NAVAL PRESENCE AND STRATEGIC COMPETITION BETWEEN INDIA AND CHINA IN THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION FROM THE EARLY 21ST CENTURY TO THE PRESENT

Maritime security is a broad and vague area, though it could be defined as the security dealing with the prevention of illicit activities in the maritime domain. Indian Ocean has become multifaceted and dynamic. Indian Ocean regional maritime security has become a key factor as the Indian Ocean Region transitions from an international backwater, a mere route for maritime trade, to a major global nexus of resource, human, economic and environmental issues. The Indian Ocean Region contains a large proportion of the world's failed and failing states, including 11 of the 20 states listed in Foreign Policy Journal 's 2009 article 'The Failed State Index'. 2 The non-traditional threats to security comprise threat of non-state actors. The trafficking of narcotics, weapons and people continues to be a great concern. The likelihood of terrorist attack has become a major concern. Although terrorist attacks on shipping remain relatively low, the threat of terrorism must be viewed as credible. Any major attack can easily disrupt global economy. Maritime security concerns in the Indian Ocean continue to be dominated by piracy and armed robbery at sea, especially hijacking of merchant vessels. Therefore, maritime security in the Indian Ocean Region is an apt model of Buzan and Weaver's 'regional security complex', that is, a group of states united by common security problems of the region. 3Geographically, the Indian Ocean is the third-largest ocean in the world, covering 68.556 million sq. km or 20 per cent of the earth's water surface. 4 Broadly, it has been bounded by India in its north; Africa in its west; Thailand, the Malay Peninsula, Indonesia, Malaysiaand Australia in its east; and Antarctica in its south. The Indian Ocean also embraces many seas like Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal, Andaman Sea, the Gulf of Mannar and the Gulf of Oman. The major ports in the Indian Ocean are Chennai, Colombo, Durban, Jakarta, Kolkata, Melbourne, Mumbai and Richards Bay. 5 There are several choke points in the Indian Ocean such as the Mozambique Channel, the Bab-elMandeb, the Suez Canal, the Strait of Hormuz, the Malacca Strait and the Lombok Strait. 6 According to Michel and Sticklor, 38 states have influence over the Indian Ocean Region. Some of the 38 states are Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Comoros, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, Myanmar, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tanzania, Thailand, United Arab Emirates and Yemen. France and United Kingdom are also included because of their island territories. 7 These countries draw 40 per cent of the world's total coastlines. In 2010, the population of Indian Ocean Region comprises almost onethird, that is 35.70 per cent, of the world's total population while the average Human Development Index of this region is only 0.597 in comparison to the world average of 0.682. Looking at the brief history of the Indian Ocean, one can say that the Indian Ocean has been a significant route, making it accessible for traders from the worldwide. The western Indian Ocean was dominated by the Persians from the third century to the seventh century while the Arabs dominated the northeastern part of the Indian Ocean from seventh century to the fourteenth century. The Arabs occupied the coastline of East Africa, the north-western coastline of India and Southeast Asia. Rais is of the view that the neglect of the naval strategy by the Arabs led European traders to enter the Indian Ocean. 8The Portuguese came with the aim to monopolize over the Asian trade, especially in spices. The Portuguese occupied Colombo, Socotra, Goa and Melaka, but by the end of the sixteenth century, the Dutch started occupying most of the Portuguese domains. The Dutch formed the United East India Company in 1602 to promote the eastern trade. It is said that Spain's occupation of Portugal in 1580 and religious intolerance and lack of commercial associations in Portugal led to weaken Portugal, while newly discovered Brazil diverted its focus from the Indian Ocean. Because of the lack of resources, the Dutch failed in effectively controlling the region. The war with England and alteration in Dutch colonial policies led Dutch to lose their domination to the British and the French in the seventeenth century. The English established the East India Company in 1601, while the French East India Company was established in 1604. The Indian Ocean has been called 'British Lake'. 9By the end of the Second World War, almost all the countries of Indian Ocean area got independence from the colonial domination. However, following the Cold War between the two superpowers, the United States and the USSR, the Indian Ocean occupied centre stage in the foreign policies of the super power because of their strategic and economic interest in the region. Chomsky argued that the United States is interested in the region because of its oil reserves. However, the Cold War reached the Indian Ocean in the 1960s and 1970s. Both the United States and the USSR tried to install their naval bases and submarines in the Indian Ocean. The United Nations declared the Indian Ocean as the zone of peace in 1971. Bouchard and Crumplin argued that the India-Pakistan war of 1971, Israel-Palestine war of 1973, Gulf oil crisis in 1973 and 1979, the Indian nuclear test in 1974, the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet and the Iran-Iraq war in 1980s gave Indian Ocean a geostrategic importance. After the end of Cold War, the United States intervened in Iraq-Kuwait war in 1991. The US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the military intervention in Iraq in 2003 brought instability to the region. The war between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) from 1983 to 2009 also brought turmoil to the region. It is argued that India is a great power in the Indian Ocean Region while China is also gradually proving its presence in the region. 10Maritime rights of the nations are enshrined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), but these rights are sometimes in conflict with their strategic interests. The Indian Ocean Region has now turned into a multidimensional and dynamic region; however, it was neglected for a long time. Venkatshamy is of the view that Indian Ocean has an increasingly important role to play in the geopolitics in the coming times. Forty-eight out of 63 ports in Asia are located in the Indian Ocean Region. By 2013, it has become the pivot of trade and energy as the region has 61 per cent of total global container traffic besides 70 per cent of the petroleum products transportation. 11 The Malacca Strait is the major shipping route between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, connecting Asia, Middle East and Europe. The 550-mile strait is a vital choke point in the Indian Ocean as more than 50,000 merchant ships travel by the waterways every year. 12 'If Straits get blocked, almost half of the world's fleet would need to reroute through the Sunda or Lombok Straits.' 13 The strategic importance of the Indian Ocean Region has made many extra-regionalstates to keep a naval presence in the Indian Ocean. 14 It is said that most of the armed conflicts are located in the Indian Ocean Region. According to Venkatshamy, 45 per cent of the world's conflicts (such as Palestine and Israel, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan) and 75 per cent of the world natural disasters occur in the Indian Ocean Region. 15The region is said to be very rich in the natural resources like gold, tin, uranium, cobalt, nickel, aluminium and cadmium. It is estimated that the region contains almost 55 per cent of recognized oil reserves and around 40 per cent of gas reserves. According to Berlin, in 2011, 40 per cent of trade in oil transports passed through the Strait of Hormuz, 35 per cent through the Strait of Malacca and 8 per cent through Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. Most of the energy exports from the five major world oil producers pass the narrow route of the Indian Ocean. 16 It is argued that the growing interest of the Gulf Cooperation countries in the Indian Ocean is because of the gradual increase in the consumption of energy by India and China. It is argued that countries like the United States, China, India and Japan are increasingly depending on energy supplied by Saudi Arabia, Russia, Qatar, Kuwait and Iran, making Indian Ocean Region more and more important in the coming decades or rather century. 17Besides its economic importance, Indian Ocean Region also has military significance. The island of Diego Garcia has been a major airnaval base of the United States in the Indian Ocean. The United States has also installed some major naval task forces such as Combined Task Force 152 and Combined Task Force 150, while France has its naval bases installed in Djibouti, Reunion and Abu Dhabi. China has commercial ports at Hambantota in Sri Lanka and Gwadar in Pakistan. Port construction by the Chinese is also under way in Myanmar and Bangladesh. It is argued that Marao Atoll in Maldives is among potential Chinese military bases.

