Navigating the Tension Between National Interests and Global Cooperation: Contemporary Governance Challenges in Defense and Security

Under its Constitution, the World Health Organization (WHO) works with its members towards the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health. The context in which WHO and its Members pursue this goal has radically changed since 1946. The interdependence produced by globalization has broken down traditional ways of conceptualizing and organizing the medical, economic, political and technological means to improve health. Nowhere is this transformation more apparent than in the rise of health as a foreign policy concern. As the papers in this issue of the Bulletin demonstrate, the relationship between health and foreign policy is vital, complex and contested. To craft health policy today, governments, international institutions and nongovernmental organizations must find mechanisms to manage health risks that spill into and out of every country. These endeavours create the new world of global health diplomacy. Critical to global health diplomacy is the relationship between health and foreign policy. Even though much of what affects health today is transnational in nature, countries remain core actors that must reorient their health and foreign policies in ways that align their national interests with the diplomatic, epidemiological and ethical realities of a globalized world. This alignment involves governments adjusting to globalization by overcoming fragmented policy competencies in national governance systems. The trade and health relationship unfolds on the cutting edge of global health diplomacy and offers lessons for the health and foreign policy nexus. The World Heath Assembly recognized this significance in a May 2006 resolution on International Trade and Health, in which the Assembly called for foreign, trade and health ministries to move towards coherency in formulating national policies on trade and health. The Assembly tasked WHO to collaborate with other international organizations to generate and share evidence on ways to align trade and health. This trade and health linkage highlights the new prominence of health within foreign policy; however, the linkage itself is not new. These enquiries allow us to see how countries historically dealt with health in their trade and foreign policies, particularly with respect to ensuring that health measures did not unnecessarily restrict international commerce. The trade and health relationship is also at the centre of international lawmaking, particularly in the World Trade Organization. International trade law allows us to analyse how countries calibrate their national interests regarding economic growth and protection of health. The trade and health arena has also seen involvement by nongovernmental entities promoting trade and health interests; these actions provide avenues for understanding how countries adjust their foreign policy strategies when non-state actors intervene. The window into global health diplomacy provided by the trade and health relationship reveals controversy, but also increasing efforts between those in trade and health ministries towards coherent policies within and among countries. WHO’s work on trade and health policy coherence reveals increasing country-level commitment to, and sophistication about, strategies to promote trade and protect health in ways that are politically feasible, economically attractive, epidemiologically informed and ethically sound. Through these efforts, health ministries are identifying how they can best inform pre-negotiation trade positions, provide input during negotiations, analyse the health costs and benefits of proposed compromises and monitor the health impacts of trade agreements. WHO is collaborating with its members and other international organizations to advance this integrated approach to foreign policy by developing a new trade and health diagnostic tool. This tool is being designed to help health and trade ministries more systematically assess trade and health issues, to empower health ministries to give better advice to their trade counterparts and to enhance health policy input into the trade community’s pursuit of integrated frameworks, trade policy reviews and aid initiatives to bolster trade capacities in developing countries. The cutting edge of global health diplomacy raises certain cautions regarding health’s role in trade and foreign policies. Competition among countries’ national interests sometimes impedes policy coherence, which makes attainment of health goals more difficult. As the trade and health relationship makes clear, health ministries, experts and advocates can affect this competition constructively by combining their epidemiological skills and ethical principles with sharpened political and economic sensibilities about global politics. Securing health’s fullest participation in foreign policy does not ensure health for all, but it supports the principle that foreign policy achievements by any country in promoting and protecting health will be of value to all. ■

Purpose of the study: The study's rationale is tied to examining the viability of global collective security within a continuously changing arena of national interest of actors. It assesses the basis for global actors' policy responses and actions in the fight against the novel coronavirus (Covid-19). Methodology: The study uses a secondary data scoping review technique focusing on collective security, national interest, and Covid -19 as the central themes. It utilizes the tenents of human nature, cooperation, and systemic considerations espoused in game theory’s stag hunt analysis and Maslow’s hierarchy of needs to explore the rationale for state actions in the global arena. Main findings: The paper confirms that while collective security is essential for global security, its efficacy is dependent on its alignment with states' national interests. Drawing from case observation of global superpowers' responses to Covid-19, the paper argues that the global and 'borderless' impact of Covid-19 serves to buttress the assertion that the integrity of collective security is a function of national interest alignment. In essence, collective security is only 'collective' and effective when state actors' national interests are directly aligned to the pursuance of such security objective(s). The paper concludes that the fight against the Covid-19 pandemic could only be won if global actors shun the narrow gains of national interest and focus on the survival of all through collective policy efforts. Application: The study is relevant as it adds to the body of knowledge and analysis for geopolitics and international relations. It is also a useful prototype in theory testing and analysis within politics and international relations subfields. It is also relevant in the discourse of global public health and human security. Novelty: The need to assess the methodology and need for collective action in the face of global threats is imperative. Thus, the study serves as an eye-opener and acknowledgment of the declining status of collective security in the face of national interest despite the clamor pre- and post-United nations formation and aim for world peace. Therefore, the global and 'borderless' impact of Covid-19 serves to buttress the assertion that the integrity of collective security is a function of national interest alignment. In essence, collective security is only 'collective' and effective when state actors' national interests are directly in agreement with the pursuance of such security objective(s).

