia (PA): AACR; Cancer Res 2015;75(15 Suppl):Abstract nr 3710. doi:10.1158/1538-7445.AM2015-3710

Research on partisan positions on higher education policies has focused to date mainly on parties in sustained democratic regimes in Western Europe. This study compares these findings with Polish parties’ positioning and investigates the extent to which parties’ preferences in post-socialist Poland can be explained by their party family affiliations. Poland provides an interesting case because of its socialist heritage of strong government control in the higher education sector and the rather fluid party system with a comparatively large share of populist right parties. By means of a qualitative content analysis of 41 party manifestos from 1989–2019, partisan positions of Christian democratic, social democratic, liberal, agrarian, and populist right parties are categorized along the re-distributive and control dimension of higher education policies. While party families can explain Polish parties’ positioning on the control dimension, there is a cross-party consensus to expand the sector and increase public funding due to strong popular demand after the transformation which contrasts with the positions of West European parties. Key results are a rising salience of this policy field in party manifestos and a detailed description of populist right parties’ preferences for government control of higher education institutions and expansion of this sector.

How do national political parties vary in their views on Social Europe? I focus on an aspect that has received less attention despite its growing prevalence—EU regulations with ambitions to diminish social inequality to encourage social convergence among Member States. Since the Juncker Commission, the European Commission has become increasingly active in pursuing this aspect of Social Europe. Thus, understanding parties' positions on this aspect of Social Europe has become more important. However, current literature lacks measures of national party stances towards Social Europe, and explanations for these stances. Here, I use data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (2006, 2009, 2014 and 2019) to develop an indirect measure of party positions on Social Europe. Leveraging studies in party politics and EU politics, I propose that party families and national economic conditions may affect parties' positions on Social Europe. The analyses suggest substantial variation in parties' positions on Social Europe both within and across party families. The analyses also demonstrate that socialist and green parties support Social Europe most, whereas radical right parties support it least. Lastly, I do not find systematic evidence that national economic conditions influence parties' support for this aspect of Social Europe.

The chapter examines party ideologies as one of the most important drivers of their responses to the EU. It classifies parties into party families and positions them along the two most important dimensions of party competition—the socio-economic left–right and the nationalism–cosmopolitanism axes. The chapter than maps party stance on the EU onto their ideologies, aimed at assessing to what extent, and in what way, party positions are value-driven. A party’s ideology proved to be an important source of motivation for a response to the EU. This is due to the specific nature of European issues, related to identity and statehood issues, in the context of these post-communist and post-conflict societies.

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Social and environmental scientists usually argue that political parties hold hostile positions towards GMOs, yet we are confronted with a lack of systematic comparative analyses in the West European context. Conducting a quantitative content analysis of 265 election manifestos in seven Western European countries from 1990 until 2020, we test this assumption and explore the salience of GMOs in election manifestos and the positions of political parties on this domain. Our findings reveal that GMOs are neither a particular salient nor ignored issue by political parties and that most party families do tend to reject GMOs. Mainstream parties are more likely to talk about GMOs and to take a critical stance during periods of high mobilization of anti-GMO movements. Additionally, we hypothesize that the presence of a Green party in the national party system may make a difference. The findings provide insights into mainstream parties’ behaviour on niche issues and information for the scientific community about how political parties may become less hostile towards GMOs.

For many years the ‘party family’ concept has been utilised by scholars for the purpose of classifying political parties across both countries and time. Like many other concepts in political science, the ‘party family’ idea is widely used, yet has suffered from a certain level of ambiguity. In this study, we try to clarify and re‐emphasise the importance of the ‘party family’ concept. We do so by offering an integrative approach for the classification of ‘party families’. This approach brings together two different theoretical schools (the ideological and the sociological approaches) for classifying ‘party families’, and also combines various methodologies (qualitative content analysis, ecological analysis and survey‐based quantitative analysis) as essential tools for defining ‘party families’. The deeply polarised party system in Israel, and especially the expanding extreme right‐wing ‘party family’ in the country, serve as our case study. The decision to focus only on one political system is meant to illustrate the importance of the ‘party family’ concept, not only for its common use as a tool in the comparative classification of parties across countries and time but also for the study of single‐party systems which are characterised by multi‐partism or polarised pluralism.

