Neither Bandwagoning nor Balancing: Explaining Europe's Security Policy

Abstract

Realists continue to bend their analytical concepts and vocabulary in an attempt to subsume recent developments in European security policy under their traditional nomenclature. Yet neither balancing (preceded by some diminutive adjunct) nor bandwagoning captures what is happening in Europe. The balancing proposition fails to explain the overwhelming incidence of European Union member states supporting rather than constraining American foreign policy. Yet that does not automatically entail bandwagoning, a concept which implies that they gave in to American threats or sought opportunistic gains through an alliance of convenience. Instead, European security policy is driven partly by a shared liberal consensus, and partly by diverging national preferences and priorities rooted in idiosyncratic political cultures. This article examines these diverging approaches by looking at how British, French, and German governments acted in the context of the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Examining the drivers behind key operations undertaken in this framework, it focuses on CSDP's intended impact on the transatlantic relationship. EU foreign policy has generally furthered rather than countered American foreign policy preferences. But it is conceptually misleading to subsume this behaviour under bandwagoning. In contemporary EU-Europe (or Europe), the relevant arena for the struggle for power is the domestic stage. Beyond Europe, this perspective also challenges realists to reconsider the importance of domestic calculations in foreign policy.