Recent decades have witnessed dramatic changes all over the world. One major trend is the proliferation and diversification of actors, forums and their arrangements to address global governance challenges, which has led to fragmentation in global governance. However, such contested multilateralism has a positive dimension, as the emergence of informal multilateral institutions claiming a major role in defining the global governance agenda creates alternatives for providing common goods. New arrangements acquire their own actorness and place in the system of global governance. In certain policy areas, there is a clear trend for the new summit institutions’ leadership. The most visible recent cases include the Group of 20 (G20), the BRICS group of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, with APEC gaining importance regionally and globally. These new informal groupings work on their own agenda. They also engage with established international organizations to steer global governance processes. Taken together, the transformative trends in international relations, the emergence of new actors, tensions between exclusive and inclusive clubs, and demands for the legitimacy and effectiveness of the international institutions define the relevance of the study, systematization and comparative analysis of the effectiveness of this model of cooperation among international institutions. This article builds an analytical framework by undertaking three tasks. It first reviews the key concepts. Second, it argues for a rational choice institutionalist approach. Third, it puts forward a hypothesis for research: to compensate for their inefficiencies, summit institutions engage with other international organizations in a mode they regard most efficient for attainment of their goals. The modes of those institutions’ engagement with other international organizations as reflected in the leaders’ discourse should thus indicate the role of those institutions in the global governance architecture, which is imputed at their launch and subsequent evolution. The hypothesis further suggests that the “governing in alliance” mode enhances the effectiveness of the summit institutions; however, those institutions’ use is not mutually exclusive. The modes of engagement with international institutions coexist in the engagement of informal summit institutions with other international organizations. The choice is defined by the policy area and type of organizations. The article concludes with a case study of BRICS engagement with international institutions. The results confirm that the choice of engagement model reflects the forum’s role and place in the global governance architecture. To maximize benefits from cooperation, the BRICS engages with relevant international organizations on agenda priorities at different institutional levels. Two types of engagement are typical for the BRICS: catalytic engagement (exerting an influence for changes in international organizations through endorsement or stimulus, or compelling them to reform) and parallel treatment (creation of the institution’s own mechanisms). By establishing new institutions, the BRICS consistently strengthens its cooperation with other international institutions. Its choice of model depends on the policy area, where it is developing cooperation and the perception of the organization’s relevance to BRICS objectives. BRICS engagement with United Nations organizations and the World Trade Organization follows the model of catalytic influence, whereas with the G20, BRICS engagement based on the model of governance in alliance with multilateral institutions remained unrealized.

Carbon markets devolve governance to external institutions and displace power from sovereign states. Major producers in these markets, notably China, have expressed concern about the adverse implications for national interests and sovereignty associated with selling off the rights to emit carbon emissions abroad. This article suggests that such concern has shaped the discursive context in which emission trading schemes have gained popularity in the country. Our discourse analysis shows that notions of market power are made manifest as a powerful storyline. In the Chinese language, “power,” “sovereignty,” and “rights” all use the same character. The storyline captures all these expressions and allows for a positive view about active engagement in carbon trading as a way to protect development rights and redeem carbon sovereignty. Thus, the contested policy of emissions trading becomes embedded in the more appealing narrative of national development and made politically attractive, despite unfavorable realities against it.

: American policy toward the Sudan was redirected in 2000 from the isolationist policies of President Clinton to the intensive engagement of the Bush Administration. In the 1990s, Sudan was perceived as posing a serious security threat to the U.S. Following the 1989 Islamist revolution, U.S. attention focused on Khartoum's support for terrorism, the long running civil war, regular humanitarian crises, and egregious human rights abuses. American security concerns were also raised by regional instability fomented by the Sudan's support for cross-border insurgencies. The Clinton Administration's effort to isolate the Sudan failed for lack of multilateral cooperation. By 2000, President-elect Bush intended to focus only on U.S. vital interests and core relationships rather than on peripheral areas such as Africa. Candidate Bush even remarked that, While Africa may be important, it doesn't fit into the national strategic interests. When President Bush entered office he did not view the Sudan as a priority country because no vital U.S. national interests were at risk and Sudan had no capacity to threaten the U.S. Nevertheless, influences from various constituencies converged to alter this view in the first year of Bush's tenure. These influences resulted in Sudan being designated a priority country for U.S. policy in Africa.