The Nordic countries constitute an interesting laboratory for the study of differentiated European Integration. Even though Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden share some historical, cultural, socio-economic and political characteristics, all those countries have ultimately opted for a different kind of relationship with the EU. Whereas Finland, a member of the Eurozone since its inception in 1999, has been considered to be part of the Union’s ‘inner core’ for quite some time, Iceland and Norway, in contrast, have opted to remain outside the EU albeit closely associated via the European Economic Area Agreement. The variation of relationships has also been reflected in Nordic parties’ positioning vis-à-vis European integration in general and differentiation of European integration in particular. Broadly speaking, party families can be distinguished along traditional (e.g., agrarian, Christian democratic, conservative, and social democratic) and modern (e.g., socialist left, green, and populist radical right) ideological orientations. Although political parties belonging to both the traditional and modern Nordic party families have adopted different stances on European differentiated integration, we would assume—against the backdrop of Nordic cooperation—higher levels of transnational cooperation in European matters. Consequently, this article examines the similarities and differences between parties belonging to the same ideological family, and the extent of transnational party cooperation in the Nordic countries. Drawing on a series of interviews conducted with party representatives as well as on official party documents, this article shows that although institutionalized party cooperation mostly reflects divisions between party families, such institutionalization does not include a common vision for European integration. We conclude that the low level of partisan Nordic integration is primarily caused by domestic-level factors, such as intra-party divisions, government participation and public opinion.

Scholarship on far right parties in Post-Communist Europe has borrowed findings and analytical frameworks from studies on the Western European far right. Similarly, studies on Western European far right parties have increasingly referenced instances of far right success in post-communist states. These parties are similar in their Euroskepticism and exclusionary populism. However, little work has compared voters for the far right between regions. Different political opportunity structures have consequences for far right voter profiles in four important respects. First, the linkage between anti-immigrant attitudes and far right support is stronger in Western Europe. Second, far right voters in Western Europe are less religious than their post-communist counter-parts. Third, post-communist far right voters are economic leftists, whereas rightist attitudes toward income redistribution slightly predict a far right vote in Western Europe. Finally, far right voters in Western Europe are more satisfied with democracy as a regime type.

Current comparative policy research gives no clear answer to the question of whether partisan politics in general or the partisan composition of governments in particular matter for different morality policy outputs across countries and over time. This article addresses this desideratum by employing a new encompassing dataset that captures the regulatory permissiveness in six morality policies that are homosexuality, same‐sex partnership, prostitution, pornography, abortion and euthanasia in 16 European countries over five decades from 1960 to 2010. Given the prevalent scepticism about a role for political parties for morality policies in existing research, this is a ‘hard’ test case for the ‘parties do matter’ argument. Starting from the basic theoretical assumption that different party families, if represented in national governments to varying degrees, ought to leave differing imprints on morality policy making, this research demonstrates that parties matter when accounting for the variation in morality policy outputs. This general statement needs to be qualified in three important ways. First, the nature of morality policy implies that party positions or preferences cannot be fully understood by merely focusing on one single cleavage alone. Instead, morality policy is located at the interface of different cleavages, including not only left‐right and secular‐religious dimensions, but also the conflicts between materialism and postmaterialism, green‐alternative‐libertarian and traditional‐authoritarian‐nationalist (GAL‐TAN) parties, and integration and demarcation. Second, it is argued in this article that the relevance of different cleavages for morality issues varies over time. Third, partisan effects can be found only if individual cabinets, rather than country‐years, are used as the unit of analysis in the research design. In particular, party families that tend to prioritise individual freedom over collective interests (i.e., left and liberal parties) are associated with significantly more liberal morality policies than party families that stress societal values and order (i.e., conservative/right and religious parties). While the latter are unlikely to overturn previous moves towards permissiveness, these results suggest that they might preserve the status quo at least. Curiously, no systematic effects of green parties are found, which may be because they have been represented in European governments at later periods when morality policy outputs were already quite permissive.

Do voters pay attention to a party’s relationship with its party family? In this paper, I argue that transnational brands such as the party family label assigned to a party are a valuable tool for parties to use to distinguish themselves. In turn, voters can more accurately position parties on the left-right spectrum when the party embraces the ideological profile of the rest of its party family. Using the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) and the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES), the results confirm my expectations that the ideological alignment of party and party family shapes the accuracy of a voter’s perception of the party’s positions. My findings provide support for the argument that transnational brands can influence how domestic political parties are perceived. These findings have important implications for our understanding of voter responsiveness in an increasingly transnational political space the role of transnational political brands.

