Negotiating Personhood Beyond the Human: A Relational Legal Thought Experiment

Recent work on legal personhood and corporations has pointed out the problematic character of such “artificial” legal personality, either because it gives legal protection to “in-human” behavior on the part of corporations, or because it unduly employs legal personhood to graft “human” rights protection onto corporations. In both cases, though, the “natural” legal person is employed as standard to criticize the “artificial” legal person. Other legal theorists, on the contrary, have defended the plasticity of legal personhood claiming that it responds better to an on-going process of de-naturalizing the “human” person, as well as allowing, via “artificial” legal personhood, the application of human rights to nonhuman beings, like rivers, forests and the like. In this chapter I want to bring back a distinction between corporation and trust, according to which the corporations endow groups of actors with one personality “by fiction” whereas the latter refer to a “real personality” of groups. I shall first discuss the crucial consequences that follow from this distinction with respect to: (a) the power relations within a group; (b) the relation between use and ownership; and (c) self vs other-directed purpose of corporations and trusts. I shall then make an argument as to why the idea of a trust may work better as a vehicle for the ascription of legal personality as well as human rights to nonhuman things than the ideas of fictional legal personality and corporate personhood.

This question of AI legal personhood is mostly theoretical today. In article we try to generalize some common ways that existing in legal theory and practice. We analyze some cases of recognition of untypical legal persons as well enacted statements in Europe and USA. Readers will not find a detailed methodology in the paper, but rather a list of criteria that is helpful to make a decision on granting legal personhood.
 
 Practices of European Union and the United States indicate that common approaches to the legal personality of some kinds of AI are already developed. Both countries are strongly against legal personhood of intellectual war machines. Liability for any damage of misbehavior of military AI is still on competence of military officers. In case of civil application of AI there are two options. AI could be as legal person or as an agent of business relations with other legal persons. Every legal person has to be recognized as such by society. All untypical legal persons have wide recognition of society. When considering the issue of introducing a new legal person into the legal system, legislators must take into account the rights of already existing subjects. Policy makers have to analyze how such legal innovation will comply with previous legal order, first of all how it will affect the fundamental rights and freedoms of the human beings. The legal personhood of androgenic robots that can imitate human behavior regarded in paper as a good solution to minimize illegal and immoral acts committed with their involvement. It would be a factor that keep people from taking action against robots very similar to people. Authors conclude that key factors would be how society will react to a new legal person, how changing of legal rules will affect legal system and why it is necessary. At least all new untypical legal persons are recognized by society, affects of the legal system in manageable way and brings definite benefits to state and society.

National legal personality is a matter of domestic law while international legal personality is an immemorial but significant subject of international law. It is generally accepted that an international organization with legal personality can represent its members, and achieve its aims more efficiently than those without having legal personality. There are a few theories about the way of acquisition of international legal personality. These main theories about international legal personality such as, subjective, presumptive and objective legal personality theories should be born in mind to better understand the legal status of international organizations. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is one of the leading international organizations functioning in petroleum sector with 13 oil rich member countries. The international legal personality of OPEC has been a long discussed yet still contradictive subject in international law. Therefore international legal personality of OPEC was chosen as the subheading, and it is defined according to the legal personality theories to better understand the power and legal status of OPEC which takes vital decisions for the world oil market. It is also presumed that the juridical personality of an entity should indicate legal personality of this entity, OPEC is also examined by its status before courts.