Strategic competition between India and China in the Indian Ocean has the potential to profoundly affect the stability and security of the region. This essay examines Indian and Chinese views on the status and legitimacy of their roles in the Indian Ocean and argues that fundamental differences in perceptions could exacerbate an already highly competitive security dynamic in the maritime domain. Delhi tends to have a somewhat proprietary attitude toward the region, questioning the legitimacy of any extraregional naval presence, particularly China. But Indian strategists also see China as having strategic vulnerabilities in the Indian Ocean. For its part, Beijing refuses to recognize claims to great-power status or special prerogatives in the Indian Ocean region (IOR).This essay first summarizes China's growing strategic imperatives in the Indian Ocean. It then considers aspirations to take a leading role in the IOR and Indian perspectives on China's presence in the region. Next, the essay discusses Chinese perspectives on India and its role in the Indian Ocean and considers the potential consequences for China of the failure to take sensitivities into account. In short, I argue that China's failure to try to co-opt India as a partner or address some of its concerns is a mistake. Beijing will find it difficult to create a favorable geostrategic environment in the Indian Ocean in opposition to India.China's Imperatives in the Indian OceanChina's primary strategic imperative in the IOR is the protection of its sea lines of communication (SLOC) across the Indian Ocean. Beijing is keenly aware that its SLOCs are highly vulnerable to threats from state and nonstate actors, especially at the narrow chokepoints through which most trade must pass. Chinese strategists are concerned that an adversary may use these vulnerabilities as a bargaining chip in the context of a wider dispute. China also has other developing interests in the IOR, including a growing population of Chinese nationals and greater investment in the region. These issues are likely to become increasingly important in the country's strategic thinking.An additional factor is that China's military expansion program will significantly enhance its ability to project military power into the IOR in the long term. Its capabilities already exceed by a considerable and growing margin. China's naval presence has grown in connection with the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy's antipiracy deployments in the western Indian Ocean, which Beijing is now making more permanent, including by developing logistical support facilities in Djibouti. China's One Belt, One Road initiative will also involve the development of a swathe of maritime infrastructure across the IOR.India's Aspirations in the Indian OceanIndia considers itself as the leading Indian Ocean state and as destined to be the natural leader of the region. It thus takes a somewhat proprietorial attitude toward the IOR and perceives the presence of extraregional naval powers, particularly China, as essentially illegitimate.India has long harbored ambitions to become the dominant power in the Indian Ocean. Though few Indian officials might care to publicly admit it, many in Delhi see the Indian Ocean as more or less India's ocean. 1 As Donald Berlin has commented, New Delhi regards the Indian Ocean as its backyard and deems it both natural and desirable that India function as, eventually, the leader and the predominant influence in this region-the world's only region and ocean named after a single state. 2India's views on the Indian Ocean are partly defensive: the country's colonial experience is used to justify the exclusion of extraregional powers from the Indian Ocean, an approach that is sometimes labeled India's Monroe Doctrine. The idea involves an assertion, at least unofficially, that the military presence of outside powers in neighborhood is essentially illegitimate and that neighboring countries should rely exclusively on India as the predominant regional manager and security provider. …

