Mushrooms, cranes, and the fear of planetary destruction: exploring children’s imaginaries of war and nuclear anxiety

Nuclear anxiety, which refers to the fear of nuclear war and its consequences, is expected to increase amid the Russian–Ukrainian War of 2022 (RUW-22). This study aimed to evaluate the prevalence of nuclear anxiety and its associated variables among university students in the Czech Republic during the first weeks of RUW-22. A cross-sectional survey-based study was carried out from March–April 2022, utilizing a digital self-administered questionnaire (SAQ) to collect data from the target population. The SAQ consisted of multiple-choice items inquiring about demographic characteristics; generalized anxiety symptoms using generalized anxiety disorder-7 (GAD-7); depressive symptoms using patient health questionnaire-9 (PHQ-9); and attitudes towards civilian uses of nuclear power, and nuclear war-related anxiety. Of the 591 participating students, 67.7% were females, 68.2% were Czech nationals, and 61.8% followed the RUW-22 news at least once daily. The mean GAD-7 score of our participants was 7.86 ± 5.32 (0–21); and their mean PHQ-9 score was 8.66 ± 6.29 (0–27). Regarding the civilian uses of nuclear power, most participants agreed that nuclear power was safe (64.5%), denied being afraid that civilian use of nuclear power might deteriorate their health (79.7%), and thought that public acceptance was important for building new nuclear power plants (56.9%). About 42.1% and 45.5% of the participants reported feeling depressed at the possibility of nuclear war and agreed that the chances that there would be a nuclear war in their lifetime were very high, respectively. When asked about their preparedness measures during the previous four weeks, less than one quarter (23.9%) reported looking for recommendations for protection against nuclear accidents, and less than one-fifth (19.3%) were looking for the nearest bomb shelter. The depression about nuclear war possibility was positively and relatively strongly correlated with the level of “feeling concerned about the RUW-22” (rs = 0.401), and it was moderately correlated with GAD-7 (rs = 0.377) and PHQ-9 (rs = 0.274) scores and weakly correlated with RUW-2-related news-following frequency (rs = 0.196). Within the limitations of the present study, nuclear anxiety was common among Czech university students. Its associated factors may include but are not limited to the female gender; common psychological disorders such as generalized anxiety and depression; RUW-22-related news following-frequency; and the level of “feeling concerned”.

Theoretical speculation has been raised that living in a world potentially compromised by nuclear war and nuclear power plant accidents affects psychosocial development and may result in various types of dysfunction. This study examines the associations between nuclear anxiety and problems experienced in seven general areas of life. These areas include drug problems, psychosomatic complaints, relationship problems, emotional distress, work problems, health problems, and family problems. To control for spurious or confounding effects, the influences of social conformity and social resources were controlled. Data were obtained from 739 young adults, and latent-variable analyses were used to address these issues. Nuclear anxiety was moderately related to psychosomatic complaints and emotional distress, modestly related to subjective perceptions of health and family problems, and was not associated with drug problems, relationship problems, and work problems. Although this cross-sectional data cannot determin...

That a full-scale war would emotionally devastate any surviving segment of the population is virtually indisputable; Lifton & Erikson suggest that the survivors would not envy so much as resemble the dead [1]. In recent years, scientists, politicians, and the media have focused on the more subtle problem of whether the threatthe persistent possibility of war in the near or distant futureaffects mental health as well. Findings have suggested that nuclear anxiety' ' is widespread , is becoming more predominant , and is harmful to mental health. This paper examines the meaning of anxiety and explores the above propositions about its breadth and impact. Since 1962 [2-3], researchers have demonstrated that large proportions of American and other populations are concerned about the threat of war. (See Eisenbud, Van Hoorn, & Gould [4] or Van Hoorn1 for reviews of domestic and international research.) Reviews of survey data indicate that anxiety has become increasingly widespread [5]; in December 1983 the Gallup survey listed of war/international problems as the nation's major fear [6]. One widely cited trend has been reported by the Monitoring the Future project, based on its

Researchers have reported that 45–50% of American and European youth aged 10‐19 worry about the negative impact of nuclear war on their lives. For some, the fear of nuclear war was associated with troubling feelings of sadness, powerlessness, and rage. Fearing they have no future, many teens rated fear of nuclear war as their second greatest worry. However, research has not identified those children or adolescents who are at high risk for nuclear anxiety (NA) or the impact of NA and developmental problems. Young Americans, who do not mention nuclear anxiety unless asked about it, were less optimistic and less knowledgeable about nuclear war than Soviet youth. Theory, implications for assessment, interventions, and research related to NA are examined.