The concept of a legal entity as an independent legal entity, independent distinctiveness of its participants was formed gradually. In the Fatherland Law, it reached its climax in the Soviet era. It was then that such classical features of a legal entity were formulated as organizational unity, property isolation, and independent responsibility. The economic system drove this approach. In a planned socialist economy, an individual could not be the owner of the means of production, and therefore the legal personality of an enterprise was maximally alienated from a person's personality, which was reflected in its characteristics. For a long time, by inertia in Russian law and legislation, this alienation of the shareholder's personality from the legal entity's personality was preserved. The reason for the revision of this approach was the abuse by limited liability participants of legal entities controlled by them, using such a person as a "mask" for their activities and leading to a violation of creditors' interests. In this regard, with Russia's transition to market relations, an interest arose in the foreign theory of corporate law, which developed mechanisms to combat such abuses, studies of corporate forms of a legal entity, and mechanisms for bringing controllers and beneficial owners to justice were updated. The article examines the dynamics of the transformation of a legal entity's theory from dependence to independence and again to its dependence. It is argued that the shareholder's connection with the legal entity is preserved, and complete separation of the legal personality from the shareholder's personality is impossible, which is confirmed by the doctrine, law enforcement practice, and trends in the development of legislation on legal entities.

This chapter introduces the concept of legal personhood as well as the right to legal personhood. Legal theory, moral philosophy, and human rights law are used to explore the definition of ‘legal personhood’. ‘Legal capacity’ and ‘equal recognition before the law’, terms frequently used in human rights law, are also explored. It is established that the terms ‘legal capacity’ and ‘legal personhood’ can be used interchangeably because they both include recognition before the law (standing) as well as legal actions (agency). It is also established that they are both elements of the overarching right to equal recognition before the law. The differences in the use of these terms in common law and civil law jurisdictions are also discussed. In addition, a history of the right to legal personhood (via the right to equal recognition before the law) throughout UN human rights instruments is provided. The chapter aims to provide clarity regarding the definition and meaning of the right to legal personhood, and related terms, in order to provide the foundation for the analyses that take place across the various chapters in this book.

Normative Transplants: The Case of Ships as Legal Persons

Completing the Cathedral Taxonomy of Salient Legal Entitlement Forms: With Application of the New Entitlement Forms to Describe Constitutional Rights, Rationalize the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine and Better Understand Legal Personhood

This research explores the issue of the legal entity for fisher-women. Feminists Legal Theory is the main foundation. This theory seeks to criticise and dismantle the law by questioning the existence of laws that bring injustice to women's groups. In the Indonesian context, where the influence of patriarchal ideology and legal positivism theory is still active, the view that the law is believed to be neutral and objective has resulted in many things that discriminate and marginalise women's groups. This research presents the criticism of Law Number 7 of 2016 concerning the Protection and Empowerment of Fishermen, Fish Cultivators and Salt Cultivators for the recognition of the legal entity of fisher-women. This research is theoretical with the type of literature study focusing on ideas using a feminist perspective research approach. The results of the study indicates the that Law Number 7 of 2016 concerning the Protection and Empowerment of Fishermen, Fish Cultivators and Salt Farmers contains many weaknesses. There is a prejudice towards the work of fishers, there is a problem defining fishers because women are excluded from defining fishers, the absence of recognition of fisher-women affects the law and becomes indirect discrimination because of gender blindness and does not take into account in terms of women's experience or interests.

Criminal law enforcement against corruption by corporations in the taxation sector in Indonesia has not yet had a maximum impact in creating a deterrent effect. This article examines the obstacles to law enforcement against corporations that commit tax crimes using Lawrence Meir Friedman's legal system theory. The method used is normative legal research with legislation, legal theory, and case studies. The study results show a mismatch between legal substance, legal structure, and legal culture in criminal law enforcement efforts against corporations. Juridical obstacles include the absence of explicit provisions in the Criminal Code and KUP Law that explicitly regulate corporate criminal liability. In addition, the corporate criminal liability model still emphasizes the individual administrators, not the corporate entity. In conclusion, there is a need for legal reforms that clarify the position of corporations as subjects of criminal law and the application of the principles of strict liability and vicarious liability to strengthen the effectiveness of law enforcement in the field of taxation.