Indian Ocean is a strategic and crucial location of the region and became the centre of global politics. Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has several important gulfs, straits, bays and seas within which most of it located in the northern part of the ocean. Major shipment routes intersect its enormous area, with crucial choke points and water courses connecting Indian Ocean to other main ocean parts on the earth. Indian Ocean region is part of China’s significant security interests, where China is currently leading to an ever advanced military existence within the area. China’s overpowering strategic focus in the Indian Ocean is the preservation of their maritime trading routes, particularly those transporting oil and gas that the Chinese economy relies upon. Indian Ocean Region is at the top of Indian policy priorities. India’s vision for Indian Ocean Region is deep-rooted in preceding cooperation in the region and to use their capabilities for the benefit of all in their common maritime home. The Indian Ocean holds particular importance for India. India is definitely trying to maintain their national security interests in Indian Ocean. In response to the condition in the Indian Ocean, India implemented its Indian Maritime Doctrine which is applied through Indian Navy as the way to respond China’s naval existence in IOR since 2008. This implementation brings the sources of its naval application as an effort to balance China’s naval presence in IOR through its doctrine. The unilateral naval effort is held to respond China in IOR. Moreover, a further effort of Indian navy is needed through bilateral cooporation that will further support its unilateral effort in balancing China’s active presence in the region.

