NATO defence readiness in Europe: A CRINK scenario analysis

The defence preparedness and readiness of NATO allies is increasingly being challenged not only by Russia, but since recently doubted also by some of its long-standing allies. This study examines how prepared are NATO allies to address a protracted conflict and war in Europe, and what strategies could enhance its readiness. Assessing the current state of two strategic readiness dimensions empirically – mobilisation readiness and sustained whole-of-society resilience – reveals that particularly the defence industrial preparedness faces structural challenges, also vis-à-vis historical defence readiness during the Cold War. A scenario analysis of a hypothetical worst-case scenario reveals a sizeable cross-country heterogeneity in whole-of-society resilience. The simulation results suggest that today's existing problems will only be amplified in a protracted conflict or war scenario. To ensure NATO strategic readiness under the most demanding conditions, it is imperative that allies embark on a rapid de-risking trajectory well before the worst-case scenario has realised.

Psychologists have discovered useful therapeutic strategies to understand and heal the inner world of individuals traumatized by political violence. However, psychological approaches built on unspoken assumptions about context, present an incomplete therapeutic picture for individuals traumatized in protracted social conflicts. Because political environment and psychological well-being are bidirectionally related, situational issues need to be addressed. Four context-related propositions are presented. In a protracted war: (a) traumatizing experiences are not only episodic but also systemic, extending over many years; (b) context may also function as a source of healing; (c) healing efforts do not take place in war-free and comfortable contexts but rather in unsafe and impoverished conditions; and (d) trauma survivors are not only victims and effects, but also empowered transformers and causes of contextual change. Applications to Philippine experiences illustrate the 4 propositions. Further explorations ...

Increasing diplomatic tension between China and the United States has led to concerns about military conflict, possibly including rapid nuclear escalation. Scholars have spent less time considering the opposite scenario: protracted conventional war. This analysis explains why a combination of politics, geography, and technology may conspire to produce such a war, despite the fact that both sides are planning for a short, high-intensity fight. It shows how the Peloponnesian War, an ancient conflict fought with ancient weapons, nonetheless provides a warning of what might happen in the present. It also describes a grim trade off that American policy-makers will face in the event of war. Washington can take steps to reduce the chance of nuclear escalation, but in so doing will make a long war more likely. The conclusion describes the diplomatic challenge of war termination in a protracted conflict where neither side can compel the other to back down.

DR Congo: managing Ebola virus in war

The displacement of civilians during a protracted war is a difficult issue that deserves our attention, and Iraq is unfortunately an emblematic example of this phenomenon. Based on the literature produced by humanitarian organizations and academia, this article aims at analyzing what triggers displacement in protracted conflict, highlighting the role of international humanitarian law (IHL) violations. It discusses how Iraq has been struggling with acts of violence, hostilities and IHL violations that have generated displacement and human suffering.

Scenario analysis constitutes a useful approach to synthesize knowledge and derive hypotheses in the case of complex systems that are documented with mainly qualitative or very diverse information. In this article, a framework for scenario analysis is designed and then, applied to global wheat health within a timeframe from today to 2050. Scenario analysis entails the choice of settings, the definition of scenarios of change, and the analysis of outcomes of these scenarios in the chosen settings. Three idealized agrosystems, representing a large fraction of the global diversity of wheat-based agrosystems, are considered, which represent the settings of the analysis. Several components of global changes are considered in their consequences on global wheat health: climate change and climate variability, nitrogen fertilizer use, tillage, crop rotation, pesticide use, and the deployment of host plant resistances. Each idealized agrosystem is associated with a scenario of change that considers first, a production situation and its dynamics, and second, the impacts of the evolving production situation on the evolution of crop health. Crop health is represented by six functional groups of wheat pathogens: the pathogens associated with Fusarium head blight; biotrophic fungi, Septoria-like fungi, necrotrophic fungi, soilborne pathogens, and insect-transmitted viruses. The analysis of scenario outcomes is conducted along a risk-analytical pattern, which involves risk probabilities represented by categorized probability levels of disease epidemics, and risk magnitudes represented by categorized levels of crop losses resulting from these levels of epidemics within each production situation. The results from this scenario analysis suggest an overall increase of risk probabilities and magnitudes in the three idealized agrosystems. Changes in risk probability or magnitude however vary with the agrosystem and the functional groups of pathogens. We discuss the effects of global changes on the six functional groups, in terms of their epidemiology and of the crop losses they cause. Scenario analysis enables qualitative analysis of complex systems, such as plant pathosystems that are evolving in response to global changes, including climate change and technology shifts. It also provides a useful framework for quantitative simulation modeling analysis for plant disease epidemiology.