Marriage dispensation is the granting of permission to marry against deviations from the minimum age permitted in the marriage law. Marriage dispensation can be requested from the court with urgent reasons and must be married immediately. This urgent reason has caused debate, because based on the determination of the religious court as a whole it grants or gives dispensation approval to prospective brides who are pregnant or have committed acts prohibited by religious law and decency. While reasons other than that can be rejected by the judge. The purpose of this research is to analyze and find the reconstruction of the regulation of marriage dispensation in the perspective of human rights based on the value of justice. This study uses the Postpositivism paradigm, with an empirical juridical approach that uses primary data. Methods of data collection using interviews, observation, and field systems. The legal theory used in this dissertation is the theory of justice as the Grand Theory, the middle theory of the legal system theory and the Applaid theory of the theory of benefit. The results of this dissertation research found that the regulation of marriage dispensation in the perspective of human rights has not had the value of justice, namely the current marriage dispensation system based on Law Number 16 of 2019 has not fulfilled a sense of justice related to equal rights before the law and Article 28 B of the Law -The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, it can be seen that dispensation is only given to prospective brides who are pregnant. The current weaknesses in the regulation of the dispensation of marriage in the perspective of human rights are weaknesses in legal substance, legal structure and legal culture. The weakness of the marriage dispensation system is that it does not provide a clear understanding of the urgent reasons, causing debate regarding the urgent reasons and giving rise to the interpretation that the urgent reason is that the candidate is pregnant and results in differences of opinion from the judges. Reconstruction of the regulation on the dispensation of marriage in the perspective of human rights based on the value of justice, namely by reconstructing the provisions in Article 7 paragraph (2) of Law Number 16 of 2019, namely that it is necessary to change the sentence or phrase "reasons are very urgent" and amended with the phrase "which based on the interests of the candidate.

The Institute for Immediate Decisions (UitVoerbaar Bij Voorraad) currently does not prioritize human rights and equal protection before the law, because the regulations regarding the Implementation of Immediate Decisions (UitVoerbaar Bij Voorraad) are uncertain in their application. The purpose of this study is to find and analyze the Civil Case Execution Regulations regarding the Implementation of Immediate Decisions (UitVoerbaar Bij Voorraad) which currently have not been able to realize Pancasila justice; Weaknesses of the Civil Case Execution Regulations regarding the Implementation of Immediate Decisions (UitVoerbaar Bij Voorraad) in Indonesia at this time; and Reconstructing Civil Case Execution Regulations for the Implementation of Immediate Decisions (UitVoerbaar Bij Voorraad) based on the Pancasila Value of Justice. In this study, the constructivism paradigm was used, the socio-legal research approach method. The data sources in this study consist of primary data sources and secondary data sources consisting of primary legal materials, secondary legal materials and tertiary legal materials. Related to qualitative descriptive data analysis. Legal theory as an analysis of Grand Theory (Pancasila justice theory), Middle Theory (legal system theory), Aplaid Theory (Progressive Law). The findings of the study are that (1) the Civil Case Execution Regulation on the Implementation of Immediate Decisions (UitVoerbaar Bij Voorraad) based on the Value of Justice has not been able to realize Pancasila Justice, because it does not prioritize human rights and legal certainty as characteristics of Pancasila justice. Apart from that, it appears that unequal treatment before the law, because of the regulations as stipulated in article 180 paragraph (1) HIR / article 191 paragraph (1) RBG, there must be Authentic Evidence of the Plaintiff, so the Immediate Application of the Decision cannot be dropped if each - each party has authentic evidence. (2) Weaknesses in the Civil Case Execution Regulations regarding the Implementation of Immediate Decisions (UitVoerbaar Bij Voorraad). In substance, this regulation is still floating (floating norm) so that the Immediate Decision cannot be implemented and executed (non-executable). This is what causes the legal structure, namely the Court does not comply with the Application of the Immediate Decision (Uitvoerbaar Bij Voorraad). This fact can become a legal culture that is not good, both within the judiciary itself and among justice seekers and society. (3) Reconstruction of Civil Case Execution Regulations on the Implementation of Immediate Decisions (UitVoerbaar Bij Voorraad) based on the Value of Justice by Removing Article 180 paragraph (1) HIR / Article 191 paragraph (1) RBG, to realize Pancasila justice which prioritizes human rights and equality before the law.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is often compared to corporations in legal studies when discussing AI legal personhood. This article also uses this analogy between AI and companies to study AI legal personhood but contributes to the discussion by utilizing the hybrid model of corporate legal personhood. The hybrid model simultaneously applies the real entity, aggregate entity, and artificial entity models. This article adopts a legalistic position, in which anything can be a legal person. However, there might be strong pragmatic reasons not to confer legal personhood on non-human entities. The article recognizes that artificial intelligence is autonomous by definition and has greater de facto autonomy than corporations and, consequently, greater potential for de jure autonomy. Therefore, AI has a strong attribute to be a real entity. Nevertheless, the article argues that AI has key characteristics from the aggregate entity and artificial entity models. Therefore, the hybrid entity model is more applicable to AI legal personhood than any single model alone. The discussion recognises that AI might be too autonomous for legal personhood. Still, it concludes that the hybrid model is a useful analytical framework as it incorporates legal persons with different levels of de jure and de facto autonomy.

