Negative Auditor-Client Interactions—An Exploration of Power Dynamics During Audit Evidence Collection

Abstract

SUMMARY Studies show that staff auditors, who often interact with high-level client management, maintain positions of lower power in these interactions. This paper summarizes a study by Carlisle, Gimbar, and Jenkins (2023) who investigate negative and unpleasant client interactions and find a deep-rooted power dynamic between staff-level auditors and their clients, whereby clients maintain the upper hand during the evidence collection process. Their study documents auditors’ concern for their clients’ perception of them and the audit team. Finally, they observe that auditors often struggle to fulfill their professional responsibilities while working to ingratiate themselves to the client. These may lead to audit quality threatening behaviors such as client avoidance and “ghost ticking.” Their results suggest that ongoing power disparities between staff auditors and their clients may impair staff auditors’ operational independence.