Risks and losses arising from system failure, unautho-rized activity, fraud and other operational errors are postulated to be one of the primary banking risks. Ex-pert-based scenario analysis aims at describing the fre-quency and severity of extreme operational losses. Ex-perts are not exact in predicting quantitative estimates for a distant future. The predicted scenarios are de-scribed by range estimates and qualitative storylines. This study introduces and applies the methodology for evaluation of the operational risk levels derived from the experts opinions collected from scenarios. The me-thodology is based on the use of fuzzy numbers to ex-press subjective probability of expert estimates. Keywords : operational risk, scenario analysis, fuzzy decision making, fuzzy number 1. Introduction In the light of the global financial crisis, both media, leading policy makers, economists and practitioners are questioning the appropriate levels of risk in the interna-tional financial system. Decision makers and banking practitioners are struggling to evaluate the risk attri-buted to the globalization of modern banking, the fast evolving information technology, new economic theo-ries, opaque financial instruments, and complex ma-thematical modeling. International banking industry had been trying to balance the existing risks in the financial systems for quite some time by regulating the ap-proaches to measure and manage risks. Although the latest financial crisis made us question some regulatory requirements, it had accentuated the necessity to eva-luate risks more holistically. The Bank for International Settlements, an interna-tional organization which fosters international monetary and financial cooperation and serves as a bank for cen-tral banks, had realized that developing banking prac-tices such as securitization, outsourcing, specialized processing operations and reliance on technology had introduced substantial risks which need to be reflected in credible capital assessments. As a result, Basel II Ac-cord that includes risks other than credit and market was proposed to be “a comprehensive framework for improving bank safety and soundness by more closely linking regulatory capital requirements with bank risk, by improving the ability of supervisors and financial markets to assess capital adequacy”, according to Fed-eral Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke in a May 2006 speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s 42nd Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition. All the largest banks in the world that carry internation-al component are mandated to become Basel certified. Resulting international risk management practice for financial institutions focuses on three main risk catego-ries: Market Risk, Credit Risk and Operational Risk (OR). OR is a relatively newly defined category of risk which includes many different types of risk, from the simple operations risks of transaction processing, unau-thorized activities and systems risks to other types of risk that are not included in market or credit risks, such as human, legal, informational and reputational risks with the exception of strategic risk [2]. By contrast with credit and market risks where acceptable models and measurements exist, it is relatively difficult to identify and evaluate levels of operational risk due to the com-plexity of its origin, lack of existing historic quantita-tive data and explanation. One of the best publicized OR risk events are rouge trading in the French Societe Generale bank, BP oil spill, and American Maddoff “ponzi” scheme causing billions of dollars to a global financial system. Scenario analysis as a decision making tool has been in existence for several decades and has been used in various disciplines, including management, engineer-ing, defense, medicine, finance and economics [6]. Sce-nario analysis is one of the four required data elements that banks must incorporate into their Advanced Model-ing Approach to adequately measure their operational risk levels. Scenario analysis brings a forward looking element into OR assessment since it describes future plausible severe OR loss events. The current range of practice published in 2009 by Basel Committee of Banking Supervision [16] identifies a lack of consistent controls to address scenario analysis bias noting that scenario analysis is subjective in nature. Chosen and estimated scenarios become an effective technique for stimulating management to identify key strategic opera-tional risks facing their businesses. Scenario workshops are used as the preferred method to develop a set of scenarios. During scenario workshop, experts are sup-plied with a library of plausible extreme operational events that have or may have happened in peer financial organization and are asked to assess the likelihood and severity of similar events if they occur in their business, as described by the Bank of Japan [25]. Scenarios as a framework offer the ability to bring qualitative business intuition data into a systematic assessment of OR which is increasingly important in an era of stress testing of international financial sector. Making point estimates in

This paper examines the concept of conflict- and war-related hatred as a multifaceted construct. Drawing upon various theoretical frameworks, we hypothesized that hatred in the context of conflict and war would encompass five distinct dimensions: Groupthink (Contagious Hatred), Destructiveness, Exposure, Chronicity, and Extreme-Severe Affect. To empirically validate this conceptual framework, we conducted a second-order factor analysis using data from 709 questionnaire responses collected from citizens in the Gaza Strip. The findings revealed that the optimal model comprises three primary constructs: Contagious Hatred, Chronicity, and Extreme- Severe Affect. Based on these results, we argue that collective existential threats in contexts of protracted conflict and war amplify groupthink, foster a sense of chronicity, and evoke intense negative affect. These findings underscore the complexity of hatred as a psychological and social phenomenon in conflict zones.

