Abstract
The effect of a possible third-party resolution on negotiation behavior is studied in an economic bargaining experiment. The bargaining phase is preceded by a production phase that allows for different fairness principles to guide the division of the total production value. The experimental results show that a possible third-party resolution lowers the dispute costs by reducing the number of rounds of alternating offers. In the presence of a third party, negotiators make first offers that are more strongly related to their production, which reduces the number of bargaining rounds. The production phase has an effect on the distributional property of the agreements. In negotiations in which third-party resolution is an option, the negotiation outcome shifts toward a more unequal outcome, more in line with each person’s contribution.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