The common and the distinctive features in the interaction between religion and politics in Western and Eastern Europe are discussed in the paper. At the beginning, the relative, flowing character of the concepts used is outlined, and the difficulties are indicated in making generalizations, since Europe sees great diversity regarding the involvement of religions in politics. The author also outlines the causes for greater interest of religious groups in politics – a large number of religious practitioners refuse to acquiesce with the place allocated for religion in the private space, where it was positioned by the Enlightenment. In the civil society, which strives to facilitate the participation of various society strata in the political process, the new tendency should not be perceived negatively. Full-value existence of democracy is inconceivable without the principles of solidarity and justice and public awareness of them, however, these are ethical categories. Increase of intolerance in many places of Europe makes one reflect upon the fact that the agreement of the public majority about the minimum common values is quite indispensable. However, in a secular state, religious groups cannot claim privileges and situation control. This is impossible also due to the fact that collisions of ideas are taking place also in religions and their movements themselves, and therefore, a discussion about the content and quality of politics is not to be perceived in a simplified way as a dialogue between the secular part of the society and the religious practitioners, but at the same time it is a conversation (often stressful) within the religious groups. The common features of the process of interaction between the Eastern and Western Europe: (1) increase of the role of religion in public space characteristic of post-secular society; (2) religion is a social phenomenon, therefore, unavoidably, the opinions and activities of its practitioners affect politics; (3) secularization, although on a different degree, affect all Member States of the European Union; (4) all the more actively, religious minorities announce themselves in public space. The different features: (1) in Eastern Europe, a larger number of people trust in churches than in Western Europe, which increases their role also among a large part of population who use to be secularly oriented on the daily routine; (2) the religious organizations in Eastern, more than in Western Europe, conceive spirituality as primarily directed towards maintaining definite ethical standards; (3) in Eastern Europe many religious organizations still are forming relations with the state and the public majority according to the principle of medieval Christendom, which provided special privileges for the church; (4) in Eastern, more than in Western Europe, the religious organizations are more sympathizing to the rightist forces. The religious groups, alongside with other non-governmental organizations, can provide an essential contribution in the discussions about the Western democratic models in the future, but they must be able to “translate” their ideas into rational arguments understandable to the secular society, avoiding theological naivety, which sees sacred texts as a monolith system of values to be transferred directly to the contemporary society.

Abstract. This article examines party‐based Euroscepticism in the candidate states of Central and Eastern Europe. In an attempt to develop comparative lessons from the different cases, it presents research into the location, electoral strength and type of Euroscepticism in the party systems of these countries. The data is then used to examine six propositions about the relationship between party‐based Euroscepticism and left‐right ideological spectrum, party position in party systems, public Euroscepticism, prospects for accession, ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ Euroscepticism and state longevity. The article concludes that extending the scope of our study of Euroscepticism to the candidate states extends our understanding of Euroscepticism from its study in Western Europe and brings new insights into party systems in Central and Eastern Europe. It also offers clues as to some future effects of European Union enlargement.

Common concepts for the classification of parties into families (origins, transnational links, ideology, name) suggest that the radical right should be less homogeneous than most other party families in Western Europe: their comparatively diverse origins, disputed ideological core features, as well as the lack of stable transnational cooperation and the absence of an agreed-upon label support this reasoning. The article uses expert survey data on six policy dimensions to assess the homogeneity of the radical right in comparison with the green, social democratic, liberal and conservative/Christian democratic party families. Analysing a set of 94 parties from 17 West European countries it is found (1) that party families on the left are more homogeneous than those on the right, and (2) that the party family of the radical right exhibits a degree of policy homogeneity similar to the conservatives and Christian democrats, while being considerably more homogeneous than the liberal party family.

This article investigates voters' preferences for party families in Western European countries' general elections in the 2000s. According to the realignment literature, “traditional” class voting patterns have been replaced by new class-party alignments: upper-middle employee classes joined the electoral bases of left parties, whereas radical right actors introduced in the electoral competition of the most deprived strata of the population, labeled “left behind”. This article aims to answer to the research questions: do social class and political values affect voting behavior in Western European general elections? Which direction are these variables associated with the preference of party families? The first section outlines the theoretical framework, accounting for the “societal modernization” processes, which have been affecting Western societies since the late 1960s. Among the “traditional” cleavages, the literature assumes the realignment of class voting patterns, as well as alignments between value orientations and political preferences. Indeed, class-party alignments are mediated by the political supply's mobilization of voters according to their value orientations. Such appeals differ among party families, partly explaining why specific classes constitute their electoral bases or contested stronghold. The theoretical framework hypothesizes political values as clustered in three ideologies (social and economic conservatism-liberalism, and authoritarianism-libertarianism). Those political values, which do not assimilate in ideologies, constitute more proximal factors, i.e., evaluations of specific political issues close to elections (attitudes). Having defined class voting realignment and a theoretical account of value voting, the paper empirically investigates their associations with vote choices in Western Europe. The analyses ground onEuropean Social Surveydata, aggregating the responses concerning the 12 Western European countries for which data are available in all waves. The dependent variable clusters the parties, which competed in the general elections occurred in the time span considered, in party families. Fixed effects multinomial logistic regression models are performed to detect which social classes constitute party families' bases or contested stronghold and how more proximal variables based on values account for class voting patterns. The results clearly show whose social classes are more likely to have voted for radical left, center-left, center-right, and radical right party families. Political ideologies account for a portion of these preferences for mainstream political actors, whereas political attitudes partly explain the introduction of radical right parties in the competition for working classes with left families.