Nature, Fate, and Causality in the Peripatetic Tradition: The Case of Alexander of Aphrodisias

It is widely agreed on that the key text to interpreting Plotinus' notion of ἐφ’ ἡμĩν, Ennead VI.8, starts off from a criticism of the notion as understood by Aristotle in the first chapters of Ethica Nicomachea (EN) III. This chapter analyses the development of the notion of ἐφ’ ἡμĩν within the Aristotelian tradition before Plotinus. First of all, it gives an account of the notion of ἐφ’ ἡμĩν in Aristotle. The focus lies on the EN and Eudemian Ethics (EE). The chapter then investigates later developments of the notion in the three earliest relevant Aristotelian 'commentaries' on the EN. Thus, it discusses Aspasius' In Ethica Nicomachea commentaria. The chapter then continues with the Anonymous' In Ethica Nicomachea II-V commentaria. Finally, the chapter analyses the development of the notion in Alexander of Aphrodisias' De fato. It ends with a general conclusion regarding the Aristotelian notion(s) of ἐφ’ ἡμĩν.Keywords:ἐφ’ ἡμĩν; Alexander of Aphrodisias; Aristotle; Aspasius; Ethica Nicomachea (EN); Eudemian Ethics (EE); Plotinus

1 Supplementum Aristotelicum II.ii 164-212, ed. I. Bruns, Berlin 1892; cf. also pp. 169-186 Bruns of the de anima libri mantissa, in Supplementum Aristotelicum II.i (1887). All references will be to these editions. On the interpretation of the de fato (as opposed to discussion primarily concerned with textual points) cf.: R. A. Pack, 'A Passage in Alexander of Aphrodisias relating to the theory of Tragedy', AJP 58 (1937) 418-436; E. Valgiglio, 'II Fato nel Pensiero Classico Antico', Riv. Stud. Class. 15 (1967) 305-330 and 16 (1968) 56-84 (pp. 309-319 are devoted to Alexander's de fato); G. Verbeke, 'Aristot,lisme et Stoicisme dans le de fato d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise', AGPh 50 (1968) 73-100; A. A. Long, 'Stoic Determinism and Alexander of Aphrodisias de fato (i-xiv)', AGPh 52 (1970) 247-268; P. L. Donini, Tre studi sull' aristotelismo nel II secolo d.C. (Torino, 1974) 127-185. There is one translation of the de fato into English, by A. FitzGerald (London, 1931), but this is in places rather inadequate; I hope myself to produce a translation at a later date. P. Thillet has indicated in the introduction to his edition of the medieval Latin translation attributed to William of Moerbeke (Attudes de Philosophie Medidvale 51, Paris, 1963, p. 61) that he intends to produce a new edition of the Greek text. Reference will be made in this article to passages from the mantissa and also to some from the Quaestiones attributed to Alexander (Supplementum Aristotelicum II.ii). It is very possible that not all the texts in these collections are by Alexander (cf. P. Moraux, Alexandre d'Aphrodise: Ex6gNte de la Noetique d'Aristote, (Liege-Paris 1942), 19-28; P. Merlan, 'Zwei Untersuchungen zu Alexander von Aphrodisias', Philologus 113 (1969) 85-88; R. B. Todd, 'Alexander of Aphrodisias and the Alexandrian Quaestiones 2.12', Philologus 116 (1972) 293305), but it seems generally agreed that they show his influence, and even texts which may not be by Alexander himself may serve to bring out tensions in the Peripatetic position on the issues to be discussed in this article. I am particularly grateful to Professor Todd for sending me a copy of a bibliography on Alexander that he has prepared.

Alexander of Aphrodisias has defended an aristotelian conception of responsability, particularly in his treatise On Fate , which presents "Aristotle's doctrine about fate and what depends on us" ( De fato , 1), and in some texts of Mantissa or Quaestiones. This defence led him to reiterate traditional anti-determinist arguments (for example the argument by legal, moral and social consequences) as well as to propose new ones. Among his rather creative and bold arguments, we can include one that admits the existence of a movement without cause, kinesis anaitios. This point is developed in Mantissa XXII, through a passage whose authenticity is highly discussed. I will attempt to show that, even if this text cannot be attributed to Alexander with certainty, it echoes some genuine alexandrian arguments, developed in the treatise On Fate .