To meet the Basel II regulatory requirements for the Advanced Measurement Approaches, the bank’s internal model must include the use of internal data, relevant external data, scenario analysis and factors reflecting the business environment and internal control systems. Quantification of operational risk cannot be based only on historical data but should involve scenario analysis. Historical internal operational risk loss data have limited ability to predict future behaviour moreover, banks do not have enough internal data to estimate low frequency high impact events adequately. Historical external data are difficult to use due to different volumes and other factors. In addition, internal and external data have a survival bias, since typically one does not have data of all collapsed companies. The idea of scenario analysis is to estimate frequency and severity of risk events via expert opinions taking into account bank environment factors with reference to events that have occurred (or may have occurred) in other banks. Scenario analysis is forward looking and can reflect changes in the banking environment. It is important to not only quantify the operational risk capital but also provide incentives to business units to improve their risk management policies, which can be accomplished through scenario analysis. By itself, scenario analysis is very subjective but combined with loss data it is a powerful tool to estimate operational risk losses. Bayesian inference is a statistical technique well suited for combining expert opinions and historical data. In this paper, we present examples of the Bayesian inference methods for operational risk quantification.

Elections are a transparent way of expressing the people’s will in selecting leaders. However, perceived irregularities in the electoral system can result in disputes that spill over into the courts or escalate into protracted conflicts. The courts therefore provide a peaceful resolution platform for contested electoral outcomes. In contemporary democratic thought, the functional separation of powers prevents excessive concentration of power and absolutism. The system divides political authority amongst the three branches of government, the executive, legislature and judiciary for the provision of checks and balances. However, the intervention of an arm of government which is itself not democratically elected, into a dispute for the legitimacy of a democratic process is debatable. But the very existence of an independent judiciary as a mediator of disputes and an arm that upholds the fairness of the law with impartiality, makes the judiciary the most suitable arbitrator for electoral disputes. Using qualitative desk-based research methodology, this chapter connects with the theoretical framework of the separation of powers. It analyses the centrality of the judiciary in public disputes especially those affecting the very concept of democracy and separation of powers. Ultimately, the judiciary upholds the law, preventing self-help in electoral disputes which can deteriorate into protracted disputes or civil war. From our analysis of the Zimbabwean electoral disputes, we recommend the simplification of the election petition process, the alignment of electoral laws with the Constitution, the total independence of the judiciary and the non-partisan approach to electoral dispute resolution.

The dynamic quality of protracted intra‐state conflicts is a factor that complicates and sometimes confounds the efforts of peacemakers. Building on this insight, and given the prevalence of conflicts of this type in the contemporary international system, this paper takes up a central question: how can peacemakers adapt to changing dynamics along the parameters of a protracted intra‐state conflict in order to cultivate effective resolution of the conflict? Inspired by the theme of this special issue on new diplomacy in new conflicts, this paper draws on and modifies the concepts of ‘adaptive peacemaking’ and ‘adaptive peacebuilding’ (de Coning, 2018; Okulski, 2017) in order to provide a heuristic device for evaluating peacemaking efforts within protracted intra‐state conflicts. In that vein, this paper examines third‐party mediation within the setting of the second Sudanese civil war through the lens of a modified adaptive peacemaking approach. The resulting analysis allows for a conceptual and empirical assessment of the prospects as well as the perils of ‘adaptive peacemaking’ within the context of protracted civil wars.

As the cradle of different civilizations, located at the trade and geopolitical cross-roads between Europe and Asia, the Black Sea subregion has been, since ancient times, a place where people of different nationalities, traditions, cultures and religions lived together and intermingled. Historically, the Black Sea basin has been known for efforts to build bridges, establish rapprochement among neighbouring — and often conflicting — nations, and develop mutually beneficial trade relations and contacts. The famous Silk Road, for centuries, linked the countries of Europe and Asia. Consequently, extensive and useful experience of trade exchange, cohabitation and mutual enrichment between different cultures and beneficial contacts among neighbouring peoples have been established and nurtured. This process, however, has never been an easy and simple one: periods of intensive trade relations, peace and tranquillity were followed by mutual misperceptions and tensions, protracted conflicts and destructive wars. In particular, for many decades after the Second World War, the atmosphere and political climate in the Black Sea subregion were characterized by mutual suspicions and mistrust between the countries belonging to the two opposing political and military blocs divided by the Iron Curtain. With the end of the Cold War in the last decade of the twentieth century, the countries of the subregion have at last won a new chance to revive the cooperative spirit of the area.