Concern about the risk of nuclear war has sparked interest in the psychology of the nuclear arms race. This paper reviews recent work in this area and develops a model linking the threat of nuclear weaponry, resultant anxiety, and psychological defence mechanisms employed by the managers of the arms race. The role of psychological defences implicit in military and political social systems is emphasized. Primitive or narcissistic defences found at both individual and group levels are maladaptive as they increase rather than decrease the risk of nuclear conflict. Psychological approaches to crisis management and conflict resolution require development and application to this problem.

These remarks constitute a “perspective” and are not meant as a critique of Professor Richard Cooper's chapter. My perspective is that of the student of international politics, the true “dismal science,” since the repeal of the Iron Law of Wages and the development of new technologies of destruction and oppression that strengthen the hands of repressive governments – and terrorists – around the world. This may be a dismal way to begin my commentary. But putting matters this way suggests an initial perspective on Professor Cooper's chapter. The risks with which Professor Cooper is concerned all have their origins in actions that would directly affect economic transactions of specific types – foreign exchange dealings, debt repayments, and trade in manufactured goods and in oil. Political-military risks, most notably, the risk of nuclear war and of a continually accelerating arms race, are not considered. Yet in the past, the world economy has been disrupted by war as well as depression, as the experience of World War I suggests. And in the present state of Soviet–American relations, the risks of nuclear war and of an escalating arms race should not be underestimated. The chief military advisor to the National Security Council declared in October 1981 that the Soviet Union had achieved military superiority, was “on the move,” and was “going to strike” ( New York Times , Oct. 21, 1981). Earlier that same month, the president of the United States suggested that a tactical nuclear war was possible in Europe without, perhaps, leading to a nuclear exchange between the superpowers.

Although fears about nuclear war and power plant accidents have been linked to psychological distress, these associations have all been cross-sectional or anecdotal and thus no causal inferences can be drawn. To examine possible bi-directional influences, prospective data were obtained at two time points separated by two months from a group of 94 young adult university students. At both assessments, participants completed the Nuclear Attitudes Questionnaire (that assesses four related dimensions of Nuclear Anxiety) and the Symptom Checklist 53 (that captures nine types of psychopathology generally reflecting Emotional Distress). Cross-lagged latent variable structural equation models were used to analyze the data. Results indicated that latent constructs of Emotional Distress and Nuclear Anxiety were quite stable over time, were modestly related to each other at the first time period, and had no cross-lagged effects between each other (as latent constructs) over time. Specific across-time relationships were evaluated with nonstandard paths (that include measured variables) and revealed several significant effects. More paranoid ideation increased nuclear support and more Emotional Distress reduced nuclear denial. On the other hand, more nuclear support reduced anxiety, reduced somatization, and increased psychoticism, whereas nuclear concern increased Emotional Distress. Theoretical implications of these results are discussed.

In the 1980s, many medical organizations identified the prevention of nuclear war as one of the medical profession's most important goals. An assessment of the current danger is warranted given the radically changed context of the post-Cold War era. We reviewed the recent literature on the status of nuclear arsenals and the risk of nuclear war. We then estimated the likely medical effects of a scenario identified by leading experts as posing a serious danger: an accidental launch of nuclear weapons. We assessed possible measures to reduce the risk of such an event. U.S. and Russian nuclear-weapons systems remain on a high-level alert status. This fact, combined with the aging of Russian technical systems, has recently increased the risk of an accidental nuclear attack. As a conservative estimate, an accidental intermediate-sized launch of weapons from a single Russian submarine would result in the deaths of 6,838,000 persons from firestorms in eight U.S. cities. Millions of other people would probably be exposed to potentially lethal radiation from fallout. An agreement to remove all nuclear missiles from high-level alert status and eliminate the capability of a rapid launch would put an end to this threat. The risk of an accidental nuclear attack has increased in recent years, threatening a public health disaster of unprecedented scale. Physicians and medical organizations should work actively to help build support for the policy changes that would prevent such a disaster.