This article will analyze the Institute of disregard for the legal personality in situations involving irregular dissolution the limited liability company, in light of the jurisprudence of the Superior Court Tribunal. We highlight the impact that new code of Civil procedure will provide for analysis to safeguard the autonomy of assets of the legal person, as well as the guarantee of due process and of ample defense, directly impacting on business law. The analysis aims to contribute to the understanding of the Institute, and the systematic procedure. Adopting the dialectical methodology and criticism.

This thesis explores the intersections of law, popular culture and medium through a cultural legal reading of the transmedial universe of Persona 4, a Japanese video game. Seeking to mimic the journey of how an ideal consumeristic fan of Persona 4 may move about the texts – not abandoning the franchise at the conclusion of the core game, but instead pursuing Persona 4’s many available official spin-offs, sequels and retellings – this thesis illustrates how cultural legal studies can be enriched by analysing a text beyond the initial point of contact. Synthesising methodologies from areas of video game studies, fan studies, psychoanalysis and cultural legal studies, this investigates the many multimodal texts of Persona 4, from video game to manga to stage play. In undertaking this investigation, this thesis tracks both how the change in medium can affect and/or alter a text’s jurisprudential meaning and also demonstrates how a cultural legal reading can be enhanced, subverted or destabilised through this transmedial analysis. Following a strain of cultural legal studies that reads popular culture texts as suggestive jurisprudential reimaginings of law, this thesis identifies Persona 4 as a complex retelling of the relationship of the person to law. This articulation of personhood within Persona 4 is considered on two levels: a metatextual level and a textual level. On a metatextual level, the thesis analogises the entwined relationship of player and digital avatar with the symbolic legal mask of personhood and the embodied individual experience that it covers. The familiar fragmentation between self and player conjures up juristic associations of personhood that mirror different occupiers of the legal persona. On a textual level, Persona 4 questions of a split self are visible through game’s narrative content, distinct realms of gameplay styles, and frequent references to notable psychoanalyst, Carl Jung. Regardless of Persona 4’s attempt to craft a narrative of a singular, monadic self, Persona 4 demonstrates the inability of the creators and players to let go of their fragmented identity even within a fictional setting. The persistent thematic of self and identity throughout the game opens up a space of critique that animates the tensions of the legal subject as a fictional, imaginary identity that law uses to construct and bind subjects to it. Beyond the core game, this thesis also examines how the narrative of legal personhood that courses through each iteration and retelling of the Persona 4 universe is changed by its medium, extended by new additions to the world, or challenged by canonical inconsistencies or redactions. Furthermore, the thematic of the fragmented self that undercuts the Persona 4 universe resonates with fans who tailor this theme to their own narration of circumstance and self through their fan artefacts. Fan creations are examined as fan explorations of the uncertainty of their own identies, using romantic and sexually-oriented artefacts to transgress the limitations of their ‘real’ selves in a fictional way. Humorous fan works, on the other hand, play with the space between avatar and person, constantly seeking a concrete articulation of the self yet never being able to find one. The journey through Persona 4 ultimately evinces a struggle for the consumer to experience themselves as anything but fractitious. The video game acts as a catalyst for people knowingly experiencing themselves as permanently divided – between player and avatar – and carrying this tension forward into other iterations of Persona 4 as well as their own creations within the universe. Unable to achieve the singular, unified self that Persona 4 allegedly promotes, consumers of Persona 4’s universe struggle with the revelation that legal personality is truly discordant with the self despite the illusions of unity they are sold.

