Neposredan izbor i odgovornost predsednika Republike

There is an old saying, You can't sue city hall. The reference is that the executive is immune from lawsuits, so don't bother with litigation. It will just be a waste of time and resources. Cynics have interpreted executive immunity as an open invitation to secrecy, corruption, and abuse of power. By making executive branch officials immune from court proceedings, critics argue that the Executive becomes above the law (see, e.g., Berger 1974). Over the years, though, legislative bodies have passed numerous laws designed to promote open government and to hold executive officials accountable to the other branches of government and to their constituents. These laws reach all the way to the highest level of government in American society: the White House. (1) Nevertheless, just because Congress wants to hold the president accountable does not necessarily mean that you can take the White House to court. Over the course of the past few decades, creative lawyers in the executive branch have asserted a variety of privileges and immunities to shield America's highest executive officials, the president and vice president of the United States, from both criminal and civil proceedings. The challenges naturally raise important constitutional questions, which the federal courts are often asked to address. (2) So when exactly can you sue the president? In the last three decades, the task of answering this question has ultimately fallen on the United States Supreme Court. Beginning with the rejection of President Richard Nixon's claim of executive privilege to prevent discovery in a criminal proceeding, the Supreme Court has offered some broad parameters for holding the president in check while at the same time preserving the balance between the three branches of the federal government. (3) This year, however, the high court was asked to settle a less clear-cut controversy: can federal courts compel the president or the vice president to disclose documents through discovery to private litigants without violating the separation of powers doctrine? While the Supreme Court failed to provide a definitive answer in Cheney v. District Court, it did indicate that presidents and vice presidents, while not above the law, are certainly entitled to greater deference than anyone else in American society. It also opened the door for executive immunity on the grounds of the separation of powers doctrine. Holding government officials accountable is a vital element of democracy. So, too, is allowing each branch of government to perform its official duties without unnecessary or inappropriate interference from the other branches or the public. In Cheney v. District Court, the Supreme Court hinted where, perhaps, the line between executive accountability and presidential prerogatives might be drawn in legal proceedings against the nation's only two elected executive branch officials: the president and the vice president. This article begins with an overview of the parameters that the Supreme Court has established regarding executive privilege and presidential immunity. (4) The article then proceeds to a discussion of how the Supreme Court recently addressed the current administration's efforts to avoid civil action against the vice president by asserting executive immunity based on the separation of powers doctrine. The article concludes with a brief discussion of the implications of the Court's ruling in Cheney v. District Court. Defining the Parameters of Executive Immunity In 1974, a unanimous Supreme Court recognized that presidents are entitled to executive privilege in certain instances that would shield the executive branch from the demands of the legislative and judicial branches of government. In the same case, however, the Court held that presidents could not escape the due process requirements of a criminal proceeding by invoking executive privilege, unless perhaps state secrets were at risk. …

The objective of this study was to elucidate the principle of separation of powers and examine the structure and functions of the three branches of government in modern political systems, specifically the presidential and semi-presidential systems, by comparing the Turkish presidential system with the French semi-presidential system. The study employed comparative techniques and the descriptive-analytical method to attain its objectives. The study concluded that the effective implementation of the separation of powers principle in modern political systems is essential for achieving the desired democracy globally. The study demonstrated the presence of parallels in the implementation of the principle of separation of powers within the Turkish and French systems, especially with the establishment of the executive and judicial branches, as well as the authorities of the legislative and judicial branches in both systems. The study demonstrated that the Turkish presidential system has attained comprehensive democracy through the effective implementation of the separation of powers concept, in contrast to the French semi-presidential system, which has forfeited its constitutional and comprehensive democratic essence. This is evident in the establishment of the French legislative branch, which was not formed entirely by popular election. This branch is divided into two components: the National Assembly, formed through direct popular elections, and the Senate, created through elections for specific categories, consisting of senators, representatives of councils of French expatriates, and municipal councilors, without a general referendum, which violates the principle of separation of powers. A closer examination highlights the intervention of the executive branch in the judicial domain within the French semi-presidential system. This is evident in the authority granted to the French president to issue pardons in specific cases after judicial decisions have already been rendered. Such authority challenges the proper application of the principle of separation Of powers.