This paper considers the conception of material cause according to Alexander of Aphrodisias. I defend the view that Alexander tries to conciliate two conceptions of material cause which are often confused in Aristotle: the concept of material cause as conditio sine qua non and the concept of material cause as a genuine cause (as 'because', dia ti). In his De fato and in his commentary on chapters 2 and 24 of book Delta of Aristotle's Metaphysics, Alexander analyses the three Aristotelian elements of material cause, namely (1) the ex hou (the 'out of which'), (2) the enuparchon (internal constituent) and (3) the hupokeimenon (substratum), and confirms the Aristotelian conception of material cause as the condition of becoming and existence of items. But explaining that material cause seems to be rather a conditio sine qua non, in his commentary on book Beta of Metaphysics Alexander explains also that, for this reason, it is less a cause than the other Aristotelian causes.

Knowledge is an interesting word, which never goes out of fashion. In the political context, knowledge is something everyone hails and cherishes. An example is that the Socialist Government in Norway renamed its "Ministry of Education and Research" to the "Ministry of Knowledge". It would probably be politically wrong to defy the word "knowledge". The word "knowledge" stirs, however, different sentiments in people. In modern education, the word signifies something notable, discernable, visual or at least possible to distinguish from what it is not. In learning in higher education, knowledge is most often considered as the raw material for learning, with the little extra that distinguishes it from "information". Knowledge is information with a direction, a purpose and meaning, but without the implied cultivation of a teaching and learning process. Given knowledge is used for educational purposes, the processing of knowledge from its basic concepts to embodied and reflected knowledge, properly understood and reconceptualised by the learner, transforms not only the learner, but also the knowledge. In a peripatetic tradition, one likes to think of knowledge as foundation elements for constructions of ethical wisdom as its highest reflective level. Probably we will never see a "Ministry of Wisdom" established, because what is "wisdom" is probably so much more politically charged than "Knowledge". One can only wonder why anyone would degrade a ministry for education to something less. In Europe a rewriting of university curricula is underway all over the continent, because "knowledge" is a key concept in the writing of "learning outcomes". It appears every college is absorbed in sorting out what knowledge is and how knowledge can be classified in categories and levels, and then composed to readable descriptions of syllabi, course descriptions and schemes. Let us hope they are more able than what has been the case. Professor Ronald Barnett of the London University, Institute of education, described, in a book published in 2000, how awkwardly most of this literature was written and claimed that most of the academic community was rather unskilled in prescribing the paths we want learners to follow to achieve wisdom. It is "...grossly under-conceptualised in higher education...." (2000, p. 322) And, he asserts, for the most they miss the point of how we become educated in our age. He comments the following about knowledge in this context, which is inescapably a supercomplex one. He suggests: The key problem of supercomplexity is not one of knowledge; it is one of being. Accordingly, we have to displace knowledge from the core of our pedagogies. The student's being has to take centre stage. Feeling uncertainty, responding to uncertainty, gaining confidence to insert oneself amid the numerous counter-claims to which one is exposed, engaging with the enemy, and developing resilience and courage: these are matters of being. Their acquisition calls for a revolution in the pedagogical relationships within a university. (Barnett 2000, s.170-171). He clearly states that knowledge is pretty useless in itself, and that higher education has a significant way to go in order to put knowledge in its proper place. Writing well about what role and position "knowledge" has in the life of higher education is difficult, and Barnett's comment should remind us that there is more to education than "knowledge". In this issue of Seminar.net, we find three different approaches to handling knowledge and putting it in its proper place. Knut Arne Strand and Tor Arne Hjeltnes focus on the process of helping corporate customers to explicate their needs for turning professional knowledge into teachable material for e-learning. Knowledge is here understood as a complex matter of people managing a professional knowledge base, and transforming it to a platform from which students can learn in practical contexts online. Siv Oltedal's project describes how a particular seminar form, using video and videoconferencing technology allows participants to elicit their knowledge and share their reflection and learning during seminars. Finally, Gunilla Jedeskog and Inger Landstrøm describe how a particular sort of knowledge, materialised in a manifest technological item, alters and disturbs the established ecology of knowledge in an organisation.