Africa is rife with sectional discontents which metamorphose into protracted conflicts, civil wars, and terrorism. With forlorn hopes of survival in the system and without a say in the constitution building process, disgruntled groups easily cloak their political and socio-economic dissatisfaction with ethnicity, religious or similar identities in order to arouse group affection. At present, Nigeria is at the brink of disintegration as a result of this problem. The country has witnessed about six constitutional arrangements since independence. Yet, the clamour for a new constitution remains constant and, invariably, influenced the convening of the 2014 National Constitutional Conference in the country. Since constitution building provides a good opportunity for the citizens and groups to enshrine their wishes in the instrument of governance and thereby preventing the degeneration of grievances into conflict, questions have continued to arise. Does the constitution making process in Nigeria involve the people for whom the laws are meant for? Are the leaders mindful of the peace potentials of constitution building? This paper seeks to ascertain the extent to which the citizens were involved in the making of the previous constitutions in Nigeria. It projects the view that the failures of the past attempts and the prevalent identity conflicts in Nigeria are attributable to non-adherence to the basic principles of the indispensable people-oriented process of constitution building.

This article contributes to debates on the politics of European Union (EU) enlargement to the Western Balkans (WB) in the 2020s. During the 2010s, the enlargement process stalled due to a lack of progress on the EU’s fundamental requirements of ‘rule of law’ and ‘democracy’. Since 2022, Russia’s protracted war against Ukraine suggests that geopolitical considerations have become more important in the politics of EU enlargement. In order to overcome the enlargement impasse, the EU has recently proposed a gradual approach to integration, particularly with regard to market integration, which is to be facilitated by a new growth plan for the Western Balkans. This article argues that this ‘carrot’ and greater flexibility in general are intended to re-legitimise the EU-WB relationship. The EU can demonstrate its ongoing commitment to the region in a political process that remains open-ended, while WB governments can benefit from new opportunities and new budgets. Despite the ‘new momentum’ in EU enlargement policies, I argue that Serbian political discourse and action have become more violent in recent years and that a negligence of the security needs of the most fragile WB states has the power to derail the enlargement process. Reinforced commitments to KFOR and EUFOR Althea as well as reinvigorated EU assistance efforts in the fundamental requirements are needed to make full WB EU membership eventually happen.

Preface Pronunciation Guide Chapter 1: Definitions of Genocides and Ethnic Cleansing Chapter 2: Heritage of Horrors Chapter 3: Balkan Wars 1912-1913: An Unrecognized Genocide The Carnegie Commission's Conclusion Epilogue: World War I as the Third Balkan War Greek-Turkish Wars Chapter 4 - Multiple Genocides of World War II: Western Balkans Preliminary Philosophical and Theological Concerns Genocide in the Independent State of Genocidal Aspects of Italian Occupational Authorities in Yugoslav Lands Slovenia Bosnia and Herzegovina Chapter 5: Multiple Genocides in World War II: Northeastern and Central Balkans Belgrade and Serbia Proper Backa and Baranja Under Hungarian Occupation The Fate of the Yugoslav Army's Jewish POWs Montenegro Albania and Kosovo Massacres and Ethnic Cleansing by Cetniks Genocide Against Romas (Gypsies) Chapter 6: Multiple Genocides in World War II: Southeastern Balkans Bulgarian Jews Not Deported to Death Camps Macedonia Greece under German, Italian, and Bulgarian Occupation Chapter 7: Retaliatory Genocide against Wartime Enemies Genocide of Yugoslavia's Ethnic Germans Massacres of Hungarians Ethnic Cleansing of Italians Bleiburg and the Fate of Ustase and Other Militaries Collaborating with the Axis Chapter 8: Ethnic Cleansing during Yugoslavia's Wars of Disintegration in the 1990s The Context Contentious Analytical Issues Chapter 9: War in Croatia Overview of the War Was it Genocide and/or Ethnic Cleansing? Chapter 10: War in Bosnia and Herzegovina Problems Leading to the War Major Events of the War The Horrors of Ethnic Cleansing The Srebrenica Genocide Genocidal Rape Did Genocide Occur in Bosnia and Herzagovina? Appendix Chapter 11: Protracted War and Conflict in Kosovo Overview of Serbian-Albanian Relationships in Kosovo, 1945-1999 Overview of the War, 1999 Destruction of Serbian Orthodox Holy Places Ethnic Cleansing in Reverse Did Genocide and/or Ethnic Cleansing Occur? Chapter 12: International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia Chapter 13-Onward into the Twenty-first Century: A Postscript Threat of Genocide Averted in Macedonia Prospects for the Balkan Time Line Notes Bibliography Index About the Author