Against the backdrop of a rapidly changing security environment in East Asia, regional actors have seen a surge in “nuclear anxiety”. Worries among citizens of US allies and partners about rising nuclear threats and nuclear proliferation risks critically shape US foreign policy in East Asia. This paper thus asks: What drives nuclear anxiety in East Asia? And how can the United States most effectively resolve it? We situate nuclear anxiety in the dynamics of abandonment and entrapment that exist between allied states, as well as in the unique regional security structure, or the hub-and-spoke system in East Asia. To better understand the implications of nuclear anxiety on regional nuclear policy, we analyze the results of an original survey conducted in June 2023 across Washington’s five allies and partners in East Asia: Australia, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. The survey results suggest the presence of the dynamics of both nuclear entrapment and abandonment among these regional actors, as well as mixed interests in indigenous nuclear programs. In addition, we demonstrate how citizens of East Asia evaluate possible policy options that could help Washington mitigate regional nuclear anxiety.

This May, the World Health Assembly (WHA) will vote on re-establishing a mandate for the World Health Organization (WHO) to address the health consequences of nuclear weapons and war (1). Health professionals and their associations should urge their governments to support such a mandate and support the new UN comprehensive study on the effects of nuclear war.The first atomic bomb exploded in the New Mexico desert 80 years ago, in July 1945. Three weeks later, two relatively small (by today's standards), tactical-size nuclear weapons unleashed a cataclysm of radioactive incineration on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. By the end of 1945, about 213,000 people were dead (2). Tens of thousands more have died from late effects of the bombings.Last December, Nihon Hidankyo, a movement that brings together atomic bomb survivors, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for its “efforts to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons and for demonstrating through witness testimony that nuclear weapons must never be used again” (3). For the Norwegian Nobel Committee, the award validated the most fundamental human right: the right to live. The Committee warned that the menace of nuclear weapons is now more urgent than ever before. In the words of Committee Chair Jørgen Watne Frydnes, "it is naive to believe our civilisation can survive a world order in which global security depends on nuclear weapons. The world is not meant to be a prison in which we await collective annihilation." (4) He noted that our survival depended on keeping intact the “nuclear taboo” (which stigmatises the use of nuclear weapons as morally unacceptable) (5).The nuclear taboo gains strength from recognition of compelling evidence of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear war, its severe global climatic and famine consequences, and the impossibility of any effective humanitarian response. This evidence contributed significantly to ending the Cold War nuclear arms race (6-7).While the numbers of nuclear weapons are down to 12,331 now, from their 1986 peak of 70,300 (8), this is still equivalent to 146,605 Hiroshima bombs (9), and does not mean humanity is any safer (10). Even a fraction of the current arsenal could decimate the biosphere in a severe mass extinction event. The global climate disruption caused by the smoke pouring from cities ignited by just 2% of the current arsenal could result in over two billion people starving (11).A worldwide nuclear arms race is underway. Deployed nuclear weapons are increasing again, and China, India, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia and UK are all enlarging their arsenals. An estimated 2,100 nuclear warheads in France, Russia, UK, US and, for the first time, also in China, are on high alert, ready for launch within minutes (8). With disarmament in reverse, extensive nuclear modernisations underway, multiple arms control treaties abrogated without replacement, no disarmament negotiations in evidence, nuclear-armed Russia and Israel engaged in active wars involving repeated nuclear threats, Russia and the US deploying nuclear weapons to additional states, and widespread use of cyberwarfare, the risk of nuclear war is widely assessed to be greater than ever. This year the Doomsday Clock was moved the closest to midnight since the Clock's founding in 1947 (10).

In early 1983, members of Stanford University's Center for International Security and Arms Control met to discuss ideas on the establishment of a joint U.S.‐U.S.S.R. center to support cooperative efforts to prevent accidental nuclear war. William Perry (former Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering) began the discussion by outlining several measures he felt could help to reduce the risk of nuclear war by accident or miscalculation. Calling attention to the earlier proposals of Senators Gary Hart, Sam Nunn, and Henry Jackson, he endorsed the concept of a joint accidental nuclear war prevention center as a mechanism to support efforts of the two superpowers to prevent or reduce the likelihood of the outbreak of nuclear war. Most notable in this regard was his personal experience of an erroneous warning of a large‐scale Soviet missile attack on the U.S., which resulted from a NORAD computer malfunction. Information exchanges and consultation to clarify circumstances surrounding an accident ‐...