<p>В статье исследуются философско-антропологические основания трансгуманизма и дается оценка их значения для сциентистской антропологии и современного антропологического дискурса в целом. Методологической основой анализа выступает диалог платоновской и аристотелевской традиций в философской антропологии, а также триада «структура — функционирование — развитие».</p><p>Философские основания трансгуманизма сформулированы в трех тезисах: человек есть разум; человек есть существо открытое, способное изменить собственную природу; конечная цель изменения человека — достижение состояния сверхчеловека. Тезисы оцениваются с биоконсервативных позиций.</p><p>В целом для трансгуманизма человек есть разум, который может и должен изменить себя (технологическими средствами). Подобное понимание человека есть сциентистский платонизм. Отрицание трансгуманизмом представлений о биосоциальной природе человека фундируется стремлением отвергнуть центральный тезис аристотелизма в философской антропологии: человек есть двуединство души и тела, которые неравноценны, но одинаково необходимы для формирования природы человека.</p><p>В контексте сциентистской антропологии трансгуманизм выступает как принципиальный оппонент биоконсерватизма, который стремится сохранить «естественного человека». В современном антропологическом дискурсе трансгуманизм представляет собой диалектическое возвращение сциентистско-метафизического платонизма русского космизма. Вероятно, что и в данном случае технократический оптимизм окажется не вполне обоснованным.</p>В концептуальном аспекте трансгуманистическая антропология есть «рафинированный платонизм», отвергающий аристотелистскую традицию постижения человека. Возникновение трансгуманизма в современном антропологическом дискурсе является закономерным. Обосновывается вывод о возможности критического пересмотра антропологических оснований трансгуманизма. Его основой станет продуктивный и взаимообогащающий диалог трансгуманистической антропологии с аристотелистской традицией в понимании человека.

Defense mechanism is a key concept in the psychoanalytic psychopathology of borderline personality disorder (BPD). Theoretical and empirical elaborations on this question are briefly reviewed and discussed with respect to process assessment of defense mechanisms; we put forward observer-rater methodology as an accurate means of assessing unconscious in-session processes. A sample of 25 patients presenting with BPD were interviewed, as were subjects from a matched control group without psychiatric symptoms (n = 25), using a psychodynamic interview paradigm. These interviews were transcribed and rated using the Defense Mechanisms Rating Scales. The results indicate that, compared to controls, patients with BPD used higher percentages of a action, borderline, disavowal, narcissistic, and hysteric defenses, along with lower levels of mature and obsessional defenses. Overall defensive functioning was significantly lower in the patients with BPD, compared to controls. Narcissistic defenses were related with symptom level. These results are discussed in light of previous studies on defensive functioning of BPD and the literature on psychoanalytic psychopathology. These results have several important clinical implications.

The life sciences in late antiquity (ad 300–600) and the early Middle Ages (ad 600–1000) centre around the study of three primary categories of ensouled or animate creatures, namely, plants (botany), animals (zoology) and man (anthropology). Major subdisciplines within these general areas of study include pharmacology, medicine, agriculture and veterinary science. The ancient Greek and Roman life scientists of the classical period (600 bc–ad 300) established much of the data and many of the fundamental concepts concerning the nature of the cosmos and its living inhabitants which scholars of the post‐classical period (ad 300–1000) would inherit. The history of the late ancient and the early medieval life sciences is essentially the story of the preservation, dissemination and partial elaboration of classical Graeco‐Roman learning within several very different political, linguistic and religious contexts following the dissolution of the political and cultural synthesis that had been established under the Roman Empire (27 bc–ad 476).Key ConceptsLife science in the classical (ad 300–600) and post‐classical (ad 600–1000) periods centres around the study of three primary categories of ensouled or animate creatures, plants (botany), animals (zoology) and man (anthropology) and includes the subdisciplines of medicine, pharmacology, agriculture and veterinary science.Soul (Greekpsyche; Latinanima) is the life principle of plants, animals and people, of which there are three broad species: the vegetative, sensitive and rational.Classical anatomy, physiology, medicine, botany and zoology are tacitly accepted in the post‐classical period.The interlocking concepts of (1) teleology, (2) the microcosm–macrocosm analogy and (3) the great chain of being provide common conceptual ground for the ancient (classical) and the late ancient/early medieval (post‐classical) world views.Classical life science continues to flourish in diverse religious (Jewish, Christian and Muslim) and linguistic (Latin, Greek, Persian, Syriac and Arabic) cultures following the dissolution of the political and cultural synthesis that had been established under the Roman Empire.Greek, Latin, Syriac and Arabic languages are the primary linguistic vehicles in the diffusion of classical knowledge throughout Europe and the Middle East.Linguistic barriers are overcome by a handful of multilingual scholars who live on the borderland of two or more dominant cultures.Christian and Muslim post‐classical scholars use their pagan classical heritage selectively by (1) choosing organisation, conciseness and practicality over theoretical and experimental elaboration and (2) adapting it to the sacred Scriptures of the Judaeo‐Christian (Old and New Testaments) and Muslim (Koranic) cultures.