The Constitution of 1787 establishes a strict system of separated and divided powers. Congress is divided into two, separately elected chambers, and members of the legislative branch may not hold offices in either the executive or judicial branches of the federal government. Despite the prominence of the U.S. presidential model, it has not proven as influential in the wider world as have other U.S. innovations in constitutional design (for example, entrenched human rights safeguarded through independent courts vested with the power of judicial review). In fact, most liberal democracies, including the many new governments established in the aftermath of World War II and after the fall of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s, have rejected the presidential model in favor a parliamentary system that features a balance, rather than a separation, of powers between the three branches of government. In particular, parliamentary systems do not observe any separation of legislative and executive power; the same persons hold and exercise both legislative and executive powers. In part, this choice reflects the lessons of history: most presidential systems have failed when divided government gave rise to a constitutional crisis. Thus, although a matter of pressing concern and central importance to the Framers of the U.S. Constitution, separating and dividing legislative and executive power tends to lack salience in most modern constitutional democracies. This essay considers some of the root causes of this U.S. fixation with separating and dividing legislative and executive power, and posits a pervasive distrust of government, its institutions, and its incumbent officers as a primary reason for the U.S. embrace of presidentialism (despite its obvious and significant downside with respect to the efficiency of government). In the United States, we embrace inefficiency as the guardian of liberty. From a global perspective, however, efficient government is not necessarily the enemy of liberty–and inefficiency constitutes, not a virtue, but a vice in constitutional design.

The article explores the intricate relationship between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches in parliamentary governance. It compares the parliamentary system to presidential and semi-presidential systems, highlighting the fusion of executive and legislative powers that fosters collaboration and accountability. The Prime Minister, appointed by the head of state, is at the helm of the government, formulating policies and ensuring their implementation while maintaining the confidence of the legislature. This system allows for swift crisis management and more inclusive governance. The legislative branch, responsible for lawmaking, also plays a critical oversight role in ensuring executive accountability. The judiciary ensures adherence to constitutional norms and protects individual rights, serving as a check on the power of both the executive and the legislature. Ultimately, parliamentary governance thrives on the dynamic interplay between the three branches of government.

The subject matter of the study is the conceptual, theoretical, empirical, methodological and applied foundations of international and national legal mechanisms of judicial liability in the context of economic globalisation of modern society. Methodology. The present study employed a combination of general scientific and special legal methodologies. Through meticulous analysis, the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of the economic and legal essence of an independent and impartial judiciary as the nation's sole arbiter of justice were systematically delineated. The synthesis yielded a comprehensive overview of the legal framework governing the judicial accountability of judges across diverse legal systems, with particular consideration for each system's economic level of development. The employment of a comparative legal methodology has facilitated the identification of both common and distinctive characteristics in both international and national legislation. This is a scientific development that is indicative of the legal mechanism for holding judges to disciplinary liability. The formal-legal method established the foundations for formulating conclusions regarding the effectiveness of existing national legal regimes for holding judges accountable. The purpose of the present article is to determine the specific features of international and national legal mechanisms of judicial liability in the context of economic globalisation in modern societies. The results of the study show that the existing international legal mechanism of judicial liability developed by international institutions is quite effective and promising for implementation within the framework of national legal regimes, and the national mechanism of judicial liability needs to be improved both in terms of procedure and means of its implementation in connection with the economic development of society. Conclusion. The establishment of functional indicators of the judiciary has been undertaken, which are convergent in combination with economic indicators of the population's well-being, conditions for opening one's own business, ensuring financial and banking stability, GDP growth, the level of development of relevant sectors of industry and the economic sphere as a whole, etc. Among the indicators that reproduce the productivity of all three branches of government, the following are highlighted: the government efficiency index - the executive branch, the legislation quality index - the legislative branch, the rule of law index - the judiciary. A direct dependence of the economic development and rule of law indices has been revealed, since under the condition of ensuring the latter, there is a guarantee of the harmonious existence of all sectors of society, and conditions are created to prevent the emergence of existential threats to the national interests of the state, including the provision of human rights and freedoms. The mechanism for bringing judges to disciplinary responsibility has been established in accordance with international standards, including 1) a special procedure for bringing judges to disciplinary responsibility, which is defined by law; 2) the formation of an independent body that should consider such cases; 3) ensuring the right of a judge to participate in such procedure directly or through a representative, to exercise his right of defence and to express his opinion; 4) the right to appeal against the decision taken on the basis of the results of this procedure; 5) the exhaustiveness of the sanctions that can be applied and their proportionality. Within the framework of the national legal systems of the countries under consideration, the features of holding judges accountable in relation to their professional activities and for offences committed outside them are determined, which mediate the implementation of the content of the immunity and immunity of such officials. The procedure for holding judges criminally and disciplinarily liable is highlighted separately, and the reasons, grounds, procedure and subjects of the above-mentioned proceedings are determined, which indicates the special status of bodies that ensure the achievement of a social compromise in the influence of society on the judiciary, in combination with the construction of ensuring the immunity of judges.