This study analysis developing country’ experiences of the last three decades after many of these countries had adopted neoliberal economic policies. An attempt is being made to study their achievements in terms of reducing poverty and unemployment. Also explores neoliberalism and globalisation and its impact on the process and development of democracy in developing countries in the present framework of global capitalism. I find that despite the disastrous experiences of neoliberal polices, especially in Latin American and African countries, still the international institutions are imposing these policies on the developing countries. It seems that little lesson has been learned from the past. There is a gap in the literature regarding the critical analysis of these polices. In recent years a number of Latin American countries have abandoned neoliberalism and adopted polices to be suitable to their national interests rather than foreign capital. I intend to examine these developments in details. We will briefly analyse the international financial institutions policies such as IMF and World Bank and their close co-operation with World Trade Organisation (WTO). Neoliberal versions of the ‘globalisation’ thesis are challenged, and it is argued that national-level economic process remains central and that the international economy is far from ungovernable. The study also examines India’s recent experiences of neoliberal policies, while in contrast to that Ecuador’s attempt to opt out of neoliberal policies and chart out new economic policies aimed towards more national economic control of resources and with active state intervention in favour of under privileged classes in the country.

Shadow Negotiators is the first book to demonstrate that United Nations (UN) organizations have intervened to influence the discourse, agenda, and outcomes of international trade lawmaking at the World Trade Organization (WTO). While UN organizations lack a seat at the bargaining table at the WTO, Matias E. Margulis argues that these organizations have acted as "shadow negotiators" engaged in political actions intended to alter the trajectory and results of multilateral trade negotiations. He draws on analysis of one of the most contested issues in global trade politics, agricultural trade liberalization, to demonstrate interventions by four different UN organizations—the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Food Programme (WFP), the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), and the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food (SRRTF). By identifying several novel intervention strategies used by UN actors to shape the rules of global trade, this book shows that UN organizations chose to intervene in trade lawmaking not out of competition with the WTO or ideological resistance to trade liberalization, but out of concerns that specific trade rules could have negative consequences for world food security—an outcome these organizations viewed as undermining their social purpose to reduce world hunger and protect the human right to food.

Shadow Negotiators is the first book to demonstrate that United Nations (UN) organizations have intervened to influence the discourse, agenda and outcomes of international trade lawmaking at the World Trade Organization (WTO). While UN organizations lack a seat at the bargaining table at the WTO, Matias E. Margulis argues that these organizations have acted as “shadow negotiators” engaged in political actions intended to alter the trajectory and results of multilateral trade negotiations. He draws on analysis of one of the most contested issues in global trade politics, agricultural trade liberalization, to demonstrate interventions by four different UN organizations – the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), World Food Programme (WFP), Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), and Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food (SRRTF). By identifying several novel intervention strategies used by UN actors to shape international trade law, this book shows that UN organizations chose to intervene in trade lawmaking not out of competition with the WTO or ideological resistance to trade liberalization, but out of concerns that specific trade rules could have negative consequences for world food security—an outcome these organizations viewed as undermining their social purpose to reduce world hunger and protect the human right to food.

Lessons from the past Most dispute settlement procedures of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and of the World Trade Organization (WTO) resulted from previous dispute settlement practices and were progressively codified (for instance, in 1966, 1979, 1982, 1989, and in 1994) in response to particular GATT and WTO legal problems.1 The frequent use of ‘constructive ambiguity’ as a diplomatic method for facilitating political consensus on the conclusion of broadly framed GATT and WTO agreements, as well as the compulsory jurisdiction provided for in the WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) as a means to ‘clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law’ (Article 3.2 of the DSU), entail a far-reaching delegation of (quasi-)judicial powers to WTO dispute settlement bodies. Negotiating incomplete agreements and delegating the future clarification of contested treaty interpretations to an interdependent system of WTO dispute settlement bodies reduced bargaining costs and enhanced the effectiveness of collective bargaining. Yet, many WTO governments remain reluctant to admit the systemic consequences of this ‘judicialization’ of WTO rules for the future evolution of the ‘member-driven’ WTO system. Past WTO case-law confirms that the WTO jurisprudence of independent international judges may differ from the views of national trade officials. Most trade diplomats continue to perceive the WTO as a separate trade regime that must remain focused on national interests, trade liberalization, and promotion of economic development through trade.