In the Aristotelian tradition, the relationship with Aristotle’s treatment of infinity has always been ambiguous for reasons connected to theology, creation, and natural philosophy. Scholastic philosophy generally rejects the existence of real infinities in the created world, while recognising potential infinities in the doctrine of the continuum, in line with Aristotle’s views on this matter. According to this view, there is no infinite power or greatness in the world. Nevertheless, notable developments emerge in which this orthodoxy is questioned, and the possibility that God could produce an actual infinity in terms of quantity, number, or intensity becomes widespread among later scholastics – such infinist approaches sometimes drawing on highly interpretative readings of Aristotle’s own thinking. Alongside these examples of internal development, the concept of the natural infinite – the presence of infinity in nature – becomes a source of tension between the new philosophy and Aristotelianism at the beginning of the modern era, even when a general framework or vocabulary of Aristotelian descent is maintained. Such a multifaceted subject could not be exhausted in a few pages, so we will only discuss two emblematic examples: a 16th-century literary celebrity and a 17th-century mathematician and philosopher. Despite being as different as possible, they are both signs of an interesting dependence on Aristotelian concepts and terminology, even while moving away from and fundamentally distorting the framework they were cast in.

In the debate on character education, broadly speaking, it is necessary to distinguish two sets of thoughts: the Aristotelian tradition and the Kantian tradition. These two perspectives have great merits but also have their limitations. Educational approaches referring to these perspectives are often based on a very fragile relationship: in the first case, between habit and behaviour, and the second case, between cognition and behaviour. According to Blasi, moral action does not depend only on reasoning or on virtuous habits, but it depends on the organization of the self and on a person’s identity. This paper argues that the integration of the perspective of identity into the theory of character education can point to further development of both theory and educational practices. To address this issue, the author explores the significant role of narrativity in the development of moral identity, drawing on the philosophical perspectives of Alasdair MacIntyre and Paul Ricoeur. The central thesis is that developing a sense of moral identity and moral character is deeply intertwined with the ability to reflect on one’s own life narrative. From this perspective, the author argues that in order to “self­‑regulate one’s life” in the MacIntyrean sense and to “re‑configure the emplotment of one’s life story” as suggested by Ricoeur, individuals must engage in a continuous process of reflection, including a critical examination of their moral values and life experiences. The implications of this narrative and reflexive approach for educational practices are discussed, with a focus on how educators can facilitate identity formation and moral development.

Socio-environmental conflicts are widespread, and global economic growth will likely increase them in the coming decades. While political ecology, the analysis of common pool resources, and ecological economics, among others, have provided praiseworthy insights into such conflicts, institutional approaches to these phenomena are still scarce. Classical institutional economics has occasionally been put to work on environmental issues, but proposed frameworks remain relatively underdeveloped. We wish to contribute to institutional research on environmental issues by building upon Bruno Théret’s interpretation of John R. Commons’s transactional model and applying the framework to a case of socio-environmental conflicts. First, we briefly sketch the landscape of institutional contributions (especially those that follow the classical institutionalist tradition) to the analysis of environmental issues. We explain why Commons has largely been ignored on these issues. Then, we analyze some of the key concepts of Commonsian economics that are of particular interest to our theoretical elaboration. Following this, we depict Commons’s transactional scheme and propose an application to a case of socioenvironmental mining conflict in Peru. Our framework could complement existing ones and shed light on the institutional dynamics of natural-resource management through conflict.

Not only should education professionals be expert in the subject(s) they teach; they should also strive to foster the aesthetic, ethical and civic capacities of students. In this regard, teaching is an ethical act which grounds a reciprocal relationship between individuals and whose purpose is to encourage the development of a set of habits among students as well as teachers. This chapter comprises a study of the idea of habit and its contribution to the development of an ethics of teaching. First, the Aristotelian view of habit as personal enrichment through the stable harmonization of spontaneity with the good is addressed. Then, the classical Aristotelian conception is further explored in light of the contemporary recovery of practical reason, read in relation to habit, freedom and personalization in the education process. Finally, the ways in which current perspectives outside the Aristotelian tradition, such as Dewey’s philosophy, may also encompass the concept of habit as a cornerstone of personal integration are also examined.