The Asian region has become the epicenter of global economic and geopolitical change. In this regard, the Pakistan Economic Corridor, ‘String of Pearls’ and the Maritime Silk Road in relation to the China Myanmar Economic Corridor are inclusive examples in this region. China has been trying to surround India in the Indian Ocean for a long time. In recent years, Chinese efforts have seen considerable upsurge. For this, it is working on a scheme called ‘String of Pearls’. To make the Indian Ocean a hub of trans-regional connectivity through several alternative routes. Despite China’s effectual interests in the Indian Ocean, its naval presence will particularly have a significant impact on the security of India and other major powers. However, as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Beijing’s strategic culture is more focused on self defense. Because the purpose of the ‘String of Pearls’ is to establish a Silk Road near the Indian Ocean region. There has been competition between India and China to find other such routes in the Indian Ocean region that could have a significant impact. The purpose of this article is to discuss China’s objectives, its approach to the Indian Ocean and its impact on India’s security measures to prevent it. Keywords: String of Pearls, Indian Ocean Region, India, China, Chinese.

In terms of geographical location and natural endowments, Indian Ocean and the coastal areas naturally have the gene to become a stage for the game of world powers and a key region for the competition of interests; the Indian Ocean Region today is experiencing not only the gradual change of international architecture but also the reconstruction of maritime order in the Indian and Pacific oceans. In the twenty-first century, the Indian Ocean Region becomes increasingly important in its strategic position but it is still not the “center stage” or “strategic center” in global politics and economics; in recent years, China’s ambition towards the Indian Ocean has been growing, but that ambition is still a subordinate direction of its geo-strategy (maritime strategy). We shall have rational understanding about the geographical environment in the Indian Ocean Region and the geographical risks in China’s the Belt and Road Initiative in the Indian Ocean; the principal geographical risk for China in the Indian Ocean Region is not the security of Indian Ocean sea routes but two others: first, regionalization of structural contradictions between big powers; second, complicated and fragile geopolitical ecology in relevant Indian Ocean areas. From the perspective of geostrategic adjustments by big powers, the rise of the “Indo-Pacific” concept indicates the competition between big powers in the Indian Ocean Region becomes increasingly complicated. The US’s Indo-Pacific strategy, in particular, makes the Indian Ocean a major geo-direction in containing China, while the India’s “Maritime Doctrine” also strengthens vigilance against China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean Region. Therefore, the geopolitical competition between big powers including the US and India are major challenges and geographical risks for China in this region. From the perspective of regional geopolitical ecology, issues like cultural conflicts, resource disputes, poverty, turbulence, territorial disputes and terrorism in the shatter belt make geopolitics in the Indian Ocean Rim complex and fragile, and geographical risks and security in this region have significant spillover effect; local turmoil and political risks with instability in relevant regions have become another main geographical risk for China. Adverse impacts of the two on China’s maintaining and expanding its strategic interests in the Indian Ocean Region go far beyond the security of Indian Ocean sea routes and unconventional security threats like the Indian Ocean pirates and regional terrorismKeywordsIndian OceanGeo-environmentGeographical risksIndo-Pacific strategyChina’s Indian Ocean strategy

Indian space exploration has entered a new phase with the formation of the Indian Defence Space Agency (DSA) in 2018 and the procurement of anti-satellite capabilities in 2019. These two incentives prompted India to join the United States, Russia, and China in militarizing outer space. In a similar fashion, Israel conducted an ASAT test of the Arrow-3 missile interceptor aimed at the exo-atmosphere. While both India and Israel have described their outer space ambitions as removing debris from the lower orbit, the constant use of their military arsenals demonstrates their common goal of obtaining the upper hand over their respective rivals, Pakistan, China, and Iran. Prospects for their partnership in outer space are highly contingent on their cooperation in other defence domains, especially maritime security. For India, the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is of utmost importance due to China's growing presence, whereas for Israel, the IOR represents a vital trade route that may be at risk due to the development of ports in Pakistan (Gwadar) and Iran (Chahbahar), through which these nations could acquire the means to expand their naval presence. Therefore, while space development complements geo-sensing, particularly in oceans, the interests of both India and Israel in space and IOR enhance the likelihood of their cooperation in these sectors. This paper evaluates how Pakistan, Iran, and China could form a trilateral alliance to counter the emerging US-supported Indo-Israeli nexus in IOR and outer space.