Regional Trade Arrangements (RTAs) have proliferated after the birth of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In these years, as the members of RTAs increased considerably, the instruments and formalities of RTAs have been varied, and the scope of RTAs has been expanded. With regards to China, it has changed its traditional view and has been engaged positively in the building its own RTAs. Facing the competition from neighboring countries, China should construct an appropriate strategy on RTAs as soon as possible. Without the derogation of multilateral trade agreement, the RTA strategy should be led by national strategic interest, contain the involvement of various levels of trade agreements, enlarge the scope of regional trade agreements, and expand the potential realm of partners for cooperation, etc.

When conducting trade activities, due to the needs of countries' national interests or due to the general international context, it is inevitable that some acts will be used to disrupt the balance of world trade transactions, thus causing conflicts between two or more nations. If a dispute arises under the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement, one party will be deemed to be in breach of the WTO agreement, and the injured party will resort to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body(DSB), and if the "losing party" does not fulfill the agreement, then the "winning party" will request the WTO Dispute Settlement Body to retaliate against it. If the "losing party" does not fulfill the agreement, then the "winning party" will request the DSB to authorize retaliation against it, to stop the behavior of the defaulting party and get certain compensation. Therefore, the retaliation system of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is of great significance to maintaining the international economic order. The establishment of this system is of great practical significance for resolving disputes between disputing parties and achieving the rebalancing of the international economic order. However, along with the continuous occurrence of various dispute cases, and in the increasingly frequent use of the WTO panel members, member states and academics have gradually recognized certain shortcomings of the retaliation system, resulting in this system for certain violations of the agreement, often helpless. In this regard, all countries have improved the retaliation system under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism from their own or overall interests. This paper discusses the shortcomings of the retaliation system in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism and then makes some suggestions on how to modify and improve it.

The election of Democratic Party candidate Joe Biden as President of the United States did not change Washington’s negative attitude towards the activities of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The historically established consensus of the Republican and Democratic parties, expressed in the general similarity of the approach of the legislative and executive branches of the U.S. government to the WTO as a tool primarily for realizing U.S. national interests in the foreign economic sphere, hinders the achievement of generally acceptable agreements within the WTO in key areas of its activities. Like the previous administration of Donald Trump, Joe Biden’s administration has, in particular, been blocking the activities of the WTO’s Appellate Body for a number of years. Despite the Democratic President’s statements about the commitment of the United States to the principles of liberal trade, the White House, as before, proceeds from the desire to maintain the leading role of the United States in the WTO, even at the cost of curtailing certain areas of its work. The dominant desire is to transform the WTO into an international economic mechanism to strategically contain China and openly oppose Russia by politicizing the WTO and taking measures that pave the way for the complete dismantling of the rules-based multilateral trading system. The WTO is in fact in a state of permanent institutional crisis in a number of central areas of its activity. The only way to deal with the current crisis is to give economics precedence, not politics, and prevent violations of agreed multilateral trade rules by unilateral actions; otherwise the negative impact on world markets and the economies of many WTO members will continue.

Regional Organizations and the Responsibility to Protect in the Context of the Arab Spring

Before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, on the United States, Africa seemed destined to remain at best peripheral to the strategic landscape as most Americans perceived it. Promising a realist-oriented foreign policy while campaigning for the presidency in 2000, George W. Bush responded negatively to a question from PBS’s Jim Lehrer about whether Africa was a significant factor in his geopolitical calculus: “At some point in time the president’s got to clearly define what the national strategic interests are, and while Africa may be important, it doesn’t fit into the national strategic interests, as far as I can see them.”1 After 9/11, however, reversing course and deeming Africa as an increasingly important “second front” in the “Global War on Terror” (GWOT) through whose optic many of them now viewed the world, U.S. policymakers from the president down began building entirely new framework for engaging the continent through overlapping networks of ties that will have profound political, economic, and military implications for years to come.

The instrument for regional structuring, particularly regional expansion leading to new autonomous regions, can be seen as a rational and logical implication of decentralization implementation. Decentralization, in turn, played a pivotal role in shaping the grand design of regional planning (Desertada) up until the imposition of a regional expansion moratorium in late 2009. This research employs a qualitative methodology, a case study approach, chosen due to its adaptability and effectiveness in addressing dynamic and unpredictable social contexts. The focal point of this study revolved around the narratives underlying the formation of new autonomous regions (DOB) in Papua, particularly emphasizing the discourse on welfare. The government has actively promoted narratives of welfare motives and national strategic interests. The government has actively promoted narratives of welfare motives and national strategic interests. Despite the expansion of the Papua region and the implementation of special autonomy, it is observed that these initiatives have not significantly contributed to development. Notably, the expansion process in Papua, marred by alleged procedural and material deficiencies, took place without indigenous Papuans' meaningful participation and consultation.