Negotiation: 4 August–9 September

Abstract

Increasingly, Eden became concerned that his military preparations would be misinterpreted and prejudice his own freedom of action. Fearful ‘that the bellicose Press would be too bellicose’, on 31 July, he had asked his press secretary to arrange for a meeting with editors of the Daily Express, Daily Mail and News Chronicle. Concerned that too much information regarding military preparations had been released, the Prime Minister then sent a memorandum to the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Cilcennin, and Mountbatten. In particular, there had been a disclosure concerning tank landing craft. Venting his exasperation, Eden wrote: ‘Now the tank landing craft are on the news, on the authority of the Admiralty spokesman. Surely he can say “No Comment” and stick to it, unless specifically authorised to speak.’ These were precautionary measures in the nature of passive crisis management, as Eden consistently believed, and as he wrote to New Zealand Prime Minister Holland, outlining the dual-track policy: ‘[W]e have of course no intention of using force unless all fails.’ He still believed, as he had at the time of his February 1955 meeting with Nasser, that the Egyptians feared the potential of Western power. Therefore, a threat posed by American, British, French and Commonwealth forces would be taken seriously by the Egyptian leader and the larger the threat, the more likely Nasser would be to comply with reinternationalisation of the Canal.KeywordsPrime MinisterSecurity CouncilMilitary OperationForeign MinisterSuez CanalThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.