Paul on Humility

On the Relationship between Mode and Substance in Spinoza's Metaphysics JOHN CARRIERO A CENTRALIF DIFFICULTPOSITIONtaken in Spinoza's Ethics is that things in the universe other than God--including rocks, trees, ideas, and minds--are modes of God; according to Spinoza, produced things are modally dependent on God. How are we to understand this relation of modal dependence? Spinoza inherits the term mode from Descartes, who was using the term as a replacement of sorts for the Aristotelian accident. In the Aristotelian tradition, accidents are supposed to inhere in their subjects. Is modal dependence for Spinoza basically the same thing as the traditional relation of inherence?' Some commentators have argued not. Explicating the traditional idea of inherence in terms of predication (so that the relation of inherence is supposed to amount to the relation between a property or quality and the subject of which the property or quality is predicated),~these commentators suggest that to interpret Spinoza's modal dependence in traditional terms would be to commit him to the view that a produced thing, e.g., Mt. Rushmore, is a quality or property predicable of God. In the view of these commentators, this position is so odd as to suggest that Spinoza's understanding of modal dependence cannot be the traditional idea of inherence but must be fundamentally novel. This line of reasoning is flawed in that it relies on a misleading caricature of the traditional relation of inherence. In particular, it is a mistake to explicate the traditional relation of inherence in terms of predication. In Section l, For ease of exposition, I am using modal dependenceas a label for the dependence of modes on their subjects in Spinoza (whatever that dependence may amount to) and inherence for the traditional idea of an accident's existing in a subject (whatever that may amount to). "Curley writes in Spinoza's Metaphysics: An Essay in Interpretation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969), hereafter cited as "SM," p. 18: "When qualities are said to inhere in substance, this may be viewed as a way of saying that they are predicated of it." [~45] ~,46 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 33:9 APRIL 1995 I sketch a traditional medieval Aristotelian conception of the dichotomy between substance and accident which distinguishes inherence from predication . I also show how Spinoza's thinking about the substance/mode dichotomy draws, often in surprising and subtle ways, on that tradition. In the remaining two sections I respond to arguments that have been offered against relating Spinoza's conception of modal dependence to a traditional conception of inherence . In Section ~, I take up Edwin Curley's claim that things like tables and chairs are of the "wrong logical type" to count as modes, which leads him to suggest that all that modal dependence comes to in Spinoza is causal dependence . In Section 3, I consider three of Bayle's objections to Spinoza's claim that produced things are modes of God, objections which Curley has suggested are so compelling as to give us further reason for doubting whether Spinoza understood modal dependence as inherence. 1. SPINOZA AND A TRADITIONAL ARISTOTELIAN CONCEPTION OF ACCIDENT Let's begin by recalling a standard Aristotelian treatment of the distinction between substance and accident.3 In the Categories (la 16ft.), Aristotle develops the notion of substance by presenting a pair of orthogonal distinctions. First, he distinguishes between things that can be said of a subject and things that cannot be said of a subject. Horse, for example, can be said of a subject, but Bucephalus cannot. Roughly, this first distinction is between universal and particular.4 Aristotle goes on to draw a second distinction, between things that exist in a subject and things that do not exist in a subject. According to Aristotle, white and being eight feet tall exist in subjects, say Socrates or Bucephalus, but humanity or horsehood does not exist in a subject. If whiteness exists in Socrates, why isn't it equally true that humanity exists in him? Aristotle 's point here is that Socrates is too closely bound up with his humanity for s As we shall see, questions have been raised in the middle part...

Transhumanism (TH) is an intellectual trend that promotes the technological transformation of human beings. We will briefly expose the most conspicuous features of the TH, as well as the main criticisms that have been made to it (section 1). The aim of this article, however, is not to enter into this controversy, so we will provide only the essential keys to be able to move forward. And one of the most intriguing keys of the TH is that, beneath its techno-futurist patina, it refers to certain philosophical ideas as old as incompatible –in appearance– with each other. The TH refers to radical naturalism, as well as to existentialist nihilism. The thesis advocated here is that both, radical naturalism and existentialist nihilism, are products of the various waves of dualism. Once we separate, in the dualistic way, freedom on the one hand and nature on the other, we can count up to two, as the dualists do, or remain just in one, as existentialists do, who stand in freedom, and naturalists as well, who only count on nature. In any case, the image of the human being, which is freedom and nature (without “and”), is damaged. Then the aporetic and sickly animal appears, which has to be saved... from itself. How? Following the Procrustean method, but now with the bio and info prefixes instead of saw and hammer, until the poor human being fits into the utopian bed that some visionaries have dreamed (section 2). But there could be perhaps a way to improve human life without forcing the human scale. In order to draw this way between the radical naturalism, that mutilates, and the existentialist nihilism, that dislodges and stretches, we should deny in advance the dualism that generates both, and follow the common sense, in line with the Aristotelian tradition, rather than utopian daydreams (section 3). In our opinion, the Aristotelian concept of human nature enables us to judge anthropotechnics better than the normativity extracted from the futuristic visions of the TH (section 4).