Abstract
Ratings enable the information asymmetry existing in the issuer-investor relationship to be reduced, particularly for issues with a high degree of complexity, as in the case of securitizations. However, there may be a serious conflict of interest between the issuer's choice and remuneration of the agency and the credit rating awarded, resulting in lower quality and information power of the published rating. In this paper, we propose an explicative model of the number of ratings requested, by analyzing the relevance of the number of ratings to measure the reliability, where multirating is shown to be associated with the quality, size, liquidity and the degree of information asymmetry relating to the issue. Thus, we consider that the regulatory changes that foster the widespread publication of simultaneous ratings could help to alleviate the problem of rating model arbitrage and the crisis of confidence in credit ratings in general, and in the securitization issues in particular.
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