The Indian Ocean is increasingly becoming the point of focus in assessing Asia's future security challenges. As both India and China are building up their naval presence in the Indian Ocean and as China's stakes in the region (protecting its maritime trade) interact with India's aspirations (being the regional dominant power and security provider), tensions are likely to rise. The United States has an established role in the Indian Ocean, and its approach to the contestation between Indian and Chinese interests may play a key role in limiting frictions. These developments have led many analysts to foresee the emergence of a balance of power system in the Indian Ocean region and East Asia which would be comparable to that of nineteenth-century Europe. In presenting the interplay between the three major stakeholders in the Indian Ocean, this paper aims to outline the implications of a balance of power system in the Indian Ocean region and demonstrate that it may not guarantee peace and stability, but, with regard to Organski's ‘power transition’ theory, could lead to quite the contrary.

With regard to China's growing maritime and naval presence in the Indian Ocean, there is an important question to raise: Will China's leaders be able to understand, to view as legitimate and requiring redress by China, trepidations over the country's growing military power among its neighbors? Will Beijing be able to recognize and effectively reassure New Delhi that China's growing military presence in the Indian Ocean does not threaten India?If China is not able to do this-if it is unable to understand, empathize with (at least to the extent of crediting the validity of Indian concerns), and respond in adequately reassuring ways to its neighbor's fears-then the probable result will be the formation of a coalition of China's neighbors seeking collective security against China. Unable to fathom how China's own growing military power and use of that power might be seen by its neighbors as threatening, the country's leaders are likely to attribute the formation of a countervailing coalition to the malevolent purposes of other powers-India, Japan, and, of course, the United States. Absolutely convinced of the justness and necessity of its military development, China is unable to understand why its neighbors are not fully persuaded by its repeated declarations of peaceful intent and goodwill. China is convinced, too, that objections to its military rise derive from a desire to keep the country weak and downtrodden, and confronted by the gradual formation of an coalition, Chinese leaders might embrace a forceful move to break out of the looming encirclement.In such a situation India would be especially vulnerable, as it is far weaker than China militarily. India's primary advantage vis-a-vis the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is the tyranny of distance hobbling China's capabilities in the Indian Ocean region, but that tyranny of distance is gradually being diminished, if not yet overcome, by China's assertion of military control in the South China Sea. Beijing sees India as an aspiring regional hegemon working to stifle China's legitimate presence in the Indian Ocean region. Yet at the same time, in the common Chinese view, India's ambitions far exceed its capabilities. Additional vulnerability derives from the fact that India is not allied to the United States, while the United States' traditional China policy is notably predicated on avoiding direct conflict with China-all factors that reduce the risk for China of U.S. intervention in a Sino-Indian conflict. The revival of isolationism by some U.S. presidential candidates makes U.S. belligerency in such a scenario even less likely. Of course, it is these very vulnerabilities that are today nudging India toward closer security ties to the United States and Japan. All this provides further evidence, from Beijing's point of view, of the hostile intentions of leaders in New Delhi, Tokyo, and Washington. From the standpoint of China's struggle against U.S., Japanese, and Indian encirclement, India might be deemed the weak link in the tightening ring of anti-China encirclement. This essay will assess China's growing military capabilities and examine the implications for a potential Sino-Indian conflict in the Indian Ocean.The Chinese Military ThreatChina's material military threat to India may be already greater than has been previously suggested. Although the tyranny of distance favors India and disadvantages the PLA in the Indian Ocean, the thrust of China's military development over the last twenty years has been to overcome distance and project Chinese military power. A 377-page report by the RAND Corporation in 2015 compared U.S. and Chinese military capabilities in ten areas in the context of a hypothetical high-intensity war over a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.1 With careful analysis, the report demonstrates that the PLA has developed the ability to launch preemptive first strikes with long-range precision missiles against U.S. bases in Japan (and soon against Guam), knocking out landed airplanes, communications, logistics and support facilities, and runways. …