Reclaiming nature’s rights

Accessible information is an essential resource for equal, meaningful participation in the public life of a democratic society. Such information is particularly vital for the effective functioning of all three branches of government in our constitutional democracy: the administrative branch, which creates government policy and holds state actors accountable to the public; the legislative branch, which scrutinizes old and creates new legislation; and the judicial branch, which reviews the acts of the legislative and executive branches. For the law-reform processes of each branch to effectively foster the informed creation and critique of public law and policy, we require reliable, accessible data depicting the diversity of individuals who make up the broader Canadian public.Beyond this practical purpose, accessible information plays an expressive role as it constitutes a particular notion of the Canadian public. The data created by national population censuses and assembled in welfare reports has the power to “nominat[e] into existence” certain groups of people and, conversely, to “refus[e] to name” others. Such information not only represents the public, it also creates the public, as it stands in for the public at all levels of government. By communicating who we are as a society and how we are changing, census information and welfare reports shape our understanding of ourselves — our laws, policies, government, and place in the world.

The very existence of the Constitutional Court is interpreted as a constitutional tribunal, which then becomes a new branch of power included in the judicial power. The model for appointing judges to the Constitutional Court may affect the independence and impartiality of the judiciary. In order to implement changes and improvements in the appointment of judges in Indonesia, we need to look at the model of appointment of constitutional judges in other countries. The aim of this research is to analyse the model of constitutional judges' appointment in Indonesia and compare it with the models of constitutional judges' appointment in other countries. The research method used is normative legal research by examining primary and secondary legal materials related to the appointment of constitutional judges. The research results show that there are several models of constitutional judge appointments in different countries, namely models involving the executive and legislative branches, models involving only the legislative branch, models involving all three branches of government, and models conducted by special institutions. Indonesia itself uses a model involving all three branches of government. This research also compares the system for appointing constitutional judges in Indonesia with other countries such as Germany, Austria and South Korea. The conclusion of this research is that the mechanism for appointing constitutional judges must be carried out in a transparent, independent and accountable manner in order to guarantee the independence of the Constitutional Court.

“Many Americans are unsatisfied with politics. Simultaneously, we are hesitant to question the basic soundness of our constitutional system. In this refreshingly provocative book, David Orentlicher explains why it is due time for us to reconsider dominant ideas about the presidency, now arguably our most powerful political institution. Challenging the conventional wisdom that the best executive is necessarily a unitary executive, Orentlicher makes a wonderful case for why ‘two presidents are better than one.’ Sure to be of interest to political scientists, legal scholars, as well as informed citizens justifiably worried about the fate of American democracy, this fascinating book dares to challenge everything you thought you knew about one of our favorite political institutions.” —William E. Scheuerman, Indiana University “Can Orentlicher be serious in calling for a plural executive? The answer is yes, and he presents thoughtful and challenging arguments responding to likely criticisms. Any readers who are other than completely complacent about the current state of American politics will have to admire Orentlicher’s distinctive audacity and to respond themselves to his well-argued points.” —Sanford Levinson, author of Framed: America’s 51 Constitutions and the Crisis of Governance When talking heads and political pundits make their “What’s Wrong with America” lists, two concerns invariably rise to the top: the growing presidential abuse of power and the toxic political atmosphere in Washington. In Two Presidents Are Better Than One, David Orentlicher shows how the “imperial presidency” and partisan conflict are largely the result of a deeper problem—the Constitution’s placement of a single president atop the executive branch. Accordingly, writes Orentlicher, we can fix our broken political system by replacing the one person, one-party presidency with a two-person, two-party executive branch. Orentlicher contends that our founding fathers did not anticipate the extent to which their checks and balances would fail to contain executive power and partisan discord. They also did not foresee how the imperial presidency would aggravate partisan conflict. As the stakes in presidential elections have grown ever higher since the New Deal, battles to capture the White House have greatly exacerbated partisan differences. Had the framers been able to predict the future, Orentlicher argues, they would have been far less enamored with the idea of a single leader at the head of the executive branch and far more receptive to the alternative proposals for a plural executive that they rejected. Like their counterparts in Europe, they might well have created an executive branch in which power is shared among multiple persons from multiple political parties. Analyzing the histories of other countries with a plural executive branch and past examples of bipartisan cooperation within Congress, Orentlicher shows us why and how to implement a two-person, two-party presidency. Ultimately, Two Presidents Are Better Than One demonstrates why we need constitutional reform to rebalance power between the executive and legislative branches and contain partisan conflict in Washington.