Most physicians do not see, or learn to see, nuclear war threat mitigation as within the scope of their professional duties. This commentary on a case argues there are 2 reasons why physicians, in particular, should draw on their unique training and expertise in medicine to help avert nuclear war: the risk of nuclear war and therefore the risk of catastrophic community, domestic, and global health consequences is presently high; and physicians today can draw on a strong history of past physicians' nuclear disarmament advocacy strategies. This commentary concludes by canvassing how those past strategies can best be applied today.

Nuclear psychology, which began with the very best of intentions is, according to this article, doomed to failure and perpetual irrelevance unless it begins to take what the author refers to as a phenomenological approach to the subject. So far, too much attention has been given to "off-the-shelf' models derived from the psychological clinic and laboratory, and too little attention has been given to the actual perspective of nuclear policy makers, who are the people psychologists must influence if they hope to reduce the risk of a catastrophic nuclear war. The author attributes this trend to positivism, the belief that psychology is a natural science rather than one of the humanities. In his view, if psychologists wish to reduce nuclear risks, they must get more fully inside the viewpoints of policymakers, they must assume policymakers' roles at least in their imaginations, and only then will they come up with proposals that will make sense to the policy-making community. There are two requirements: (1) to obtain a greater understanding of what policymakers' thoughts and feelings are about during nuclear crises-those episodes when nuclear risks have been greatest, and (2) to know what it actually is like to have such thoughts and feelings at moments when the fate of the world is believed to be at stake. Importantly, this leads, or ought to lead, psychologists to the study of the Cuban missile crisis, the closest call by far to nuclear war between the superpowers. There is a great deal to be learned about the psychological reality of that moment of maximum nuclear danger in October, 1962. The author illustrates his argument with a literary metaphor drawn from John LeCarre 's The Little Drummer Girl. "She's panicked," Litvak announced suddenly to Becker's back. Puzzled, Becker turned and glanced at him. "She's gone over to them," Litvak insisted. His voice had a throaty instability. Becker returned to the window. "Part of her has gone over, part has stayed," he replied. "That is what we asked of her." "She's gone over!" Litvak repeated, rising on the swell of his own provocation. "It's happened with agents before. It's happened now... So what's her motivation? She's not Jewish. She's not anything. She's theirs. Forget her..." From the shallows of his sparse camp bed, Kurtz offered drowsy consolation. "Germany makes you jumpy Shimon. Ease off. What does it matter who she belongs to, so long as she keeps showing us the way?" (LeCarre, 1983)

Assessment of the clinical value of (18)F-FDG-PET for detection of recurrent head and neck cancer, local lymph node involvement and distant metastases comparing a qualitative visual with a semiquantitative analysis (SUV values). Retrospective evaluation of 73 (18)F-FDG PET studies in 55 patients by use of a four-step qualitative visual grading system and calculation of standard uptake values in pathological lesions. Calculation of SUV values in normal regions for generating a map of physiological (18)F-FDG distribution. Correlation to histopathological findings and clinical follow-up. 1. Qualitative visual analysis of (18)F-FDG PET studies: a) local recurrence sensitivity 79%, specificity 97%, positive predictive value 95%, negative predictive value 85%, and diagnostic accuracy 89%; b) local metastatic lymph nodes 100%, 95%, 85%, 100%, 96%; c) distant metastases 100%, 98%, 86%, 100%, 98%, respectively. 2. Semiquantitative analysis had only little incremental, non-significant value in comparison to qualitative visual analysis for the detection of a local recurrence in two patients: a) local recurrence: sensitivity 83%, specificity 100%, positive predictive value 100%, negative predictive value 88%, and diagnostic accuracy 93%; b) local metastatic lymph nodes or c) distant metastases did not change in comparison to qualitative visual analysis. (18)F-FDG PET is an effective tool for re-staging of patients with suspected recurrence after therapy for head and neck cancer.

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