An evaluation of tsunami hazard using Bayesian approach in the Indian Ocean

China has actively begun to increase its naval capabilities since the last decade. As the PLA Navy aims at enhancing its strategic reach and push its maritime defence perimeter seaward, it requires modern naval hardware, additional infrastructure to support the growing force size, transformed operational doctrines, tactics and procedures and a matching manpower profile. The three primary objectives behind the PLA Navy's modernisation programme are the Taiwan question, significant US naval presence in the Pacific Ocean and the desirability to develop a ‘blue water’ fleet to secure its sea lines of communication (SLOCs) passing though the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. The last factor perhaps dictates the Chinese compulsion to aim for the PLA Navy's permanent presence in the Indian Ocean. The PLA Navy's current capabilities may not match its ambitions, but the rapid progress related to the acquisition of these capabilities, may pose questions on the future stability quotient in the Indian Ocean Region. Maintaining a clear perspective on this imminent event will serve the interests of the larger global community, well.

With the implementation of trade protectionism by western countries dominated by the US and EU, particularly the redefinition of trade rules by the Trump administration based on the “America First” policy, over the past two years, China’s foreign trade and investment will expand into the Indian Ocean region at a faster pace, and China will become an increasingly important economic and security stakeholder in the region. Moreover, the US is shifting its strategic focus from anti-terrorism to checking “strategic rivals”, hoping the countries within the Indian Ocean region like India and Australia will assume more security responsibilities. That causes new changes to the international environment in the Indian Ocean region, and the strategic competition among powers in the Indian Ocean region is increasingly intensified. Meanwhile, instead of being eased, the instability of the security situation across the Indian Ocean shows a sign of further deterioration. In the future, the US will still be the biggest variable that affects the international environment in the Indian Ocean region, and India, as a power within the region, will become a main variable that affects the international environment in the region. Amid the changing international environment across the Indian Ocean region, China will have fast growing demand for security in the region, which will prompt China to include the Indian Ocean into its strategic vision to meet its rising economic interests and security demand in the region and ease the pressure from the strategic competition among powers. According to this report, although China is not a country in the Indian Ocean, it’s a country close to the Indian Ocean. That is to say, China is the power outside but closest to the Indian Ocean. As the economic relations between China and the countries along the Indian Ocean coast has become increasingly closer in recent years, both traditional and non-traditional security challenges are growing in the region; in particular, given the strategic importance of the Eastern Indian Ocean, which is adjacent to South China Sea, to China’s peripheral environment, actively creating the political, economic and security environment favorable to China in the Indian Ocean region will be a choice for China’s foreign strategy in the next decade or even a longer period of time. In the Indian Ocean region, China has been, is, and will always be a builder that promotes economic prosperity, a participant that develops international rules and a contributor that safeguards common security. The main objective of China’s Indian Ocean strategy is to safeguard its freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean and ensure its security of maritime transport, and to have the capability to expand its economic interest in the Indian Ocean region. This requires China to have corresponding military defense and projection capabilities, and to play a constructive role that matches its own capabilities in the field of security governance in the Indian Ocean.KeywordsIndian Ocean strategyInternational EnvironmentStrategic GameBelt and Road Initiative

Population structure, phylogeography and demographic history of Tenualosa ilisha populations in the Indian Ocean region inferred from mitochondrial DNA sequence variation