This article talks about the relationship of the National Assembly with the executive and judicial powers. The author came to the conclusion that under the parliamentary model, the functions performed by the state authorities are actually not equal in nature and differ from each other in legal force and content, that is, the activities of the legislative branch are of a legislative nature, and the judicial and executive authorities are of a sub-legislative nature. The article also emphasizes the idea that the legislative branch has so-called “functional superiority” over other branches of government, which in itself should not be considered as a violation of the constitutional balance between the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government. Because the essence of the principle of separation and balancing of powers is not to preserve equal functions for the branches of government, which, due to the nature of the functions of the branches of government, are no longer equal, but to ensure the necessary and sufficient powers of each branch of government.Addressing the issue that one of the central issues in the relationship between the branches of legislative and executive power is parliamentary control over the executive power, and emphasizing that in such conditions it is necessary to ensure effective mechanisms to curb the dominance of the executive power (Prime Minister) becomes of key importance, the author as a political guarantee of the implementation of high-quality control in relation to the executive branch, it takes into account the presence of a strong parliamentary opposition, because the main criterion for creating an opposition is not power, law, but the limitation of power by law.

The most eminent person to sit on the Appellate Committee is the Lord Chancellor. But the Lord Chancellor is more than an ex officio member of the Appellate Committee. He is the head of the judiciary in England and Wales. He is a senior member of Cabinet. And he is the Speaker of the House of Lords. In short he stands in a unique position at the meeting-point of the judicial, executive and legislative branches of government. The present individual appointed to perform all of these tasks is Lord Irvine of Lairg. He is the 234th person to have been Lord Chancellor since the Norman invasion. At the beginning of 1998 he became a household name to many people in Britain as the member of government who was allegedly spending somewhere in the region of £300 of taxpayers' money on each and every roll of wallpaper that he was using to decorate his official residence inside the Palace of Westminster. It is unfortunate for Lord Irvine that while the great majority of ordinary British people might not be entirely aware of his unique constitutional status as the only public office-holder with a foot in the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, they are acutely aware of the price of a roll of wallpaper – and at an alleged £300 a go this Lord Chancellor's taste in interior decoration seemed a trifle expensive. It seemed so to journalists as well.KeywordsPrime MinisterPolitical LifeLabour PartyConservative PartyGovernment RecordThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Constitutional Overlaps: Judicial Power and the Executive and Legislative Arms of Government

The article analyzes the system of checks and balances in Ukraine, which is an essential component of the separation of state powers. This system prevents the usurpation of power and ensures equilibrium among the branches of government. It has been established that the constitutional reform of 2004 significantly altered the distribution of powers in Ukraine, impacting the interaction between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. As a result of these changes, Ukraine became a parliamentary-presidential republic, whereby the powers of the Verkhovna Rada in forming the government were expanded. The article examines the powers of the President of Ukraine within the parliamentary-presidential model. It is demonstrated that the President lost the unilateral ability to appoint the Prime Minister, making the government more dependent on the parliamentary coalition. Nonetheless, the President retained certain levers of influence, including the right to veto legislation, the ability to dissolve Parliament under constitutionally defined conditions, and authority in foreign policy and national defense. It is shown that the Verkhovna Rada, in turn, gained more tools to oversee the executive branch, including approval of the Cabinet of Ministers’ composition, endorsement of the government’s program of action, and the ability to express a vote of no confidence. The judiciary was intended to play the role of arbiter in disputes among the branches of power; however, its independence remained constrained due to political influence. The study concludes that the 2004 reform was repealed in 2010 but reinstated in 2014, and its core principles continue to shape the modern system of checks and balances in Ukraine. The article highlights the critical role of judicial review in this mechanism, particularly in assessing the constitutionality of acts passed by the legislative and executive branches, thereby upholding the rule of law. Furthermore, decentralization, as part of subsequent reforms, has strengthened this balance by expanding the powers of local self-government bodies.

COVID-19 has made videoconferencing a regular occurrence in the lives of Canadians. Videoconferencing is being used to maintain social ties, run business meetings—and to uphold responsible government. On April 28, 2020, Members of the House of Commons sat virtually using Zoom. The virtual sitting was the first of what will become a stand-in for regular proceedings, allowing the Members to fulfill some of their parliamentary duties while complying with physical distancing (see Malloy, 2020). As the legislative and executive branches look to digital technology to allow the business of government to continue, what about the judicial branch of Canada's government? Courts are an essential service. This is best articulated by the Chief Justice of Nova Scotia: “The fact is, the Courts cannot close. As the third branch of government, an independent judiciary is vital for our Canadian democracy to function. It is never more important than in times of crisis” (Wood, 2020). In this analysis, we seek to understand how courts have responded to COVID-19 and the challenges of physical distancing through the use of digital technologies. This is accomplished through a systematic review of COVID-19 statements and directives issued from all levels of court across Canada. We briefly compare Canada to the United States, a jurisdiction that demonstrates greater openness to technology.

This paper attempts to combine the political economics models on separation of powers between the legislature and the executive with public choice theories on the behavior of the judicial branch. We obtain a model of political accountability and checks and balances with up to three government branches: the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. We conclude that an independent judiciary improves the political accountability of democratic systems relative to the political economics models with two government branches. An accommodating judiciary, however, changes the distribution of political rents without improving accountability.