This article critically examines the methodology of defining the essence of law, revealing a fundamental flaw in many legal theories that equate the general concept of law with its specific form — juridical law. Legal scholars typically view law as a civilizational phenomenon, largely disregarding its historical development and the existence of other forms of law, such as primitive customary law (preceding juridical law) and humanistic law (which follows it). Only dialectical legal theory, developed in recent decades, has proposed this broader perspective, challenging the traditional focus on juridical law as the sole manifestation of legal reality. A significant limitation of mainstream legal theories is their failure to address the species-level essence of law, often reducing it to class-based and state-sanctioned norms. While some theorists, such as S. S. Alekseev, recognize the idea of “humanistic law,” they frame it as an advanced stage of juridical law rather than a distinct form of law. Conversely, early societies are either considered devoid of legal structures or are assumed to operate under an ambiguous notion of “natural law,” which does not align with their actual social practices. The article highlights a fundamental issue in legal categorization: legal scholars frequently classify law using arbitrary criteria without adhering to logical principles of taxonomic division. As a result, numerous subcategories of law—such as objective and subjective law, private and public law, national and international law—are defined inconsistently, lacking a systematic approach to distinguishing general and specific legal concepts. This methodological oversight obscures the deeper essence of law and prevents a coherent understanding of its true nature. Even scholars closest to the dialectical approach, such as L. S. Yavich, failed to establish a clear methodology for determining the essence of law. Yavich attempted to explain law through its class-based nature and economic determination, arguing that juridical norms represent the institutionalized will of the ruling class. However, his analysis remains incomplete, as it does not clarify how this “deep essence” of law emerges or how it fundamentally structures legal relations. Yavich identifies juridical law’s normative properties, arguing that objective and subjective law are interdependent and function as a unified whole within legal systems. Nevertheless, he does not resolve key contradictions inherent in his framework, particularly regarding the relationship between legal norms and individual legal rights. The article argues that a truly scientific understanding of law requires a dialectical approach that situates law within a broader historical and logical framework. Instead of viewing juridical law as the universal form of law, legal scholars must recognize the plurality of legal forms and analyze their evolution from primitive customary norms to class-based legal structures and beyond. Furthermore, legal norms should not be limited to legislative prescriptions, as many traditional theories assume. Rather, they must be understood as actual behavioral norms that materialize in real legal relationships, thereby moving beyond the abstract “objective-subjective” dichotomy. A comparison is also made with A. F. Zakomlistov’s “normological approach,” which claims to offer a universal legal theory free from class-based constraints. However, Zakomlistov reduces the essence of law to its juridical form, defining it through anthropological and ethical abstractions rather than historical material conditions. His view of law as an “anthropological norm” that defines human existence detaches law from its concrete social and economic basis, ultimately leading to an abstract and non-historical legal conception. Legal understanding will remain trapped within the confines of juridical essence unless scholars adopt a dialectical methodology that fully accounts for law’s historical transformations. While juridical law remains the dominant legal form in class-based societies, it does not exhaust the full spectrum of legal reality. A comprehensive legal theory must integrate insights from dialectical logic and materialist history to accurately define the nature of law as a social phenomenon. Without such a methodology, legal scholars risk conflating law with state-sanctioned norms, thereby obscuring its deeper ontological and historical foundations. Key words: essence of law, juridical essence, dialectical legal theory, legal normativity, class-based law, types of law, primitive law, humanistic law.