National security ensures the existence of the state through economic power, political power, diplomacy and military power. In the contemporary times military might and defense preparedness is just one aspect of national security and it surround a wide range of non-military variables such as economic security, energy security, environmental security etc. In this context each country has to devise means and methods to protect itself from internal and external threats. Military or defense preparedness however remain a foremost manifestation of national security. All the super powers, major or regional powers maintain security forces which protect country’s national interest and create deterrents to secure themselves. India is a large country of sub-continental dimensions and a major power of South Asia. Its borders touch Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, Nepal, Myanmar, and Pakistan. It has a long maritime boundary, territorial waters and resource rich continental shelf. Its presence into the Indian Ocean is bolstered by hundreds of islands such as the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and the Lakshadweep Islands. India has a security environment around its borders and in the adjoining ocean which is full of challenges. The Indian Ocean, on which depends its maritime trade, its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) from which it extracts bulk of its oil needs need to be protected. India faces the challenge of rising terrorism, Somalia born sea piracy, security of sea lanes of communications (SLOCS), protection of its valuable and coveted assets at sea and a plethora of other national security concerns. These challenges motivated India to build and develop a strong navy and show its naval presence throughout the length and breadth of the Indian Ocean. Over the years, India has expanded its naval outreach to become a leading naval power of the region. It has also made strategic use of its nave and used it as a diplomatic tool to build relationships with other major powers within and outside the region. After a strong and formidable build up, Indian Navy has emerged to become the fifth largest in the world. It is a potent force known for its professional competence. In this light the paper throws light on the expanding might of Indian Navy to protect Country’s national security. The paper is an attempt to understand and analyze the national security threats and contribution of its navy to stamp these threats and help India in its power projection in the Indian Ocean region.

China’s port facility construction projects in the Indian Ocean (IO) region, particularly those in Gwadar and Djibouti, have led to a heated debate among strategists over whether the country has been carrying out a ‘string of pearls’ strategy, an alleged Chinese scheme to challenge America’s military predominance in South Asia. Although Beijing has denied the existence of such a strategy, it has enhanced its strategic ties with littoral countries in the IO region over the past few years. This article discusses the evolution of Beijing’s IO strategy and examines the nature of these Chinese port projects. It argues that rather than simply copying the American model of developing military bases overseas, China has been deliberating a more sophisticated plan for its physical presence there—creating a new set of ‘overseas strategic pivots’. These ‘pivots’ are designed to help Beijing sustain its anti-piracy campaign and serve as forward stations for the transportation of China’s imported energy and merchandise while, with a relatively low-key stance, reducing any unnecessary opposing actions by rival powers. In addition, their political and economic functions are to a certain extent greater than their military functions despite the fact that they appear to be military bases. More importantly, these ‘pivots’ can help China create closer partnerships with littoral governments in the IO region, which suggests that the country is trying to create a friendly international environment favouring its plan to step into the global maritime domain.

The Sino-Indian competition is not a recent development when it comes to global and regional affairs. In recent years, the crisis between China and India has manifested serious geostrategic risks to the stability and safety of the South Asian region and maritime domain. This paper precisely analyses the Sino Indian maritime competition in the Indian Ocean where both the Asian powers are regarded as one of the most significant naval capabilities for their geostrategic vision. An overview of China’s and India’s strategic objectives in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is what this study aims to convey in the first section. The section analyzes the geo political and geo-economic importance of Indian Ocean for both China and India. The latter section sheds light on China’s growing concern for the IOR stemmed from its Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) security and explains the expanding activities of China in the region. The Indian security community views China’s continued modernization of its military, increased power projection in the Indian Ocean, and political and economic ties with the IOR states as measures to counterbalance India’s dominance in the region. The next section outlines how China’s increasing sway in the IOR is becoming a major worry for New Delhi. In an effort to project power and protect its strategic interests both inside and outside the IOR, India has worked to modernize and bolster its armed forces over the past ten years, particularly the navy. India is currently envisioning a more grandiose and newer role for itself in the IOR by procuring infrastructure in a number of IOR countries. India has been trying to thwart China’s attempts to establish IOR dominance. This, combined with India’s essential naval build-up and overwhelming spatial advantage, would significantly challenge China’s goal of enhancing its leverage in the IOR through its “String of Pearls.” Thus, all these counter activities of the two Asian powers against each other have gradually been fueling the maritime competition in the IOR a more intense one. BIMRAD Journal VOLUME 5, ISSUE 1, DEC 2024; PP-63-84